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    1  Introduction  1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The completion of this monograph falls in a period where the accession talks 
between Poland and the European Union (EU) have reached their final stage. 
One of the last and most difficult issues to be settled concerned the agricultural 
sector and the extent to which the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU 
will come into force on the first day of Poland’s EU membership. Regardless of 
the precise conditions under which Poland will join the EU, there is a wide-
spread agreement that the development problems of Polish agriculture will re-
main on top of the economic and political agenda for the years to come. The ob-
jective of the first subchapter is to introduce into these problem-areas and to ac-
quaint the reader with some of the structural weaknesses of the farm sector in 
Poland, notably its low productivity, the low investment level in agriculture, and 
the limited progress in structural change. A frequently cited reason for the dis-
satisfactory performance of the sector is farmers’ insufficient access to credit. 
Indeed, government action on rural credit markets has figured prominently over 
recent years, primarily in the form of interest subsidies. Subchapter 1.2 gives an 
overview of recent public measures. Drawing on this background information, 
subchapter 1.3 introduces the notion of credit rationing which will serve as the 
leitmotif and major analytical concept throughout the monograph. Based on this, 
the central research questions of the study are presented. The following subchap-
ter 1.4 briefly summarises the main controversies of the scientific debate on the 
topic and attempts to identify the borders of current wisdom. The final subchap-
ter 1.5 provides an overview of the subsequent analysis. 
1.1  Current development problems of the Polish farm sector 
In this subchapter I wish to outline a number of key development problems of 
agriculture in Poland, based on official statistics. It is intended to highlight the 
main structural weaknesses of the sector in an economic perspective and thus to 
provide a motivation for the further research in this study. 
I focus on three problem areas which I will attempt to illustrate by statistical in-
formation: 
1.  the comparatively low productivity of farms, 
2.  the low level of investment in the agricultural sector, and 
3.  the limited progress in farm growth implying slow structural change. 2   1  Introduction 
Figure 1-1:   Yields of selected agricultural products 1989-2002 (Poland in 

























Notes:  Wheat and potatoes as yield per ha, milk as annual yield per cow. Data for 2002 is 
provisional. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on FAO (2003). 
Figure 1-1 compares annual average yields in Poland with the aggregate current 
members of the EU over 1989-2002. The figure includes data for wheat, pota-
toes, and milk, three major products of Polish agriculture. All yields range be-
tween 40 and 70 percent of the EU reference, and are thus clearly below the EU 
average over the whole period. Apart from a significant decline between 1989 
and 1992, wheat and potatoes show no distinct trend and the relation to the EU 
standard is subject to notable annual fluctuations. In contrast, milk yields stead-
ily converged with EU figures since 1995.
1 Milk yields were at 73 percent of the 
EU average in 2002. Overall, agricultural productivity for the three key products 
shown is substantially below the EU average. A similar picture could be drawn 
for many other agricultural products. It is highly unlikely that this productivity 
gap is the result of differing natural conditions (PETRICK et al. 2002, p. 207). 
                                           
1   In an instructive cross-methodological comparison of measures of competitiveness, 
FROHBERG (2000, p. 59) finds that Poland’s livestock production indeed tends to outper-
form its plant production in terms of international competitiveness.     1.1 Current development problems of the Polish farm sector  3   
Figure 1-2:   Investment in the agricultural sector compared with all sec-




















Notes:  Indices in constant prices. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GUS (2002 and earlier issues). 
Figure 1-2 illustrates the development of investment outlays in agriculture as 
compared with all sectors of the Polish economy between 1989 and 2001. 
Whereas investment expenditures in constant prices of all sectors more than 
doubled between 1989 and 2000, investment in agriculture stagnated at about 30 
percent of its 1989 value since 1992. Only in 2001, also overall investment de-
clined. Compared with the initial situation at the beginning of the political re-
form period, modernisation and growth in agriculture has hence lagged far be-
hind the rest of the economy. Taking into account the fact that agriculture was 
among the most undercapitalised sectors already during socialism, this result is 
even more remarkable. 4   1  Introduction 



















Notes:  Individual farms according to amount of land cultivated. 
Source:  GUS (2001, p. 27). 
The importance of different size classes within the group of individual farms in 
Poland is displayed in Figure 1-3. Individual farms in the definition of the Cen-
tral Statistical Office of Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS) comprise 
privately owned farms cultivating more than one hectare of land (GUS 2002, p. 
342). This is the currently predominant farm type in Poland (see PETRICK 2001, 
pp. 9-13). Here I neglect regional differences, which are illustrated in more de-
tail in section 3.2.1 below. A general impression from the figure is the over-
whelming importance of small-scale farms in Poland. Over the entire decade, 
more than 50 percent of all holdings registered as individual farms cultivated 
less than 5 ha, and more than 80 percent cultivated less than 10 ha. Furthermore, 
Figure 1-3 shows that, between 1990 and 1996, there was a slight increase in the 
groups of farms smaller than 2 ha and larger than 15 ha at the cost of medium-
sized farms. Between 1996 and 1998, the share of size classes remained almost 
stable. Only between 1998 and 2000, there was again a very slight increase in 
the smallest and largest farm size classes. Overall, to the extent that it mani-
fested in changes of land resources per farm, there was virtually no structural 
change in the Polish farming sector since the beginning of reforms in 1990. In 
addition, the minimal changes visible in the statistics show no uniform shift to-    1.1 Current development problems of the Polish farm sector  5   
wards larger farm sizes. On the contrary, the importance of the smallest farm 
size class even increased.
2
The structural deficiencies of the Polish farm sector as presented previously go 
hand in hand with a low remuneration of labour in agriculture. Individual farms 
in Poland are usually operated by the labour force of a family. A large number 
of small-scale farms therefore employ a substantial amount of labour, with the 
result of a quite high man/land ratio. Dividing the labour force working on indi-
vidual farms (only full-time workers) by the total amount of land under cultiva-
tion on these farms results in a man/land ratio of 26.7 persons per 100 ha of ag-
ricultural land in 1996.
3 This number is grossly supported by more recent survey 
data on small-scale farms as given in PETRICK et al. (2002, p. 206). The latter 
study also presents a comparison with two German Länder, namely Mecklen-
burg-West Pomerania and Bavaria. The average man/land ratio per farm in these 
regions was 1.31 and 4.17 annual work units per 100 ha, respectively, in 1999.
4 
The tremendous differences imply a remuneration of family labour from agricul-
ture that is thirteen to fifty times lower in Poland than in Germany, depending 
on the regions compared, whereas average salaries across all sectors differ only 
by a factor of five (PETRICK et al. 2002, p. 212). A part of this is attributable to 
the different policy environment in the two countries. Even so, it is clear that 
structural weaknesses of the Polish farm sector are largely responsible for the 
unfavourable economic situation of the agricultural labour force in Poland, both 
in intersectoral and international comparison. Also including part-time workers, 
the labour force living on individual farms made up 21.2 percent of the total Pol-
ish population in working age in 1996.
5 Every fifth adult Pole is hence immedi-
ately affected by the situation in the agricultural sector. 
                                           
2   Changes within the group of farms larger than 15 ha are not shown in Figure 1-3, although 
they were significant. In particular, formerly state-managed collective farms were broken 
up during the transition period, which led to a decline in the average farm size and hence 
an increase in the number of farms larger than 15 ha (see section 3.2.1). 
3   This calculation is based on agricultural census data given in GUS (2001, pp. 28; 62). The 
number of full-time workers on individual farms was 3,723.4 thousand, the area under cul-
tivation 13,972 ths. ha in 1996. 
4   One annual work unit equals the labour input of one adult person employed full time over 
the whole year. 
5  GUS (2001) reports that there were 4,843.7 ths. persons employed on individual farms 
(full-time plus part-time) in 1996 (p. 62). The total number of persons in working age in 
the same year was 22,820.0 (men and women, p. 57). 6   1  Introduction 
Solving the structural problems of Polish agriculture is therefore of utmost po-
litical importance. But how can these deficiencies be tackled? It has been a 
widely held view among economists and politicians that farmers’ limited access 
to finance is one of the major obstacles to a more favourable development of the 
farm sector in Poland. Right from the outset of market reforms in Poland, ex-
perts stressed the crucial role of credit access. Supply of working capital was 
regarded as decisive for maintaining sufficient levels of input use and hence se-
curing or even increasing productivity levels in agriculture (DEQUIN 1990, p. 
488). Furthermore, it was pointed out that worsened availability of long-term 
loans led to a sharp decline in agricultural investment (KOWALSKI 1993, pp. 350; 
353). At the same time, access to investment finance was seen as a precondition 
for modernisation and growth of farms (DEQUIN 1990, pp. 487-488). 
A vivid picture of credit shortages in the Polish peasant farm sector in the early 
1990’s was drawn by ZBIERSKI-SALAMEH (1999, pp. 194-196). According to this 
author, farmers’ credit needs to finance current production or even investment 
were largely frustrated due to poorly designed official assistance, a lack of man-
agement skills to draw sophisticated business plans, or the fact that credit access 
was tied to personal connections with former socialist authorities. The following 
passage summarises the author’s impression (p. 196): 
“Despite the government’s programmatic commitment to modernize and restruc-
ture agriculture – specifically its preferred private subsector – few financial re-
sources were extended to peasants for renewal of their production cycle, and 
none were offered for expanding and modernizing their farms. For expansion 
and modernization, peasants were expected to generate their own funds through 
increased productivity (which the other constraints precluded).” 
ZBIERSKI-SALAMEH suggests that this lack of credit had three major implications 
for farm households (1999, pp. 204-205): (a) distress sales of land to ensure fi-
nancial liquidity, (b) increased efforts to find off-farm employment, and (c) a 
general extensivation of production by switching to what she calls ‘closed-cycle 
production’, which means a minimum of market integration. Since smallholders 
had pursued extensive production anyway and large-scale farmers probably still 
faced the most favourable credit access, particularly medium-sized farms (7 to 
15 hectares) were hit by credit shortages. Subsequent land sales led to a frag-
mentation of medium-sized farms and an increase in the number of smaller and 
larger farms, as reported in Figure 1-3 for the period 1990-1995. 
A decade after the beginning of transition, analysts still suggested that lack of 
credit may significantly restrict productivity enhancement and structural change 
in Polish agriculture. MOOSBURGER et al. (1999, p. 364) argue that a well-    1.2 Policy action on rural credit markets in Poland  7   
targeted, governmentally supported credit supply could ease the implementation 
of profitable farm investment. A similar position is taken by CZERWIŃSKA-
KAYZER (2000, pp. 6-7). WOŚ (1999, p. 7) contends that 80 percent of Polish 
farmers cannot afford self-financing of farm growth, which implies that funds 
have to come from external sources. 
In the early 1990’s, farmers’ protests increasingly put the government authori-
ties under pressure to intervene on rural credit markets. It may be noted that the 
‘Samoobrona’-movement (‘Self-Defense’), which was among the leaders of the 
anti-EU campaign in Poland, originated as a group of commercially oriented ag-
ricultural producers with high debt liabilities.
6 In the sequel, substantial meas-
ures were undertaken by the Polish government to improve the supply of funds 
to the farm sector. Government action culminated in the establishment of the 
Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (Agencja Restruk-
turyzacji i Modernizacji Rolnictwa, ARiMR) in 1994, which since then has the 
task of channelling preferential credits into the sector. The following subchapter 
will describe in more detail the governmental credit policy in rural Poland. 
1.2  Policy action on rural credit markets in Poland  
The major form of state intervention on rural credit markets in Poland is the ex-
tension of preferential loans to agricultural producers.
7 Borrowers pay only a 
part of the commercial interest rate, whereas the remainder is paid by the gov-
ernment. There is hence a subsidy on interest rates. A second form of interven-
tion is by loan guarantees. However, the budgetary importance of the latter is 
small as compared with the subsidies (less than one tenth). Furthermore, guaran-
tees are primarily used for specific price stabilisation schemes, and are almost 
exclusively granted to farms in the public sector (at least until 1996, according 
to CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX 1997, pp. 18-19). I therefore focus mostly on the 
interest subsidy programme in the following. 
Since 1994, preferential credits have been handed out by the Agency for Re-
structuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARiMR), which in the following 
years provided more than 30 different credit lines for various purposes 
                                           
6   The Samoobrona was founded by Andrzej LEPPER, a farmer from the Northeast of Poland 
who allegedly accumulated interest liabilities of close to 1 billion zł on a loan of 280 mil-
lion zł (ZBIERSKI-SALAMEH 1999, p. 219). 
7    Overviews of credit market intervention in Polish agriculture are provided by 
CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX (1997, pp. 17-20), POGANIETZ and WILDERMUTH (1999), and 
CZERWIŃSKA-KAYZER (2000). 8   1  Introduction 
(CZERWIŃSKA-KAYZER 2000, p. 9). These credit lines comprised loans for work-
ing capital, basic investment, land purchases, investments by young and begin-
ning farmers, sector programs (milk, cattle, poultry, etc.), loans to resume farm 
production, loans to restructure debts, and also loans to create non-farm jobs in 
urban and municipal areas (CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX 1997, p. 18). Special 
credit schemes aiming at market stabilisation for agricultural products included 
subsidised credit for cereal purchases and commodity loans for large farmers 
who store their harvest. The government apparently aimed at targeting the dif-
ferent credit lines by varying the volume and the extent of subsidisation 
(POGANIETZ and WILDERMUTH 1999, p. 537). The different credit lines are 
grouped into the two major categories “working capital” and “investment”. In 
1999, the last year covered by the detailed farm-level analysis below, subsidies 
on working capital loans amounted to 423 mln. zł, whereas investment loans 
were supported by 771 mln. zł (OECD 2000, pp. 106-107). Not regarding ex-
penses for the farmers’ social insurance fund, these payments made up 38 per-
cent of the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Min-
isterstwo Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi, MRiRW) (see MRIRW 2000).  
In 1999, preferential interest rates were in part lower than 6 percent p.a. (see sec-
tion 4.2.2). In the same year, the rediscount rate for commercial bank loans was 
between 13.9 and 24.4 percent (NBP 2000). The inflation rate was at 7.3 percent 
(GUS 2000). Interest subsidies hence led to a substantial reduction of interest 
costs for farmers, even implying negative real interest rates. 
Preferential loans under the government programme are extended through the 
existing network of banks. In Poland, there are two types of lending organisa-
tions specialised on agriculture, namely the Bank for Food Economy (Bank Go-
spodarki Żywnościowej, BGŻ), and the system of cooperative banks (KLANK 
1999). However, preferential credits can also be received via almost all of the 
commercial banks in Poland. The BGŻ was the primary channel for financing 
state-managed agriculture during the socialist period, which implied that the 
bank inherited quite a number of bad loans in the course of market reforms. 
Similar to other formerly state-owned banks in Poland, there were several at-
tempts to comprehensively restructure or liquidate the BGŻ during the past dec-
ade. However, this was successfully blocked, inter alia by agricultural lobby 
groups. Local cooperative banks had often been founded prior to the second 
World War, and existed under the umbrella of the BGŻ during socialism. In 
1990, most of them left the BGŻ in order to form regionally oriented coopera-
tive banking structures (WENZELER 1999, pp. 128-129; 196-200). Even so, their 
reconsolidation has remained incomplete to date. Furthermore, KHITARISHVILI     1.2 Policy action on rural credit markets in Poland  9   
(2000) provides evidence based on a stochastic frontier analysis that the effi-
ciency of Polish cooperative banks lags behind international standards. Whereas 
the general privatisation and liberalisation activities in the Polish banking sector 
have proven largely successful (RUTKOWSKA 1998, p. 66), agricultural banking 
is still an exception. Recent years have seen a general decrease of the importance 
of the traditional rural financial institutions (BGŻ and cooperative banks), 
whereas commercial banks – partly backed by foreign investors – expanded into 
rural areas (KLANK 1999, p. 41). 
The procedure for obtaining loans is as follows. Prospective borrowers have to 
submit a loan application at a local bank branch, together with a business plan 
describing the envisaged use of the loan. The latter is usually evaluated by the 
public extension service ODR (Ośrodek Doradztwa Rolniczego, Extension Cen-
tre of Agriculture) prior to loan application. The bank then applies for subsidy 
payments at ARiMR. The bank bears the full default risk of the loan and there-
fore is also responsible for screening and monitoring of borrowers as well as 
possible enforcement of repayment or liquidation of collateral (POGANIETZ and 
WILDERMUTH 1999, p. 539). In contrast to other transition countries, mortgaging 
loans is less of a problem because most of the land remained in private property 
during the period of socialism. Accordingly, mortgaging is currently a com-
monly used instrument to collateralise loans (PROSTERMAN and ROLFES 2000, 
pp. 128-129). However, as stressed by KARCZ (1998, p. 96), the reliability or 
reputation of a borrower as indicated by previous punctual repayment of loans is 
at least as important for obtaining credit as is the sufficient availability of collat-
eral. 10   1  Introduction 
Figure 1-4:   Outstanding volume of total and preferential credits in the 





































Notes:  Credit volume as outstanding on 31 December. Monetary values in 1999 prices, us-
ing the consumer price index. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on unpublished data of National Bank of Poland. 
Figure 1-4 depicts the outstanding amount of total and preferential credits in the 
agricultural sector between 1993 and 2002. Monetary values are given in 1999 
prices. The foundation of ARiMR marked the start of a phase of rapid credit ex-
pansion, with growth rates of the preferential credit volume of almost 60 percent 
in 1995 and 1996. In 1997, the volume of subsidised credits reached a peak, 
whereas it declined in the following years. This is consistent with the fact that 
the number of credit lines for agriculture and the volume of public funds ear-
marked for subsidising interest rates were considerably cut down in 1998 
(CZERWIŃSKA-KAYZER 2000, p. 12). Since 2000, the volume of preferential 
credits has been almost stable in real terms. 
In the phase of credit expansion, the share of preferential credits in the total 
credit volume temporarily increased from 53.7 percent in 1994 to 85.9 percent in 
1997, whereas it decreased afterwards. This is evidence for a crowding-out ef-
fect, which means that borrowers turned to the cheaper government loans al-
though they would have also borrowed under fully commercial terms. However, 
it seems that the total amount of credit outstanding was mainly driven by the 
changes in governmentally sponsored credit supply.     1.3 Resulting research questions  11   
Comparing the tremendous shift in credit use as presented in Figure 1-4 with the 
moderate changes in investment outlays as reported in Figure 1-2 suggests that 
the effects of credit expansion on investment were rather dubious. The previ-
ously cited growth rates in credit volume of about 60 percent stand opposite to a 
growth in investment in agriculture of only 11.0 and 29.5 percent in 1995 and 
1996, respectively. In 1997, investment even declined by 4.5 percent as com-
pared with the previous year. Indeed, it appears to be the case that the strong 
public support to credit expansion did not result in a significant mobilisation of 
additional funds for investment. Even worse, POGANIETZ and WILDERMUTH 
(1999, p. 540) provide some evidence that subsidised credit funds were in fact 
diverted to non-productive purposes, for example for renovating residential 
buildings and their technical infrastructure. Significant changes in farm produc-
tivity compared to the EU as a response to increasing credit availability in Po-
land are likewise not visible (Figure 1-1). The only exception might be milk, 
where a slight but steady improvement materialised after 1995. 
The tentative analysis suggests that positive impacts of governmental credit 
market intervention on the structrual problems described in subchapter 1.1 are in 
no way evident. It seems even unclear whether access to credit is in fact the bot-
tleneck which is constraining farming operations to a significant extent. Two 
questions therefore emerge from the preceding discussion, which provide the 
major motivation for this study. First, is there a problem of credit access existing 
in the Polish farm sector, and second, if yes, does the public intervention pro-
gramme contribute to solve this problem? These questions will be taken up in 
the following subchapter. 
1.3  Resulting research questions 
After having unfold the structural weaknesses of Polish agriculture and the ex-
tent of government intervention on credit markets in the previous subchapters, it 
is now possible to explicitly state the research questions that guide this study. 
However, before doing so I want to introduce a major term which will serve as 
the connecting thread throughout the monograph. It is the notion of credit ra-
tioning. This notion abounds in the recent literature on credit market problems, 
particularly in developing and transitional economies, although it is by no means 
used in a uniform way. For the moment, in line with a common sense under-
standing, I simply use credit rationing to describe a situation in which prospec-
tive borrowers cannot obtain as much credit as desired or no credit at all. A more 
detailed examination of the literature and a more precise definition of the term 
will be the subject of subsequent sections (see in particular subchapter 2.1). 12   1  Introduction 
Taking the notion of credit rationing as summarising a potential problem on ru-
ral credit markets in Poland, the central research questions of this study can be 
divided into two broad groups as follows: 
1. Does credit rationing provide an explanation for the structural problems of 
Polish agriculture as outlined in subchapter 1.1? What is the relationship be-
tween credit use and production and investment outcomes in the farm sector?  
2.  Could the prevalence of credit rationing therefore serve as a justification for 
governmental intervention on Poland’s rural financial markets? What can be 
learned with regard to the economic impact of this intervention? 
The two key issues of the following analysis are therefore the search for an ex-
planation of structural deficits and an investigation of the impact of policy 
measures. Both issues may be addressed from at least three directions: 
(a) theoretical reasoning, (b) experience from other countries that had similar 
problems and/or implemented similar policies, and (c) empirical evidence from 
Poland based on the experience made in the country so far. In this monograph, I 
focus on the first and the third of these directions. Direction (c) appears to be a 
most natural way to examine the Polish case. In addition, it seems indispensable 
to try to put the empirical analysis on a solid theoretical fundament, particularly 
since theoretical aspects are less frequently dealt with in empirically oriented 
studies on transitional countries. In contrast, the literature has produced quite 
some (albeit often controversial) knowledge on how rural credit policies worked 
in other countries, so that I confine myself to a brief overview in the following 
subchapter. 
1.4  Controversies in the literature and limitations of current wisdom 
This subchapter aims at giving an overview of the research field and highlight-
ing the border of current wisdom. As introduced previously, I distinguish three 
strands of literature dealing with credit rationing and governmental credit policy, 
namely theory, international experience, and specific research on Poland. As far 
as the first and the third strand are covered, I give only brief introductions which 
are substantiated in later sections of this monograph. 
1.4.1 Theoretical controversies regarding credit rationing 
The traditional assumption of neoclassical economic theory is that markets clear 
and there is no rationing. Any excess demand or supply is eliminated by the ‘in-
visible hand’ of the price mechanism. This stands opposite to real world obser-
vations of, for example, persisting unemployment or credit rationing. Although     1.4 Controversies in the literature and limitations of current wisdom  13   
explanations of these phenomena have been sought and proposed for a long 
time, only recently did economists seriously call into question the general appli-
cability of the standard textbook model to certain types of markets. Drawing on 
pioneers such as AKERLOF (1970), a branch called the ‘economics of informa-
tion’ developed models in which persistent excess demand could be established 
due to an asymmetric distribution of information between market participants. 
With regard to credit rationing, STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) is a frequently men-
tioned paper. 
The major contribution of this branch of literature is the demonstration that 
“contractual arrangements [...], and in this sense ‘institutions’, can be analyzed 
through the use of the basic behavioural hypothesis of neoclassical economics: 
self-interest as expressed by homo oeconomicus. [...] The result is a genuine ex-
tension of the neoclassical standard model” (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1997, p. 
249). Although this can be regarded as an important theoretical progress, the 
implications are less comforting. As soon as information asymmetries are intro-
duced, most of traditional welfare analysis breaks down. As shown by 
GREENWALD and STIGLITZ (1986), in economies with imperfect information, 
market equilibria are rarely efficient. This implies that much of received eco-
nomic reasoning (such as “government intervention on competitive markets is 
welfare decreasing” or “unfettered markets are efficient”) loses its basic founda-
tion. 
The question is hence whether the neoclassical standard model of clearing mar-
kets is a permissible simplification. Are credit markets really distinct from mar-
kets for chairs, tables, or pencils (JAFFEE and STIGLITZ 1990, p. 838)? The deci-
sion has particularly serious consequences due to the fact that, once information 
asymmetries are allowed for, the models do not provide clear-cut policy advice 
anymore. A recent case in point is the interrelatedness of credit rationing and 
underinvestment. From a standard neoclassical perspective, one would assume 
that, by its very name, credit rationing necessarily implies too little investment 
as compared with a first-best solution. DE MEZA and WEBB (1987; 2000) show 
that this is in no way the case, since credit rationing may both imply too much or 
too little funding. Whether one or the other applies in a given real-world situa-
tion is therefore an a priori open question. Compared with the standard welfare 
arguments usually put forward by trade theorists when it comes to an assessment 
of border protection or customs regulation, the economics of information pro-
vide much less straightforward guidance. There are hence theoretical controver-
sies on two levels: whether information asymmetries are a relevant phenomenon 
at all and, if yes, what their implications are. 14   1  Introduction 
1.4.2 International experience on rural credit policies 
Government intervention on rural credit markets has figured prominently both in 
developed and developing countries over decades. For this reason, it is no sur-
prise that there is a considerable amount of literature dealing with this topic. It is 
not the aim of this section to do justice to all these contributions. However, I 
want to sketch at least the major arguments that might be relevant for the subse-
quent analysis in this monograph. 
In the Western world, governmental intervention on credit markets is a wide-
spread instrument to support national farming sectors. State-administered loan 
programmes for agriculture include the ‘cooperative Farm Credit System’ (cre-
ated in 1916) and the ‘Farm Services Agency’ (formerly the ‘Farmers Home 
Administration’, created in the 1940s) in the U.S. (BARRY and ROBISON 2001, p. 
557), and the ‘Einzelbetriebliches Förderprogramm’ (farm support programme, 
founded in 1973) or the ‘Agrarkreditprogramm’ (agricultural credit programme) 
in Germany (LANDWIRTSCHAFTLICHE RENTENBANK 1996).
8 The support meas-
ures in these programmes usually encompass interest subsidies, public grants, or 
public loan guarantees, or a mixture of these elements. 
In developing countries, credit programmes sponsored by governments or inter-
national donor organisations to boost agricultural production became of major 
importance after World War II (for an overview see ADAMS 1995). Many of 
these programmes were characterised by strict interest controls or ceilings on 
loan interest rates, additional subsidisation, and extensive loan targeting. The 
latter was pursued by making credit access conditional on the use of certain in-
put or technology packages, supervision, or the affiliation with specific borrower 
groups. More recently, under the heading of ‘rural microfinance’, there was a 
shift towards public support of financial institutions serving various types of ru-
ral clientele, including women or small-scale enterprises in general. 
After the implementation of market reforms, many governments in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) also 
introduced new, seemingly market conform intervention measures. Specific 
problems of these countries include the accumulation of debts inherited from 
former state enterprises, absence of mortgage facilities due to lacking land regis-
ters, and low farm profitability as a result of deteriorating agricultural terms of 
trade (SWINNEN and GOW 1999). However, the policy instruments used resemble 
                                           
8   The latter two have now merged as ‘Agrarinvestitionsförderungsprogramm’ (agricultural 
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those in other countries, for example loan guarantees, interest subsidies, or the 
establishment of specialised lending institutions for agriculture (for an overview 
see OECD 1999).
9
It needs hardly any explanation that public support on credit markets is usually 
welcomed by the beneficiaries. Likewise, from the view of the policymaker, it is 
a popular, politically expedient, and often relatively easily administered policy 
instrument (BARRY and ROBISON 2001, p. 559). To the contrary, economists 
tend to be much more sceptical with regard to the economic rationale of such 
programmes. However, serious and comprehensive evaluation of credit pro-
grammes is an often costly, methodologically difficult, and sometimes politi-
cally undesired task. Despite the more critical attitude of most economists, there 
is neither a uniform opinion with respect to the reasonable extent and usefulness 
of government intervention on credit markets in general nor on the impact of 
specific policy measures on the performance of supported enterprises and pro-
jects. Some of the critical issues in evaluating these programmes as stressed in 
the literature may be summarised as follows:
10
1. It is often claimed that governmental credit support helps to improve the 
competitiveness and  the income generation potential of farm enterprises. 
However, ex-post evaluations of state administered credit programmes have 
shown that they often fail to achieve their objectives. Beneficiaries frequently 
neither improved the efficiency of their operations vis-a-vis the non-
beneficiaries, nor were incomes significantly increased. It seems hence ques-
tionable whether government agencies are more successful in selecting prom-
ising and economically viable borrowers for their loan programmes than 
commercial banks. Arguments in favour of these programmes stress their im-
portance for supplementing rural incomes. However, distributional effects of 
loan programmes are often such that existing inequalities are even rein-
forced.
11  
2. If the problems of credit access are related to a lack of collateral, interest 
subsidies will not lead to an improvement. Public loan guarantees have been 
                                           
9   A general discussion of transition-specific problems of rural finance can be found in 
BLOMMESTEIN (1998), KOESTER (2001), and SCHRIEDER and HEIDHUES (1998). 
10  For overviews of these arguments see ADAMS (1995), BRAVERMAN and GUASCH (1993), 
PEDERSON and KHITARISHVILI (1997), and SWINNEN and GOW (1999). 
11    See for example BRÜMMER and LOY (2000) and STRIEWE et al. (1996) on Germany. 
ADAMS et al. (1984) and VON PISCHKE et al. (1983) contain numerous cases from develop-
ing countries. 16   1  Introduction 
proposed as a solution in these cases, since they are supposed to lift credit 
constraints induced by collateral requirements. However, they may increase 
the level of defaulting loans due to incentive problems of their own. These 
may result from the fact that banks have less incentive to properly screen bor-
rowers, a kind of moral hazard by banks (KRAHNEN and SCHMIDT 1994, pp. 
70-72). 
3. Low interest rates and other types of preferential treatment have been pro-
posed as a financial buffer for enterprises in an economically difficult transi-
tion period. However, favourable loan terms and soft budget constraints 
might also give wrong signals to enterprises which need restructuring, par-
ticularly if they allow an undue postponent of that task (PEDERSON and 
KHITARISHVILI 1997, p. 27) 
4.  Interest subsidies and other government expenditures on loan support might 
in fact lead to higher interest rates if they induce increasing government bor-
rowing. This runs counter to the goal of reducing interest rates. 
5. The provision of preferential funds may often involve a lot of bureaucracy 
and hence imply a substantial transaction cost component, which has the 
character of a fixed cost for the borrower. Smaller loans therefore become 
relatively more expensive, which leads to the perverse effect of further re-
stricting small farmers’ credit access, just the problem the policy was meant 
to alleviate. Similar effects result as a consequence of interest rate ceilings 
(GONZALEZ-VEGA 1977). 
6. The fungibility of credit usually makes specific loan targeting impossible. 
Subsidised funds may substitute for own funds, thus implying little addition-
ality as a result of government intervention. Furthermore, funds may be di-
verted to other purposes which were unintended by the government (VON 
PISCHKE and ADAMS 1980). 
7.  Preferential loans are often claimed to improve the access to finance for cer-
tain groups of borrowers. However, in the longer run they are detrimental to 
the development of alternative financing sources, such as trade credit or the 
formation of self-help groups. They result in little demand for loans at market 
rates and therefore reduce incentives to become engaged in any innovative 
activitiy to raise credit.  
8.  Existing financial intermediaries are often economically strangled by repres-
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since intermediaries are unable to attract sufficient funds and are not allowed 
to demand cost covering prices for their services. 
9.  Support programmes starting as short-term responses to specific situations of 
crisis frequently become permanent programmes because they (a) create ex-
pectations on the part of the beneficiary that they will be continued or re-
peated, (b) create their own constituency and are for political reasons difficult 
to remove afterwards, and (c) become incorporated into prices for less mobile 
production factors such as land and hence raise production costs for new pro-
ducers, and therefore demands for their continuation (SWINNEN and GOW 
1999, p. 39). 
Overall, the experience suggests that there are many potential pitfalls for gov-
ernment intervention on rural credit markets. Even so, the policy recommenda-
tions drawn from this experience span from suggesting slight modifications of 
existing programmes in order to avoid the most serious problems up to a total 
abolishment of governmental credit promotion.
12 This corresponds with the am-
biguity of policy recommendations based on theoretical reasoning, as outlined in 
the previous section. It is no surprise that the basic positions concerning gov-
ernment intervention on credit markets are widely varying, as the following two 
quotes may illustrate: 
“There is a role for the state in financial markets; it is a role motivated by perva-
sive market failures. In most of the rapidly growing economies of East Asia gov-
ernment has taken an active role in creating financial institutions, in regulating 
them, and in directing credit, both in ways that enhance the stability of the econ-
omy and the solvency of the financial institutions and in ways that enhance 
growth prospects” (STIGLITZ 1994, p. 50, italics in the original). 
“In summary, there may be good arguments for intervention, and some may be 
based on market failure. But as one unpacks each argument, the realization 
grows that, given the current state of empirical evidence on many relevant ques-
tions, it is impossible to be categorial that an intervention in the credit market is 
justified. Empirical work that can speak to these issues is the next challenge if 
the theoretical progress on the operation of rural credit markets is to be matched 
by progress in the policy sphere” (BESLEY 1994, p. 45). 
A general lesson is hence that serious policy advice will have to take the specific 
conditions within a country or region into account. The following section aims 
at summarising the current wisdom on the Polish case. 
                                           
12  In Germany, the first position seems to be taken for example by BEUERMANN et al. (1996) 
and MÜLLER and P.M. SCHMITZ (1996), whereas the latter standpoint is represented by 
ALBERS (1983) and STRIEWE et al. (1996). 18   1  Introduction 
1.4.3 The state of knowledge concerning rural credit in Poland 
The basic characteristics of the Polish rural credit market were already described 
in subchapter 1.2, I therefore concentrate on the existing knowledge regarding 
credit rationing and the effects of governmental credit promotion. 
The current wisdom regarding both issues is very limited. Apart from the more 
anecdotal evidence provided by ZBIERSKI-SALAMEH (1999) as mentioned previ-
ously, a recent World Bank study (2001) is the only publication I am aware of 
which explicitly deals with the issue of credit rationing of Polish farm house-
holds. The section on credit (WORLD BANK 2001, pp. 63-85) is concerned with 
the question why Polish farmers borrow so little. Two hypotheses are put for-
ward (pp. 65-66): (a) farmers do not request loans because, due to uncertain ex-
pectations about the future, they have no viable investment projects available, 
and (b) farmers want to borrow but rural credit markets in Poland fail, with the 
result of rationing, either in the form of quantity rationing or due to prohibitively 
high direct (interest, fees) and indirect (paperwork, travelling) costs of borrow-
ing. Based on survey results, it is reported that many of the farmers interviewed 
regard hypothesis (a) as valid. If this were true, this suggests in my view that 
there is nothing wrong with the credit market in Poland. However, the study also 
argues that there is evidence in favour of the second hypothesis. About one half 
of all borrowers in the survey said that they wanted a larger loan on the same 
term as the loan they received (p. 66). Furthermore, dummies indicating the 
voivodship the respondent lives in turned out to be highly significant in regres-
sion analyses of borrowing and investment behaviour. This is interpreted as evi-
dence against the uncertainty hypothesis, since uncertainty due to macroeco-
nomic factors should more or less evenly apply to all regions of the country. In 
addition, in a bivariate Probit model, current income turned out to be a signifi-
cant determinant of the investment decision. In the view of the author, this sug-
gests the existence of a financial constraint (p. 85). However, the latter finding 
might be objected due to the unclear causal relationship between income and 
investment (this is admitted by the author himself, p. 83, see also section 3.2.2 
below). Furthermore, the reported regression results surprisingly omit the in-
come variable discussed in the text.
13
There is hence some, albeit provisional, evidence that credit rationing is a sig-
nificant problem in rural Poland. However, the World Bank study does not es-
                                           
13  This might be due to an editorial mistake. Curiously enough, the tables with the regression 
results (Tables 3.8 and 3.13 on pp. 78; 84) do not contain any income variable, although 
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tablish any causal relationship between credit rationing and government inter-
vention on credit markets in Poland.
14
A number of authors call the economic rationale of government intervention on 
Polish credit markets into question, but their arguments usually rest on general 
theoretical reasoning or on aggregate statistics, as presented in previous sub-
chapters. CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX (1997, pp. 19-20, 33-35) argue that the 
costs of government intervention by far exceed their benefits, based on a very 
rough estimation and plausibility considerations. Accordingly, they recommend 
to phase out the programme (pp. 43-44). A similar approach is taken by 
SCHRADER (1996). He suggests that, although capital needs in the agricultural 
sector are large, the sector still is in a better shape than other sectors of the Pol-
ish economy. According to his view, this is due to the fact that interruptions of 
production processes were much less severe than in many other industries, major 
parts of the capital stock had not to be written off, and the key production factor 
land underwent no depreciation at all. Furthermore, SCHRADER contends that 
capital subsidisation leads to a substitution of labour by capital, which he re-
gards as counterproductive in an environment of high (hidden) unemployment. 
He therefore also advises to abolish the credit subsidies (p. 28). 
A recent paper by JÓZWIAK (2001) aims at assessing the microeconomic effects 
preferential credits had, based on a sample of book-keeping farms. The author 
compares the performance of several groups of borrowing farms with a control 
group of non-borrowing farms. He finds that borrowing farms in general realised 
a higher income growth than non-borrowers but at the same time increased the 
intensity of family labour on their farms more strongly (p. 26). Unfortunately, 
the relatively simple with-and-without comparison does not allow to control the 
simultaneous influence of several determinants. It is hence difficult to judge 
whether increased incomes are due to borrowing or due to a higher labour inten-
sity. Furthermore, his results may be subject to selectivity bias (see section 3.2.2 
below). 
JÓZWIAK (2001) also finds evidence that subsidised credit funds were used for 
non-productive purposes, although he does not further explain what is precisely 
meant by this (pp. 24-25). He suggests that an annual fraction of preferential 
credits varying between 23 and 48 percent was diverted between 1993 and 1997. 
                                           
14  There is a current work by LATRUFFE and FRASER (2002) exploring the effects of govern-
ment intervention on credit rationing in Poland. At present, this work is solely based on a 
theoretical model. Depending on various parameter choices, policy implications differ, so 
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Furthermore, he suggests that preferential credit promotion after 1995 led to a 
decrease in the diversion of funds (p. 26). 
In summary, apart from a general criticism of public credit market intervention, 
the empirical evidence regarding the impact of the preferential credit programme 
in Poland is meagre and ambiguous. Furthermore, the problem of credit ration-
ing of Polish farm households still awaits a rigorous empirical examination. This 
assessment is shared by other researchers, and could even be extended to other 
CEECs, as the following quote from TANGERMANN and SWINNEN (2000, p. 198) 
demonstrates: 
“As far as factor markets are concerned, much research has studied land reform 
processes, legal provisions concerning land markets and restructuring of enter-
prises. [...] [M]ore issues are unresolved in understanding structural changes in 
the agricultural labour and capital markets in CEECs and their implications. 
They are the least understood aspects of the transition process in agriculture, al-
though many studies suggest that they are key factors in CEEC agricultural pro-
ductivity growth, output recovery and rural development in general” (emphasis 
added). 
1.5  Organisation of the monograph 
The study attempts to address the research questions stated in subchapter 1.3 
both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical analysis is pursued in chapter 
2. Chapter 3 develops a research methodology that aims to make the theoretical 
considerations fruitful for the empirical investigation of the Polish case. In chap-
ter 4, the results of this investigation are presented. The final chapter 5 synthe-
sises the findings and aims to place them in the wider context of current eco-
nomic research. Furthermore, based on the results of the analysis, a number of 
policy recommendations are derived. Overviews of the contents of single chap-
ters are given at the beginning of each chapter. 
It is one of the central aims of this monograph to combine a theoretically moti-
vated discussion of credit rationing with a rigorous empirical application of this 
concept. Given the diversity of the literature and the complexity of the methodo-
logical approaches, this is a challenge for both the author and the reader. Tenta-
tive experience suggests that the reader faces two particular challenges. The first 
is to comprehend what is actually meant by credit rationing. A basic definition 
that can be used as a reference point throughout the monograph will be given in 
section 2.1.1 below. However, the definition of credit rationing is intimately 
linked to the theoretical view of the world one is willing to adopt. Since I could 
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definition is scrutinised and challenged throughout the entire chapter 2. The 
quick reader is advised to turn to the summary sections, in particular 2.1.6, pp. 
47 et seq., and 2.2.4, pp. 74 et seq. Furthermore, the fact that theory-based defi-
nitions can rarely be applied directly to real world observations made it neces-
sary to take up again the discussion on defining credit rationing in the methodo-
logical chapter. Different methods of analysis even required different opera-
tional definitions of credit rationing. The reader will find a summary of these in 
section 3.3.2, pp. 145 et seq. 
The second challenge for the reader is due to the separation of the material into 
three major chapters dealing with theory, methodology, and empirical results, 
respectively. Although this appears to be a quite conventional and commonly 
employed structure, it conceals an alternative way of organising the study. This 
alternative is suggested by the three major analytical approaches used in the the-
sis, which each focus on specific aspects of the theoretical discussion. The three 
approaches analyse, in turn, (a)   the determinants of being credit-rationed, 
(b) the effects of credit rationing on farm output, and (c) the effects of credit ra-
tioning on farm investment. The following matrix aims to make transparent 
where these three approaches are located in the monograph and hopefully con-
tributes to a better orientation of the reader. 
The quick reader is offered the alternative to have a look at one of the journal 
articles that emerged from the thesis and which cover its major scientific contri-
bution. PETRICK (2004) contains an analysis of credit rationing and its effects on 
farm output, PETRICK (2004a) focuses on the effects on farm investment, and 
PETRICK (2004b) presents an overview of methods for measuring credit ration-
ing. 22   1  Introduction 
Table 1-1:   Major analytical approaches of the study and where they are 
presented in the text 







Analysis of the determinants of 
being credit-rationed 
Subchapters 2.1 
and 2.2,  
pp. 23 et seq. 
Section 3.3.3,  
pp. 146 et seq. 
Subchapter 4.1, 
pp. 163 et seq. 
Analysis of the effects of credit 
rationing on farm output 
Section 2.3.1,  
pp. 77 et seq. 
Section 3.3.4, 
pp. 149 et seq. 
Subchapter 4.2, 
pp. 171 et seq. 
Analysis of the effects of credit 
rationing on farm investment 
Section 2.3.2,  
pp. 91 et seq. 
Section 3.3.5, 
pp. 157 et seq. 
Subchapter 4.3, 
pp. 184 et seq. 
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2 CREDIT RATIONING IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The aim of this chapter is to address the questions raised in subchapter 1.3 from 
a theoretical perspective: how can credit rationing be understood and explained 
on theoretical grounds? How does credit rationing affect production and invest-
ment outcomes of farm households? Can the prevalence of credit rationing serve 
as a justification for government intervention? I proceed in several steps: sub-
chapter 2.1, by undertaking a journey through the current literature, attempts to 
clarify what precisely is understood as ‘credit rationing’ in theory. Subchapter 
2.2 aims at consolidating a number of the issues involved by presenting a theo-
retical model that explains credit rationing as a result of asymmetric information 
between market participants. Subsequently I discuss the robustness and the re-
sulting policy implications of this approach. Subchapter 2.3 examines the effects 
credit rationing has on production and investment decisions of farm households 
in different static and dynamic settings. Particularly the last subchapter will also 
provide an important background for the empirical approach to be discussed in 
chapter 3. 
2.1  Forms and sources of credit rationing 
2.1.1 Defining credit rationing 
In subchapter 1.3, I introduced a common sense understanding of the term credit 
rationing. It can be restated as follows: credit is a means to enable investment by 
solving a liquidity problem. The liquidity problem arises from the fact that out-
lays triggered by the investment precede (expected) future returns. Investment in 
turn is guided by certain higher-level goals such as profit or income generation. 
Credit rationing is understood as a situation where a lack of sufficient credit in-
hibits desirable investment, since the liquidity problem cannot be solved. That 
is, credit rationing is seen as the reason for too little or underinvestment.  
To be more precise is not without difficulty, since there are various definitions 
of credit rationing used in the literature (this is discussed by JAFFEE and 
STIGLITZ 1990, pp. 847-849, and LEATHERS 1990, p. 782). However, to provide 
a common reference point for the discussion in this chapter, it seems useful to 
further distinguish credit rationing and underinvestment as follows: 
A potential borrower is regarded as being credit-rationed if his private de-
mand for credit persistently exceeds the loan amount offered by the lender, 
with the loan terms showing no tendency to change. A credit market outcome 24    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
is characterised by underinvestment if the level of investment carried out by 
borrowers is persistently below the socially desirable level. 
This definition deserves a number of comments. First, a difference is made be-
tween private and social desirability. The former is related to the goals of the 
individual borrower, whereas the latter is concerned with the goals of the society 
as a whole. These may sometimes harmonise and sometimes not, as is discussed 
below. Similarly, credit rationing may sometimes imply underinvestment and 
sometimes not. The qualification ‘persistently’ is used here to exclude situations 
of sluggish adjustment or short-term market dynamics, which are not the focus 
of this research. My interest is in stable or equilibrium situations of credit ration-
ing. 
If credit rationing is believed to be present in a given real-world situation, the 
preceding tentative definition suggests three major questions: first, which cir-
cumstances constitute an ideal situation of absent credit rationing, in which all – 
privately or socially – desirable investment is carried out? Second, what are the 
reasons for the observed deviation from this ideal? Third, is it possible and does 
it make sense to intervene in order to (re-)establish the ideal situation?  
An answer to the first question would hence provide an important analytical 
benchmark. This benchmark of an ideal or first-best situation would allow to 
assess the degree of credit rationing in terms of a deviation from the so defined 
ideal. Possibly it would also give some hint regarding the rationale behind this 
deviation, which in turn would be helpful for those who consider intervention. 
They would know how much intervention is necessary and could perhaps also 
measure the success of their endeavour. In the following, I therefore try to clar-
ify the first question of what is the benchmark that establishes the presence or 
absence of credit rationing before, in the course of the chapter, I discuss the sec-
ond and third questions concerning the reasons for credit rationing and the pos-
sibility of intervention. 
2.1.2 The benchmark case of a perfect capital market 
Since Adam SMITH’s notion of the ‘invisible hand’, economists have been fasci-
nated by the ideal of a competitive market that achieves a best possible solution 
to the resource allocation problem of society. Seeming like a paradox, in this 
ideal situation, prices coordinate the otherwise independent activities of purely 
self-interested participants in such a way that everybody’s welfare is maximised. 
The modern formalisation of this notion is the general equilibrium theory ad-
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economics takes this neoclassical model as a benchmark (SCITOVSKY 1990, p. 
135, cited in BRANDES et al. 1997, p. 24): 
“Ever since the paradox was first noted, generations of economists have ad-
mired, taught and argued it, and the Arrow-Debreu theory of general competi-
tive equilibrium is the culmination of the profession’s long struggle to under-
stand fully all its conditions and implications”. 
According to MAGILL and SHAFER (1991, p. 1524), much of economic theory 
can be viewed as a study of the causes and consequences of market failure, 
where the Arrow-Debreu theory provides the idealised framework in which 
markets function at their best. In fact, this is precisely the approach taken in the 
current chapter. In line with the given focus of interest, I will therefore outline 
the major assumptions and implications of a perfect, neoclassical capital mar-
ket, before challenging them in later sections. 
In the following, the capital market is understood in an abstract sense as the 
place where payment streams are traded (see SCHMIDT and TERBERGER 1997). 
The important fact is that payment streams are traded intertemporally. Earlier 
payment streams are traded for later ones. If the payment stream is such that, in 
view of the single market participant, outlays precede receipts, one speaks of 
investment (or lending); if the reverse holds, one speaks of financing (or bor-
rowing). Investment and financing, lending and borrowing are treated as com-
pletely symmetric. Intertemporal trade is useful since payments have different 
values at different times, due to varying time preferences of market participants. 
The difference per period is the rate of interest. It says in percent per period how 
much the value of a later payment exceeds that of an earlier payment. Payment 
streams may differ in terms of maturity or due date. 
In analogy to the neoclassical model of a competitive economy, a number of key 
assumptions are made that establish the existence of a perfect capital market (see 
ROBISON and BARRY 1996, p. 34): there are no barriers to entry, no participant 
can influence the interest rate, transactions are costless to complete, relevant in-
formation about the exchanged payment streams is widely and freely available, 
payment streams (within given maturity classes) are homogenous, and they are 
continuously divisible. For the moment it is also assumed that expectations are 
certain, that is only payment streams are regarded which will be made with per-
fect certainty. 
Under these conditions, there is one interest rate at which payment streams of 
given maturity and due date are traded. This interest rate represents the opportu-
nity cost of capital for all market participants. Under the further assumption that 26    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
actors behave in a utility maximising or rational way, it is possible to analyse the 
activities on a neoclassical capital market in a graphical model of intertemporal 
choice due to FISHER (1930), see Figure 2-1. In the model, a rational investor – 
for example a farmer – facing a perfect capital market is endowed with initial 
wealth and productive investment opportunities. His problem is to maximise in-
tertemporal utility by making optimal investment, financing, and consumption 
decisions. Objects of utility are consumption levels today and in a given future 
period. 
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Source:  Modified from ROBISON and BARRY (1996, p. 35). 
In Figure 2-1, the two axes represent consumption opportunities at time t=0 
(present) and time t=1 (future). The investor begins at time t=0 with wealth 0W0 
which may be consumed or invested (the subsequent exposition follows 
ROBISON and BARRY 1996, pp. 34-37). Wealth 0W0 can be invested in (a) a set 
of productive investments ordered according to diminishing returns along line 
W0W1; or (b) a financial investment with a rate of return r=tan α – 1, assumed to 
exceed zero, along parallels of the line M0M1. Initially, the return on productive 
investments exceeds return r. Therefore, the rational actor makes productive in-
vestments by moving along curve W0W1. The profitability of the productive in-
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investment. The comparison is between the diminishing marginal internal rate of 
return (IRR) on the former given by the slope of W0W1 (which is   
–(1+IRR) and the market interest rate given by the constant slope of M0M1 
(which is –(1+r)). The future value of an euro invested in productive invest-
ments is equal to the (negative) slope of the productive investment curve. The 
future value of a current euro invested in the financial market is equal to the 
(negative) slope of the financial market line. 
Beginning at W0, the optimal level of productive investments is eventually 
reached at point A, where the marginal IRR on productive investments is equal 
to the market interest rate r. The optimal level of productive investment, 
I0W0=0W0 – 0I0, yields consumption opportunities equal to 0I1 at t=1. The opti-
mal level of financial investment, 0I0, yields I1M1 at t=1. This combination of 
productive and financial investments has a present value of 0M0 or a future value 
of 0M1. The net present value (NPV) described by point A equals the discounted 
value of future returns less the initial investment: 
0 0 0










An important result is that at the optimal level of investment, all productive in-
vestment is undertaken that adds to the investor’s NPV. At point A, an equilib-
rium is reached, since there is no incentive to change investment plans anymore. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, those productive investments are made that maximise 
investors’ NPV. Furthermore, all productive investments are made whose IRR 
exceeds the market interest rate. 
The optimal investment decision is solely determined by the rates of return on 
productive investments relative to the market interest rate. Now I consider the 
investor’s desire to consume quantities of goods c0 now and c1 in the future. The 
investor’s utility function, u(c0,c1), and indifference curves have no influence on 
the optimal investment under these perfect market conditions. However, the util-
ity function does determine the trading activities (lending or borrowing) that 
yield a utility-maximising combination of present and future consumption for 
the investor, given the optimal level of investment. For example, Investor 1 in 
Figure 2-1 has a strong time preference for current consumption, as indicated by 
the location of his indifference curve in the diagram. He will undertake produc-
tive investments to point A, and then move in the reverse direction by borrowing 
0c01  – 0I0, moving along the financial market line M0M1 until tangency is 
achieved with the highest attainable indifference curve. In contrast, Investor 2, 
who has a weaker time preference, will invest in point A and then save 0I0 – 0c02 28    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
additional funds moving along the line M0M1 until tangency with her indiffer-
ence curves occurs at D. 
The detailed allocation can be seen in Figure 2-1 for both investors. The pre-
ferred consumption choice for Investor 1 (c01,c11) is indicated by point E. To 
reach E, the investor allocates part I0W0 of his initial wealth to productive in-
vestments, leaving 0I0 of initial wealth for consumption. The optimal consump-
tion plan is then attained by borrowing amount I0c01, so that present consump-
tion equals 0c01. The amount of the loan plus interest given by c11I1=I0c01(1+r) 
is repaid from the returns of the productive investment at time point t=1, leaving 
the desired consumption level 0c11 at t=1. Thus, the utility-maximising con-
sumption levels at point E are 0c01 at t=0 and 0c11 at t=1. 
The preferred consumption choice (c02,c12) for Investor 2 is indicated by point D. 
To reach D, the investor allocates part I0W0 of her initial wealth to productive 
investments, then saves c02I0, so that present consumption equals 0c02. The 
amount saved plus interest given by I1c12=c02I0(1+r) increases future consump-
tion possibilities to 0c12. Thus, the utility-maximising consumption levels at D 
are 0c02 at t=0 and 0c12 at t=1. 
In the end, both investors have the same present values of investment decisions 
on the one hand, but different utility-maximising financing and consumption 
decisions on the other. In the presence of a perfect capital market, investment 
and consumption decisions are thus separable. For both investors, at optimal 
points D and E in Figure 2-1, the slopes of the financial market line, the produc-
tive investments line, and the indifference curves are equal. Thus, equality oc-
curs among the investor’s marginal rates of utility substitution between present 
and future consumption, the market interest rate, and the marginal investment 
return. In analogy to the neoclassical equilibrium model, these are the conditions 
under which the capital market operates efficiently. 
If there are many investors trading on the capital market, it provides the impor-
tant service of allowing a redistribution of people’s consumption opportunities 
over time through lending and borrowing. The prevailing market clearing inter-
est rate reflects the time preferences of investors given their present levels of 
wealth and their investment opportunities. In equilibrium, all productive invest-
ments with a positive contribution to NPV are undertaken, all investors realise 
their utility maximising consumption bundles given their resources, and there-
fore all gains from intertemporal trade are exhausted. This situation is said to be 
Pareto-optimal, since consumption opportunities cannot be reallocated to make 
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In summary, the assumption of a perfect capital market in connection with ra-
tional behaviour has three major implications: 
1.  All productive investment that yields at least the market interest rate is under-
taken. In equilibrium, rational actors maximise the net present value of their 
investment portfolio. 
2.  Investment decisions are made independently of consumption and financing 
decisions. Individual preferences thus do not influence which investments are 
undertaken. (These first two implications are known as the Fisher Separation 
Theorem). 
3. The perfect capital market allows an efficient, Pareto-optimal allocation of 
payment streams. Both the private and the social optimum are reached. 
It may be added that these results hold even if expectations are uncertain, as long 
as the assumption of a perfect capital market is maintained. In its most general 
form, the Arrow-Debreu model allows an equilibrium under uncertainty, since 
every possible future state is covered by a so-called state-contingent claim, and 
perfect insurance is possible (ARROW and HAHN 1971). Also without such an 
assumption, MODIGLIANI and MILLER (1958) have shown that the market value 
of a firm facing a perfect capital market is independent of its financial structure. 
This holds even if firms differ in their business risk. Therefore, the firm’s finan-
cial policy is irrelevant for its investment decisions. This is the Modigliani-
Miller Theorem, which can be viewed as a counterpart, with a given degree of 
uncertainty, to the above mentioned Fisher Separation Theorem (see SCHMIDT 
and TERBERGER 1997). Finally, SHARPE (1970) has demonstrated in his Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that under explicit consideration of risk, invest-
ment projects can be evaluated in separation from financial decisions. Hence, 
without going into the many details, the assumption of certain expectations is 
not crucial for the central neoclassical result: in the presence of a perfect capital 
market, there is an objective criterion concerning which investment projects 
should be carried out. Sufficiently profitable projects (taking into account a risk 
premium) can and will be financed. Therefore, for the moment, I will not con-
sider the aspect of uncertain expectations further,
15 while coming back to it in 
section 2.1.5. 
Due to its desirable properties, the perfect capital market will serve as the 
benchmark for further reasoning on credit rationing. Coming back to the consid-
                                           
15  I also do not discuss the various concepts of risk and information efficiency prevailing in 
the capital market literature (see e.g. FAMA 1976 and SHARPE and ALEXANDER 1990). 30    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
erations of the introductory section 2.1.1, it becomes clear that in a perfect capi-
tal market, all investment projects can be financed as long as they yield at least 
the given market rate of interest. However, these are precisely the projects that 
contribute positively to the investors NPV, so that there is no excess demand and 
hence no rationing. Even if the investor prefers not to invest his own wealth into 
the project (as Investor 1 in Figure 2-1 does), sufficiently profitable investment 
will nevertheless be undertaken via funding from the capital market. For the in-
vestor, there is no problem of financing, since he is completely indifferent as to 
credit versus equity funding. Based on these theoretical reflections, the follow-
ing definition emerges:  
On the basis of the neoclassical model of a perfect capital market, I define 
credit rationing as being absent if all projects are undertaken whose return is 
at least as high as the market rate of interest. 
An ‘ideal’ situation is thus established that implies no credit rationing. Indeed, 
the definition includes an important restriction. In case that an investment pro-
ject does not yield the necessary rate of return equal to the market interest and 
hence cannot be credit funded, there is no credit rationing. Such a  project is in-
efficient and would be a waste of money (see SCHNEIDER 1992, p. 629). As an 
implication, inefficient projects are sorted out by the market mechanism without 
any government intervention. 
2.1.3 Problems with the neoclassical view of a perfect capital market 
The definition given in the previous section under which circumstances there is 
no credit rationing might be regarded as being not fully satisfying. For example, 
it remains unclear what should be used as ‘the’ market rate of interest. What if 
no single market rate exists? Does credit rationing automatically prevail in all 
cases not fully in compliance with the assumptions of the neoclassical model? 
To answer these questions, a more operational definition of credit rationing is 
clearly desirable. In fact, the attempt to be more precise about the presence of 
credit rationing is intimately linked to the query of how realistic the neoclassical 
model of a perfect capital market is. Most people would probably agree that the 
conditions under which such a market emerges are hardly met in reality. Not the 
least observations of phenomena such as credit rationing have fuelled scepticism 
with regard to the appropriateness of this model. In essence, in the neoclassical 
model, credit rationing is assumed away. By definition, there is no credit ration-
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At this point, a key dilemma becomes visible: in the just presented mainstream 
theory the problem to be analysed does not occur. Hence, apart from defining a 
benchmark, neoclassical theory appears to be of little value in explaining real-
world observations such as credit rationing. 
Which are the consequences of this insight? The issue of how to deal with ob-
servations that seem irreconcilable with the orthodox view of perfect markets in 
fact denotes a fundamental crossroad in contemporary economic theory. I want 
to sketch three ways out of the dilemma: 
1.  Ignore the problem. The first solution is to disregard problems of credit ra-
tioning or to downplay their importance. This is the view of neoclassical 
capital market theory. Its representatives – key contributors such as FISHER, 
MODIGLIANI and MILLER, and SHARPE have already been mentioned in sec-
tion 2.1.2 – maintain the assumption of perfect capital markets throughout 
their analyses. 
2.  Extend the neoclassical model in an appropriate way. Proponents of this so-
lution agree with members of the first group that the insights of the neoclas-
sical model have relevance for the study of economic behaviour. Their strat-
egy is to gradually modify the model to allow the occurrence of phenomena 
impossible in the pure neoclassical world. In doing so, formal and/or mathe-
matical notation is usually retained. Since many researchers of this group will 
become relevant in later sections of this chapter, I only mention STIGLITZ as a 
key contributor (a recent overview of his work is his 2002 paper). 
3.  Abandon the neoclassical model altogether. In its extreme version, the third 
way completely denies that the frictionless, perfect market model has any-
thing meaningful to say about economic events in the real world. In this re-
spect, DEMSETZ (1969, p. 1) speaks of a “nirvana approach”. Representatives 
of this group thus attempt to explain economic behaviour in a principally dif-
ferent manner than the neoclassical model, for example by the assumption of 
bounded rationality and opportunism (such as O.E. WILLIAMSON; see e.g. 
1985 and 1993). A formal analysis in mathematical terms is usually rejected, 
though research topics often parallel those of the former way, e.g. with re-
spect to a comparative analysis of institutional settings alternative to the per-
fect market. Within the focus of financial issues, research on ‘behavioural fi-
nance’ seeks to identify and explain behaviour inconsistent with the rational-
ity postulate (see THALER 1993). 32    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
Both the second and third way are usually classified as belonging to the broad 
‘institutionalist’ field of economics, which is why a clear cut border between the 
two may be difficult to draw. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a de-
tailed overview of the different branches of the so-called ‘New Institutional 
Economics’ (NIE). The reader is referred to the comprehensive survey in 
FURUBOTN and RICHTER (1997), especially chapters 4 and 5.  
The principal approach of this monograph is very much in favour of the second 
way. This line of reasoning will therefore be examined with some detail in sub-
sequent sections. The rationale behind this decision is as follows. Since the in-
vestigation of credit rationing is the declared objective of the current study, it is 
obvious that the first way makes little sense to follow. However, to completely 
call into question the neoclassical foundations of economic theory, as suggested 
by the third way, seems to be unwarranted as well. In particular, there exists no 
unified theory which may take the place of a central reference comparable to the 
neoclassical tradition, and which is equally well analysed, understood and ac-
cepted. Therefore, I explicitly maintain the neoclassical model as a benchmark, 
as already indicated above. It will serve as an important background for the fur-
ther discussion of credit rationing, similar to most of the theoretical credit ra-
tioning literature. Positions that are critical of a merely gradual modification of 
the neoclassical model will be taken up from time to time in later sections. 
2.1.4 Extension 1: positive transaction costs 
If credit rationing does not occur in the neoclassical model, it is natural to sus-
pect that this may be due to the specific assumptions underlying the model. In 
this and the following section, I will therefore investigate the consequences of 
relaxing two major assumptions made so far (section 2.1.2), namely 
(a) transaction costs are zero, and (b) relevant information about the exchanged 
payment streams is widely and freely available. 
Transacting on markets involves costs in addition to the nominal price of the 
good to be purchased or sold – this intuitively plausible statement might be illus-
trated by a passage from COASE (1960, p. 15), who was among the first to point 
out the importance of positive transaction costs:
16  
“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is 
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on 
                                           
16  My attention was drawn to this passage by FURUBOTN and RICHTER (1997, p. 43), who 
however only cite the first sentence. The first conceptual treatment of transaction costs 
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what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the con-
tract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the con-
tract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, 
sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried 
out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.” 
Transaction costs are the result of activities necessary for search and information 
gathering, bargaining and decision making, and supervision and enforcement of 
formal or informal contracts (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1997, pp. 44-45). They 
can be regarded as the economic equivalent to friction in physical systems (O.E. 
WILLIAMSON 1985, p. 19). Clearly, these costs have a close connection to the 
fact that individuals are not fully informed about the good to be traded, the other 
market participants, or the practical and legal aspects of concluding contracts. 
Though not all transaction costs are due to imperfect information (e.g. time ex-
penses for waiting or transportation costs), it is useful to examine the effects of 
positive transaction costs and asymmetric information jointly. For the moment, 
however, I concentrate on the cost dimension. COASE already mentions an im-
portant consequence of these costs: nonzero transaction costs can make trade 
activities prohibitively costly that would have been carried out otherwise. Do 
transaction costs therefore constitute a case of rationing? 
Before discussing this question, I first want to raise a second question that has 
caused some confusion in the literature, namely: can transaction costs be meas-
ured? And if yes, having in mind the introductory remarks of section 2.1.1, does 
this measure provide a yardstick that allows the quantification of credit rationing 
as a deviation from the neoclassical ideal?
17
At first glance, this suggestion seems to be quite reasonable. In fact, both with 
regard to credit markets in general and to rural credit markets in particular, 
economists have stressed the importance of transaction costs. BENSTON and 
C.W. SMITH (1976) regard transaction costs as the ultimate reason for the exis-
tence of financial intermediaries such as banks.
18 With respect to rural credit 
markets, a strand of literature closely associated with the so-called Ohio State 
school of rural finance stresses the importance of non-interest loan transaction 
costs prevalent in developing countries (ADAMS and NEHMAN 1979; various 
contributions in ADAMS et al. 1984). According to ADAMS and NEHMAN (1979, 
pp. 6-7), loan transaction costs may include first of all loan charges collected by 
                                           
17  I discuss these questions already here in the theoretical chapter since they are central to an 
understanding of the nature of the concept ‘transaction costs’. 
18  Curiously enough, banks have no role to play in general equilibrium theory, where they are 
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the lender beyond interest payments, such as application fees, forced purchase of 
other lender services, bribes, or compensatory balances, secondly costs due to 
negotiations with someone outside the formal lending agency, such as extension 
staff, local officials, or cosigners, and finally travel and time expenses which 
may be substantial in rural areas and at certain times, e.g. in planting or harvest-
ing periods. This list suggests that loans made to rural inhabitants can be re-
garded as quite transaction cost intensive from the borrower’s point of view. 
These costs certainly can be measured, at least as long as they are actual cash 
expenses. There are several contributions in the literature presenting figures of 
loan transaction costs arising in rural credit markets of various countries.
19 Fur-
thermore, writers of this tradition have claimed that loan transaction costs are the 
ultimate reason for credit rationing of certain types of borrowers, particularly 
small farms (CUEVAS and GRAHAM 1986; LADMAN 1984; R.L. MEYER and 
CUEVAS 1992).
20 It appears thus useful to formally investigate which conse-
quences the introduction of transaction costs on loan markets has. 
In relation to the loan size, positive transaction costs cause an increase in the 
effective interest rate a borrower has to pay, since they add to the nominal inter-
est. Similarly, they reduce the effective rate a saver may obtain. They thus drive 
a wedge between, in this case, saving and borrowing rates.  The general result is 
a price band between actual sale and purchase prices the decision maker faces 
(see HIRSHLEIFER and GLAZER 1992, pp. 375-387; SADOULET and DE JANVRY 
1995, pp. 149-159; 254-5). The consequences can be analysed in the graphical 
model presented in section 2.1.2 as follows, see Figure 2-2. 
                                           
19  See ADAMS and NEHMAN (1979) on Bangladesh, Brazil, and Colombia, various contribu-
tions in ADAMS et al. (1984) mainly on Latin America, CUEVAS and GRAHAM (1986) on 
Bangladesh, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru, AHMED (1989) on Bangladesh, R.L. 
MEYER and CUEVAS (1992) on Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Niger, Phil-
ippines, and Togo, and OLOMOLA (1999) on Nigeria. 
20  There is a tension between the use of the term credit rationing in the cited Ohio State 
school literature and the more formal agency literature as presented below. While the latter 
– in accordance with the definition given in this monograph, section 2.1.1 – clearly sees 
credit rationing as a quantity restriction, the Ohio State school writers seem to imply that 
rationing works through a price mechanism (via transaction costs). The only way to recon-
cile these two views is by regarding a borrower’s demand for credit determined by a hypo-
thetical first-best interest rate. In case the borrower actually faces positive transaction 
costs, she can afford less than the first-best credit volume, which restricts the quantity bor-
rowed and might hence be interpreted as an excess demand. See the further discussion here 
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Source: Author’s  depiction. 
In  Figure 2-2, the investor has available the same set of productive investments 
according to line W0W1 as in Figure 2-1. However, the financial market line is 
now split. The investor can borrow money at the interest rate rb=tan β – 1 and 
save money at the rate rs=tan γ - 1 < rb. Furthermore, in comparison to Figure 
2-1, rs < r < rb. Hence, all reasonable combinations of consumption bundles at 
time points t=0 and 1 are depicted by the line M0BAFM1. Under these condi-
tions, which is the optimal volume of productive investment? The answer clearly 
depends on the time preference of the investor. An investor with a weak time 
preference would probably prefer a point on the line FM1. In this case, he will 
save money at t=0 for consumption at t=1. Relevant for him is thus rs, and he 
would productively invest W0F. An investor with a strong time preference, such 
as Investor 3 in Figure 2-2, would probably choose a point on the line M0B, in 
which case she would borrow at rate rb, invest W0B, and consume (c0,c1). Both 
investors could calculate a NPV by using their relevant interest rate for discount-
ing. For Investor 3, the NPV is W0M0. Finally, an investor with a medium time 
preference may prefer point A. He has to directly compare his time preference 
with the IRR of his productive investment, since no useful NPV can be calcu-
lated.  36    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
Hence, an important result is the following:  
With positive transaction costs, investment decisions cannot be made in 
separation from consumption decisions. There is no objective criterion con-
cerning which productive investments should be made, since the relevant dis-
count rate (if one exists at all) depends on the preferences of the investor.  
Suppose now that Investor 3 wishes to productively invest I0W0 – the optimal 
amount with zero transaction costs – but needs to consume 0c0 at t=0 in Figure 
2-2, since this is an indispensable subsistence bundle without which Investor 3 
cannot survive. At the borrowing rate rb, he would obtain L0W0 from the loan 
market. Hence, there remains a financial gap of size I0L0 – c0W0. This is pre-
cisely the case where nonzero transaction costs prevent otherwise profitable in-
vestment. To decide whether there is any persistent excess credit demand as 
compared to the ideal situation in Figure 2-1 or whether credit allocation in the 
presence of transaction costs is socially inefficient ultimately depends on the 
interest rate taken as benchmark. Positive transaction costs distort the unambi-
guous benchmark of the ideal, neoclassical world in such a way that a definite 
judgement cannot be made any more. 
One way out of this dilemma could be to simply accept transaction costs as a 
fact of life and treat them similarly to conventional production or transportation 
costs – as was implicitly done in the analysis so far. Without severe difficulties, 
‘transaction activities’ could be included in an otherwise unchanged neoclassical 
trade model (see the example in FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1997, section 2.4). 
With a given (convex) transaction technology, rational decision makers would 
economise on transaction costs, this would slightly affect the optimal solution of 
the model, but the property of Pareto-optimality – given positive transaction 
costs – would be preserved. By such a model, interest spreads as in Figure 2-2 
can be explained. However, the problem of evaluating investment projects as 
just demonstrated emerges, which is why the situation is simply declared as be-
ing ‘constrained-efficient’ or ‘second-best’ as compared to a world with zero 
transaction costs. Taking the problem of Investor 3 as an example, it would be 
regarded as socially constrained-efficient in a second-best world that his desired 
investment I 0W0 cannot be carried out, while in a first-best world it would 
clearly be inefficient to refrain from doing so. On the private level, taking one or 
the other interest rate as appropriate discount would end up in the same di-
lemma. 
As DAHLMAN (1979) has pointed out, a fundamental difficulty arises from this 
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taken as given, a situation can always be described as Pareto-optimal: “if it ex-
ists it must be optimal, and if it does not exist it is because it is too costly, so that 
it is optimal too” (DAHLMAN 1979, p. 153). As a result, any reasonable bench-
mark in terms of efficiency or optimality disappears. 
Taking stock, the previous discussion can be summarised as follows: there are 
examples of transaction costs on loan markets that can be and are measured. 
However, the introduction of given transaction costs into the formal analysis at 
the same time undermines the previously established criterion of efficiency.  
I conclude that a judgement concerning the presence of credit rationing in a 
world of positive transaction costs is impossible as long as the nature of 
these costs is not investigated further.  
One decisive question to be posed during this investigation is, as FURUBOTN and 
RICHTER (1997, pp. 62; 460-1) made clear, which transaction costs or which ad-
ditional constraints of the real world are unavoidable and which can be circum-
vented. The next steps in the analysis are therefore guided by the following two 
issues: (a) a closer examination of the nature or the determinants of transaction 
costs, and (b) the search for an operational rule that allows to assess whether 
transaction costs are avoidable. 
Before going into the details of the former issue, I want to call the reader’s atten-
tion to an important source of transaction costs regarded as being ‘avoidable’ by 
many economists who are in favour of financial liberalisation and deregulation. 
This source is government intervention. In previous decades, intervention on fi-
nancial markets often took the form of foreign exchange controls, interest rate 
ceilings, high reserve requirements, and the suppression of private capital mar-
kets; thus overall leading to a situation of financial repression (FRY 1995, pp. 
20-21). Under these conditions, it is quite plausible that potential borrowers find 
that they either cannot borrow as much as they would like to at current interest 
rates or are unable to borrow at all (DRISCOLL 1992, p. 68). Therefore, many 
economists would probably agree with BALTENSPERGER (1978, p. 180) that “le-
gal [...] constraints on loan term adjustments may lead to rationing and certainly 
may have undesirable efficiency results.” This is also the major argument of the 
Ohio State school of rural finance. Writers in this tradition make (in their view 
avoidable) transaction costs caused by overly restrictive government regulation 
directly responsible for credit rationing of rural borrowers (see ADAMS 1993; 
CUEVAS and GRAHAM 1984 and 1986; LADMAN 1984). In this view, the best in-
tervention to mitigate credit rationing is to remove existing financial policy 
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Over recent years, policies of financial liberalisation have figured prominently 
world-wide (see CAPRIO et al. 2001). They were also an important step in the 
transition process of the CEECs. How far liberalisation is still due on the Polish 
rural credit market has been briefly addressed in section 1.2 and will be taken up 
again in the discussion of the empirical results of this thesis. For the moment, I 
will not elaborate further on policy issues but come back, on a theoretical level, 
to the question of the nature of transaction costs.  
Indeed, possibly as a consequence of widespread liberalisation policies, there is 
now a substantial volume of literature investigating the causes of credit rationing 
on  unrestricted financial markets. Compared with the literature emphasising 
measurement or observation of transaction costs, which was regarded previously 
as not fully satisfying in theoretical terms, this line of research is primarily con-
cerned with more abstract and formal models. It is thus quite close in spirit to 
conventional, neoclassical equilibrium theory and belongs to a research pro-
gramme usually called ‘agency theory’, ‘principal-agent analysis’, or ‘econom-
ics of information’ (for an overview see BAMBERG and SPREMANN 1987). As 
was indicated in section 2.1.3, this research programme attempts to extend the 
neoclassical model in an appropriate way to make it more flexible for explaining 
real world events, without throwing all its major assumptions overboard. As the 
names suggest, the basic premise of this literature is that there is an asymmetric 
distribution of information between decision makers, which constitutes the so-
called agency problem. Economic actors have to be treated differently according 
to their information status, which is why the distinction between principal and 
agent is introduced. As subsequent sections will show, this is tantamount to a 
much more comprehensive analysis of a variety of institutional arrangements 
than possible in the orthodox, neoclassical framework.
21 The next section will 
outline some basic elements of this theory. 
2.1.5 Extension 2: asymmetric information 
The consideration of asymmetric information between market participants has 
opened a wide arena of economic research that today represents a major branch 
of institutional economics. One of the earliest contributions in this line of re-
search was AKERLOF (1970), who demonstrated the effects of unknown quality 
of used cars on outcomes of the second-hand automobile market: the fact that 
there are ‘lemons’, that is used cars of a poor quality which cannot be distin-
                                           
21    In the terminology of O.E. WILLIAMSON’s Transaction Cost Economics, this analysis 
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guished from high-quality cars by potential buyers, may lead to a complete 
breakdown of the market. Already in this paper a second market receives atten-
tion where similar problems may occur: the market for credit, on which lenders 
have only limited information about the ‘quality’ of borrowers, that is their hon-
esty, reliability, or trustworthiness with regard to the due repayment of the 
loan.
22 It may pay the opportunistic borrower to pretend to be honest, and take 
the money and run after he received the loan. As a result, the lender will think 
twice whom he will grant a credit. In this case, the lender is called the principal, 
and the borrower is the agent, due to the differential information they possess 
about each other. In this way, a peculiar type of uncertainty is reintroduced into 
the analysis. 
Later research made clear that the effects of asymmetric information distribution 
may reasonably be classified according to the sequence of actions of principal 
and agent. As a consequence, principal-agent problems are often cast in game 
theoretic terms (see RASMUSEN 1994, part II). With regard to credit markets, 
there are three key problems a lender must contend with: the lender must 
(a) ascertain what kind of a risk the potential borrower is (the problem of ad-
verse selection), (b) make sure she will utilise the loan properly, once made, so 
that she will be able to repay it (moral hazard), and (c) learn how her project 
really did in case she declares her inability to repay (costly state verification).
23 
Accordingly, one can distinguish informational asymmetries that are ex ante 
(adverse selection), interim (moral hazard), or ex-post (costly state verification) 
to the borrowing transaction (FREIXAS and ROCHET 1997, p. 16). I will charac-
terise the three phenomena in turn:
24
1.  Adverse selection in loan markets arises when borrowers have characteristics 
that are unobservable to the lender but affect the probability of being able to 
repay the loan. A farmer may be in a better position than the bank to assess 
                                           
22  Such phenomena also figure prominently on the labour market, on which other early pa-
pers of the asymmetric information tradition focus, for example SPENCE (1973) and 
STIGLITZ (1974). AKERLOF, SPENCE, and STIGLITZ were awarded the Nobel prize for their 
work in 2001. 
23  Here I ‘borrow’ from the successful formulation of GHATAK and GUINNANE (1999, p. 197). 
They mention as a fourth important problem the enforcement of the loan contract, which is 
omitted here since it is not directly related to asymmetric information. 
24  I draw mainly on GHATAK and GUINNANE (1999). Other expositions of the principal-agent 
problem with increasing degree of complexity are HOFF et al. (1993), NEUBERGER (1998), 
BRANDES et al. (1997), FURUBOTN and RICHTER (1997), KREPS (1990), and RASMUSEN 
(1994). This list does not claim to be comprehensive. 40    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
whether his soils and his abilities justify investment in a fruit tree plantation. 
If the bank, therefore, cannot discriminate between borrowers, low-risk in-
vestment projects might be withdrawn from the market if they are only of-
fered the average loan contract conditions. This in turn worsens the average 
quality of the loan applicant pool from the point of view of the bank, which is 
a process of adverse selection. The presence of high-risk borrowers in the 
market thus exerts a negative externality on low-risk borrowers. In the ex-
treme case, the result is zero trade, as in AKERLOF’s (1970) lemon example. 
Hence, both lenders and low-risk borrowers have an interest to overcome the 
informational asymmetry. This is however not costless, since it involves ex-
penses on screening or signalling activities (see SPENCE 1973 on the latter). 
In credit markets, these are particularly widespread: lenders demand collat-
eral that can be seized in case of loan default, borrowers are required to fi-
nance part of the investment by their own wealth, or they must show exten-
sive business plans, third-party guarantees, or income statements. According 
to KREPS (1990, p. 651), if the informed side takes the active role, one speaks 
of signalling (e.g. by offering a third party guarantee), while screening is pre-
sent if the side without information proposes a menu of contracts (e.g. includ-
ing different interest-collateral combinations) among which the informed side 
selects. These mechanisms will be explored in a more formal way in later 
sections of this chapter. 
2.  Moral hazard is related to the fact that, once a borrower has taken a loan, the 
project’s payoff depends in part on the borrower’s effort. This may be not di-
rectly observable by the bank. Since, absent collateral, the borrower does not 
fully internalise the costs of project failure, there are incentives for him to 
maximise his personal welfare to the detriment of the lender. If the project 
outcome involves some randomness, such as weather events, the agent can 
always argue that a poor result was attributable to forces beyond his control 
and, thus, not his fault. Moral hazard occurs if the borrower does not take 
those actions that make repayment of the loan most likely: though the farmer 
cannot affect whether there is early frost that potentially destroys his blos-
soming cherries, he can affect the losses he incurs by taking precautionary 
action, even if this requires additional effort. Countermeasures include active 
and costly monitoring of agents by the principal, aiming at preventing oppor-
tunistic behaviour. 
3.  Costly state verification is necessary if lenders cannot easily check whether 
borrowers who say they cannot fully repay are indeed unable to do so. For 
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likewise does it incur costs to verify the actual project outcome. To solve the 
double problem of false reporting and costs of state verification, TOWNSEND 
(1979) has demonstrated that the optimal solution is a so-called standard 
debt contract: the borrower promises a fixed repayment, and the bank seizes 
the entire cash flow of the project when the borrower claims she cannot re-
pay. However, if information asymmetries regarding project outcomes are 
pronounced, potential auditing costs may be assessed as being too high, so 
that again no loan contract materialises at all. 
It probably became clear that asymmetric information is not an unalterable fact, 
but it is costly to counteract and sometimes impossible to fully overcome. 
Hence, a demand for services or institutions that help to mitigate the negative 
consequences of asymmetric information is likely to emerge. This in turn pro-
vides a rationale for the existence of financial intermediaries, which are super-
fluous in a world with perfect information. As may be intuitively plausible, there 
will be economies of scale in screening, monitoring, and auditing (as well as in 
risk diversification), which fosters the creation of specialised firms offering 
these services. In fact, it may be efficient for borrowers to form ‘information 
sharing coalitions’ in order to signal their quality to investors, an argument that 
can explain the emergence of specialised financial intermediaries (LELAND and 
PYLE 1977). Similarly, they may emerge if it pays individual lenders (or savers) 
to delegate the monitoring activity to a specialised institution, instead of per-
forming it themselves. This is the ‘delegated monitoring’ theory of financial in-
termediation (DIAMOND 1984; for overviews see FREIXAS and ROCHET 1997, 
NEUBERGER 1998, and RÜHLE 1997). 
Summing up, the introduction of informational asymmetries considerably com-
plicates the neoclassical model of the capital market. Although their effects were 
only sketched briefly so far, it is obvious that they undermine the traditional role 
of the price as the single allocation mechanism if the quality of the good in ques-
tion (here: investment projects to be financed) depends on its price (the interest 
rate; see STIGLITZ 1987). Therefore, non-price allocation mechanisms such as 
collateral, but also honesty or reputation come into play. Interlinkages between 
different markets may arise, for which trade credit is an example (JAIN 2001). 
New sorts of externalities emerge. A whole set of institutions in the area of fi-
nancial intermediation is the response to prevailing informational asymmetries. 
As was already suggested, even in the presence of such institutions, markets are 
still unlikely to function perfectly. Some markets, particularly those involving 
risk, will be missing, and many other markets will be thin and thus imperfectly 42    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
competitive (HOFF et al. 1993). The possibility of credit rationing is one of the 
ultimate consequences. 
It has been demonstrated in the literature on agency theory that each of the three 
phenomena of asymmetric information explained above taken alone may lead to 
credit rationing in a particular narrow sense. See the contributions of STIGLITZ 
and WEISS (1981) on adverse selection and moral hazard and S.D. WILLIAMSON 
(1987) on costly state verification. I will examine some of these rather stylised 
and abstract models in more detail in subchapter 2.2. In this literature, credit ra-
tioning is understood as the fact that a borrower’s demand for credit is turned 
down, even if this borrower is willing to pay all the price and non-price ele-
ments of the loan contract (BALTENSPERGER 1978, p. 173). Non-price elements 
include collateral, borrower’s equity, a stable customer relationship, or the 
length of the loan period. Quite in line with the definition given in section 2.1.1, 
a situation is thus characterised as ‘pure’ or ‘equilibrium’ credit rationing if 
there is a persistent excess of demand over supply with price and non-price 
terms showing no tendency to clear the market (STIGLITZ and WEISS 1981, pp. 
394-5; JAFFEE and STIGLITZ 1990). In the extreme case, apparently identical bor-
rowers’ access to loans is simply by chance, or randomised (BESANKO and 
THAKOR 1987, p. 678). 
The relationship between credit volume and interest rate may be depicted in a 
supply and demand diagram as in Figure 2-3. The decisive property of supply is 
that it is backward bending, as shown in the figure. Subchapter 2.2 will demon-
strate in more detail under which circumstances such a backward bending supply 
schedule may occur – for example, it may reflect an adverse selection effect of a 
rise in the interest rate. For the demand schedule 1, a competitive equilibrium 
exists, characterised by equality of supply and demand, so that the nominal rate 
R1 clears the market.
25 However, for the demand schedule 2, supply and demand 
curves do not intersect. An equilibrium with credit rationing will then occur, 
characterised by the interest rate R*, in which credit is allocated by means other 
than the interest rate.
26
                                           
25  Throughout this monograph, R is gross repayment including interest, and r is the interest 
rate, such that R = K(1+r), with K the amount borrowed. 
26  Following KEETON (1979) as cited in FREIXAS and ROCHET (1997, p. 155, fn. 2), it may be 
reasonable to distinguish two types of rationing. Type I rationing occurs when all borrow-
ers receive credit but are restricted in the size of the loan they obtain; type II rationing oc-
curs when borrowers have only randomised access to the full loan size they demand, so 
that some borrowers obtain the loan they demanded while others obtain no loan at all. If     2.1 Forms and sources of credit rationing  43   










Source:  Adapted from FREIXAS and ROCHET (1997, p. 140). 
This situation is clearly a substantial deviation from the perfect capital market 
model which was established as a benchmark in section 2.1.2 above. Much less 
clear are two related key questions:  
1.  Does such rationing actually exist as an important phenomenon in reality?  
2.  If it exists, does it provide a case for government intervention?  
There is an intensive debate in the current literature concerning both questions, 
since they are still not answered satisfactorily (see BALTENSPERGER and 
DEVINNEY 1985  and  HUBBARD 1998 on the first, and BESLEY 1994 and 
DRISCOLL 1992 on the second question). Therefore, most of the remaining 
analysis in this thesis is devoted to further exploring them. I will briefly outline 
the crucial issues of both questions in the following, before going more into the 
details in later sections. 
To demonstrate that pure credit rationing actually exists requires clarification on 
two fronts. First, it may be asked how robust models of equilibrium credit ra-
                                                                                                                                    
projects are indivisible, rationing is always of type II. If projects are divisible, rationing 
would be of type I under decreasing returns to scale, and of type II under increasing returns 
to scale (FREIXAS and ROCHET 1997, p. 140). 44    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
tioning are on theoretical grounds. Since most models work with rather restric-
tive and stylised assumptions, this may be a central objection, which will be dis-
cussed in subchapter 2.2. Second, it is necessary to develop empirical tests that 
conclusively verify or reject the propositions of the models. A fundamental 
problem in this respect is to find an operational definition of credit rationing that 
fits into the restrictive assumptions of the theory. Since laboratory experiments 
are largely impossible in empirical economics, it is probably difficult to isolate 
certain determinants of credit rationing, if the phenomenon has been operational-
ised after all. Furthermore, these determinants have to convincingly represent 
the presence or absence of asymmetric information. Questions of an empirical 
strategy to detect credit rationing are the focus of chapter 3. 
If there is still a long way to go before pure credit rationing as an empirical fact 
can be verified, it appears even more difficult to think about reasonable govern-
ment intervention. In theory, the presence of asymmetric information seems to 
imply that there is almost always space for ‘constrained’ Pareto improvements 
via tax policy (GREENWALD and STIGLITZ 1986). With regard to credit rationing, 
JAFFEE and STIGLITZ (1990, p. 868) state that “A market equilibrium with credit 
rationing [...] is not Pareto efficient in general, even when account is taken of the 
costs of information.” However, which type of policy is optimal is often impos-
sible to determine since even simple theoretical models generate irreconcilable 
implications once the assumptions of the model are slightly modified (see DE 
MEZA and WEBB 1987 and subchapter 2.2 of this monograph). HOFF et al. 
(1993, p. 19) argue that, as a result of asymmetric information, the justifications 
for market interventions grow in number but also in complexity and side effects. 
They plausibly assume that, if asymmetric information is at the core of market 
failures, better information and more transparency in markets and institutions 
will be at the core of any solution. However, it is quite an open question whether 
governments possess an advantage over private agents in dealing with these 
problems, for example in gathering information on the varying probabilities of 
default in the loan market (STIGLITZ 1987a). In the end, government intervention 
aimed at mitigating problems of asymmetric information may create even new 
agency relations.
27 Practical policy advice might thus be difficult to give. An 
even more anti-interventionist position is taken by BALTENSPERGER (1978, p. 
180) who says: 
                                           
27  An example is the introduction of public guarantee schemes for rural borrowers. The inter-
national evidence suggests that these programmes tend to result in severe problems of 
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“Endogenous constraints based on imperfect information and screening [...] 
should not be seen as a factor causing inefficiencies and distortions. Rather, they 
represent an efficient response of the market to the existence of certain cost ele-
ments present in the loan market but not in the usual ‘textbook’ market, namely 
information and transaction cost elements found in any market with heterogene-
ous goods (such as, e.g., the labour market, the housing market, the insurance 
market, and many more). They can certainly not be the rationale, therefore, for 
any corrective regulatory measures.” 
According to this view, although the private demand for funds may exceed the 
loan offers, this is not regarded as socially undesirable. 
Looking back, the following becomes clear:  
Agency theory has much to say about the nature and the determinants of 
transaction costs. However, whether these costs do indicate an inefficiency or 
even provide a rationale for intervention appears almost impossible to judge 
a priori.  
Issues of policy intervention will be taken up again in section 2.2.3 and subse-
quent chapters of the monograph. 
Finally, it is interesting to see how the notion of transaction costs (or ‘agency 
costs’, to mention a term used by several writers) changes its meaning in the lit-
erature on agency theory (see TERBERGER 1994, pp. 125-134). Along with a shift 
towards theoretically more sophisticated, often highly stylised models goes an 
increasingly abstract understanding of these costs, up to the point where they are 
regarded as a superfluous concept at all. A case in point is the paper by JENSEN 
and MECKLING (1976) concerning the separation of ownership and control in a 
corporate firm. These authors define agency costs as the sum of (a) monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, (b) bonding expenditures by the agent (similar to 
signalling activities explained above), and (c) the residual loss, which can be 
regarded in a general sense as the difference between the hypothetical welfare in 
a first-best world and the welfare actually attained when transaction costs are 
positive and total welfare is not truly maximised by the actions of the agent. The 
difference between the first- and second-best solution are the gross agency costs. 
However, these costs can never be measured, since the first-best outcome is 
generally unknown. As a result, the notion of transaction costs can only be used 
reasonably in a metaphorical sense (see the dispute between SCHNEIDER 1987 
and SCHMIDT 1987 and section 3.1.2 below). In the end, endogenising the entire 
institutional structure and thus giving due attention its specific information and 
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futility, as HELLWIG (1988, p. 200) has noted (cited in TERBERGER 1994, p. 133, 
fn. 131): 
“...when there is incomplete information, Coasian transaction costs depend on 
the precise nature of the strategic interactions and cannot be assessed prior to a 
full analysis of the system. After such an analysis, when one understands the 
system anyway, it is not clear what additional purpose the concept can serve.” 
Essentially, a precise measurement of transaction costs is impossible since the 
correct opportunity costs of transaction activities are unknown. As long as the 
institutional arrangement used to determine the value of an alternative activity is 
unclear, these opportunity costs cannot be calculated.
28 If the optimal institu-
tional arrangement is known, the exact volume of transaction costs accruing in 
the second-best situation provides little additional value. Therefore, the notion of 
(measurable) transaction costs plays almost no role in formal agency theory. 
Somewhat surprisingly, O.E. WILLIAMSON, the ‘inventor’ of the term ‘Transac-
tion Cost Economics’, also does not aim at measuring transaction costs, although 
he acknowledges empirical work (1985, p. 22):  
“Empirical research on transaction cost matters almost never attempts to meas-
ure such costs directly. Instead, the question is whether organizational relations 
(contracting practices; governance structures) line up with the attributes of 
transactions as predicted by transaction cost reasoning or not.”  
Measurement of transaction costs will again be an issue when it comes to quanti-
fying interest rates faced by farmers in Poland in subchapter 3.3, where an em-
pirical model of household decision making is considered. However, in the light 
of the preceding discussion, it seems unjustified to regard transaction costs in 
the sense of actual cash or time expenses per se as a useful measure of credit 
rationing. 
Before examining one of the well established models of equilibrium credit ra-
tioning, I now want to summarise the hitherto gained knowledge concerning the 
classification and assessment of different types of credit rationing. 
                                           
28  This also qualifies the results of WALLIS and NORTH (1986) concerning the measurement 
of transaction costs in the American economy. They attempt to measure these costs by add-
ing up the value of services of what they call transaction industries, with the result that the 
percentage share in GNP of these costs more than doubled between 1870 and 1970. As 
TERBERGER (1994, p. 127, fn. 113) argues, this approach disregards opportunity costs, 
since it only shows that more and more coordination activity is delegated to specialised in-
dustries from which it is purchased afterwards. According to TERBERGER, what this docu-
ments is an increasing division of labour within the economy, which indirectly suggests the 
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2.1.6 Summary and conclusions for further research 
This section attempts to synthesise the answers found in theory so far on the 
questions emerging from a common sense understanding of credit rationing. In 
section 2.1.1, credit rationing was regarded as a situation where a lack of suffi-
cient credit inhibits privately desirable investment. The questions brought up 
were: is there an ideal situation of absent credit rationing? What are the reasons 
for any observed deviations from this ideal? Is it possible to intervene in order to 
re-establish the ideal situation? 
In section 2.1.2, the benchmark model of a perfect, neoclassical capital market 
was established, which has the desirable property of guaranteeing that all suffi-
ciently remunerative investment projects can be financed. Moreover, funding is 
independent of the wealth of the investor who runs the project. The perfect capi-
tal market achieves a best possible solution (in the sense of Pareto-optimality) to 
the allocation problem of society. It provides an objective criterion on which 
projects shall be carried out (which are therefore ‘desirable’): those projects 
qualify for funding that yield at least the (single) market rate of interest. In this 
form of capital market, there is no credit rationing. Furthermore, no intervention 
is necessary, because all privately and socially desirable investment is made. 
The merit of this model – that it entails no credit rationing by definition – was 
regarded as a weakness as well (section 2.1.3). In the real world, there may be 
various interest rates, and it may be doubtful whether all profitable investments 
are really always funded (according to DRISCOLL 1992, p. 78, this typically is in 
question with regard to students, small businesses, and farmers). The ideal, neo-
classical model was therefore viewed as not very helpful in analysing these eve-
ryday observable problems. Suitable extensions of the model were thus sought 
in the literature. 
The first extension was the explicit consideration of positive transaction costs 
(section 2.1.4). Transaction costs can explain the existence of differing interest 
rates, but they also decay the objective criterion concerning which projects are 
socially desirable to finance at all. To escape this dilemma, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between avoidable and unavoidable transaction costs – which however 
requires a new, ‘objective’ criterion. It was hence regarded as indispensable to 
further investigate the nature and the causes of transaction costs. For many 
economists, particularly those transaction costs seem definitely avoidable that 
are the direct consequence of governmental intervention, which should therefore 
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In section 2.1.5, as a second extension, the consequences of asymmetric infor-
mation between agents on the credit market were studied. Phenomena of adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and costly state verification establish quite plausible 
reasons for the prevalence of positive transaction costs. Furthermore, a host of 
institutional arrangements that are unnecessary on a perfect capital market but 
do exist in the real world – such as financial intermediaries – can be explained as 
a response to these informational asymmetries. However, the role of the interest 
rate as an objective decision criterion is fundamentally shaken, since interest 
changes may affect the quality of the investment projects ready to be financed. 
Whether this is a justification for government intervention largely depends on 
the precise situation and is thus open to doubt. If there were a Pareto-improving 
policy measure, then the costs arising from imperfect information clearly could 
be regarded as avoidable. However, just because there are widespread problems 
of asymmetric information, this question is most difficult to answer. 
As a synthesis of the discussion, and for further reference, the following three 
sources of credit rationing may be distinguished: 
1.  Interest rate rationing: A project cannot be credit funded because it does not 
yield the market rate of interest. In the neoclassical market model, this is nei-
ther privately nor socially efficient and should not be called credit rationing. 
In a model with positive transaction costs as part of the effective interest rate, 
there may be credit rationing if transaction costs are avoidable. This is a cru-
cial issue if the costs are a result of government regulation, so that the next 
paragraph applies. Furthermore, the interest rate may be influenced by 
asymmetric information, so that the next but one paragraph applies. 
2.  Government intervention: A project cannot be funded because of governmen-
tally imposed regulations that restrict access to funds for certain types of bor-
rowers, or imposes interest ceilings so that the interest rate cannot adjust to 
appropriately reflect demand and supply. This is usually regarded as ineffi-
cient and may be viewed as an (avoidable) form of credit rationing. 
3.  Asymmetric information: A form of pure or equilibrium credit rationing oc-
curs that results in randomised funding of apparently identical projects. It is 
usually discussed in the framework of (rather stylised) models of asymmetric 
information. There are authors who argue that this is a socially efficient re-
sponse to the existence of transaction costs. Others regard it as inefficient and 
show that, in a theoretical model, there are policy interventions that achieve 
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Unfortunately, all these forms or descriptions of credit rationing are intimately 
linked to a certain view of the world, or a given theoretical perspective. They are 
therefore of only limited value for empirical analysis and practical policy advice. 
Nevertheless, it appears possible to extract some generalised conclusions from 
the previous theoretical discussion. In my view, from a pragmatic standpoint that 
aims at empirically investigating the presence and the determinants of credit ra-
tioning, the following lessons can be learned (they are purposively formulated 
without precision): 
1.  A comparison between observable interest rates on loan markets on the one 
hand and rates of return of investment projects on the other may serve as a 
(possibly rough) guideline for assessing to which extent, in a given situation, 
there are substantial deviations from the perfect market model. In case that a 
large number of sufficiently profitable projects cannot be credit funded, this 
indicates the presence of credit rationing and may also point to the possibility 
of underinvestment. 
2. The problem of asymmetric information between borrower and lender is 
likely to play a significant role as a determinant of credit rationing. It will be 
worth investigating to which extent and at what costs signalling, screening, 
monitoring, or auditing activities can overcome this problem. 
3. Government policy has to be looked at critically. It may improve access to 
credit, but in many cases regulation or intervention may be the ultimate 
source of credit rationing. With regard to lesson 1, it will be of particular in-
terest how far government policy systematically influences interest rates or 
returns of projects. 
These thoughts will be made more precise at the end of the following subchap-
ter, in which I want to examine a number of issues only briefly touched upon in 
previous sections in more detail and more formally. This may provide the reader 
with a flavour of the style of argumentation in the literature on agency theory, 
but also with an impression of the difficulties of formalising real-world prob-
lems. 
2.2  Equilibrium credit rationing due to asymmetric information 
After having unfold in a mostly literary way the major issues of a theoretical 
analysis of credit rationing in the previous subchapter, I now aim at investigat-
ing a number of selected problems more formally, and thus more akin in style to 
the rather abstract literature on agency theory. However, although the discussion 50    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
will be more formal than in subchapter 2.1, an attempt is made to use mathe-
matical notation only to a moderate extent.  
I take as a starting point the model of credit rationing by STIGLITZ and WEISS 
(1981), thus largely ignoring the theoretical literature prior to this seminal work. 
The reader interested in earlier developments is referred to surveys such as 
BALTENSPERGER (1978) and BALTENSPERGER and DEVINNEY (1985). After an 
outline of the model, I go on, based on the relevant literature, to question the 
premises of the model and explore the effects of changes in the assumptions. 
This will lead up to a discussion of policy implications and an overview of the 
theoretical literature concerning countermeasures to credit rationing. 
2.2.1 Credit rationing in the model of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) 
The central objective of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) is to demonstrate the possi-
bility of a stable equilibrium where demand for loans exceeds supply with no 
tendency for the interest rate to clear the market (see Figure 2-3). In this situa-
tion, banks deny loans to borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable 
from those who receive loans (STIGLITZ and WEISS 1981, p. 394) although all 
market participants behave in a rational, profit maximising way. The ultimate 
reason for this form of credit rationing is that banks have only limited informa-
tion about the riskiness of projects to be financed. This fact can explain the exis-
tence of a bank optimal interest rate, beyond which, at an increasing interest 
rate, the loan supply of the bank actually decreases. In the following, I concen-
trate on the case where a rise in the interest rate leads to an adverse selection 
process regarding the pool of loan applicants (section I of STIGLITZ and WEISS 
1981). 
STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) consider the lender-borrower relationship on a loan 
market as follows. They assume that the bank faces a group of prospective bor-
rowers, each of whom holds a project with uncertain outcome to be credit 
funded. Borrowers and lenders are risk neutral, and the supply of loanable funds 
available to the bank is unaffected by the interest rate it charges borrowers. 
Banks act as price setters on the credit market and as quantity setters on the de-
posit market. They simultaneously choose a capacity of funds on the deposit 
market and a nominal loan rate in such a way that their profit is maximised, tak-
ing as given the return demanded by depositors and the loan rates set by other 
banks (see FREIXAS and ROCHET 1997, p. 140).  
Projects are assumed to be not divisible, that is, unless a borrower is successful 
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that the amount borrowed for each project is identical. However, for each project 
there is a probability distribution of gross return y which cannot be altered by the 
borrower. All projects have the same mean return but differ by a risk parameter 
θ , which only the borrowers know. The bank thus cannot ascertain the riskiness 
of an individual project, but it knows the statistical distribution of returns among 
the population of potential borrowers. Let the distribution of returns be  ) , ( θ y G  
and the density function  ) , ( θ y g . Greater θ  corresponds with greater risk in the 
sense of mean preserving spreads. This implies the following (see ROTHSCHILD 
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that is the distribution of the riskier project has more weight in the tails. 
Borrowers are required to pledge a certain amount of collateral C. Since the 
bank cannot discriminate between borrowers, the bank offers all borrowers the 
same standard debt contract, in which the borrower either repays a fixed amount 
R (if she can) or her collateral plus cash flow is seized by the bank. The profit of 
each borrower can thus be written as: 
) , max( ) , ( R y C R y − − = π . (2-1) 
Hence, the borrowers’ profit is convex in y (see Figure 2-4).  52    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 








Source:  Adapted from STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981, p. 396). 
To the contrary, the return to the bank ρ  is a concave function of y (Figure 2-5): 
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Source:  Adapted from STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981, p. 396). 
Borrower and bank are thus affected differently by an increasing riskiness of 
projects: while borrowers gain if the return of the project undergoes a mean pre-
serving spread, the bank loses. The downside risk is borne by the bank alone. 
This is an application of Jensen’s inequality, which states that the expected value 
of a convex (concave) function increases (decreases) as its argument undergoes 
a mean preserving spread.
29 As a consequence, within the pool of borrowers 
with the same expected project returns, the more risky borrowers generate the 
largest profits. However, the projects with the lowest risk generate the highest 
return for the bank. Since all borrowers are offered the same interest rate, low-
risk borrowers implicitly subsidise high-risk borrowers, which is a special form 
of externality. 
Under these circumstances, STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) establish that the effect 
of an increase in interest rates on the bank’s return is twofold. On the one hand, 
it increases the return the bank makes on any individual loan granted to a bor-
                                           
29  Jensen’s inequality does not appear in the original paper of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981). 
However, it is a useful formalisation of their argument (see LENSINK et al. 2001, p. 17 and 
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rower with given risk θ . On the other hand, it also decreases the return of the 
bank: a rising interest rate decreases the profits of borrowers, probably below 
zero (or any reservation level). The crucial fact is that, as explicated above, the 
projects with the lowest risk drop out of the market first, since they generate the 
lowest profits for borrowers. In turn, the pool of borrowers becomes more risky, 
which decreases the return of the bank. Therefore, an increase in the interest rate 
need not necessarily increase the return to the bank. If the adverse selection ef-
fect outweighs the increased return from interest rates, the total return of the 
bank declines. Whether and when this is the case depends on the distribution of 
θ . For some of these distributions, the bank’s expected return on loans will be 
single-peaked with a maximum for a repayment R* (see the simulation in NEYER 
2000, pp. 95-100). Under the assumption that the supply of deposits is not fully 
elastic, this results in a backward bending supply of credit and, therefore, a 
situation of equilibrium credit rationing as shown in Figure 2-3. 
STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) also consider a case where moral hazard induces a 
backward bending loan supply curve (in section II of their paper). In this in-
stance, each borrower has available a choice of projects with different risks. In-
creasing the interest rate increases the relative attractiveness of the riskier pro-
jects, for which the return to the bank is lower. Raising the interest rate may thus 
lead borrowers to take actions that are contrary to the objectives of the bank. 
This establishes a similar case to the one above, where the bank may ration 
credit instead of raising the interest rate. 
The results of STIGLITZ and WEISS stand in marked contrast to the conventional 
perfect market model (see STIGLITZ 1987; HILLIER and IBRAHIMO 1993, pp. 284-
288): 
1. Equilibrium credit rationing is inconsistent with the orthodox view that in 
equilibrium supply equals demand (the ‘law of supply and demand’). 
STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981, p. 409) conclude their paper by saying that “The 
usual result of economic theorizing: that prices clear markets, is model spe-
cific and is not a general property of markets – unemployment and credit ra-
tioning are not phantasms.” 
2. Conventional comparative static analysis breaks down in the presence of 
asymmetric information. For example, a shift in demand, that is an increase 
in demand at every interest rate level, would usually be expected to increase 
both the interest rate and the loan volume traded. If the market is character-
ised by equilibrium credit rationing, such as with regard to Demand 2 in 
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3.  Supply and demand are no longer independent, if informational asymmetries 
are important. Suppose that an external shock makes all projects to be fi-
nanced less likely to be successful. This would affect the demand for funds 
and also the banks’ willingness to supply funds, since both functions partly 
depend upon the distribution of projects’ risk.  
4.  If there are observationally distinguishable groups of borrowers, particularly 
risky groups may be denied credit at any rate; a phenomenon known as ‘red-
lining’. This may be the case if there is no interest rate at which the bank re-
ceives a certain minimum return. Although these borrowers have particularly 
profitable projects, the market equilibrium fails to allocate credit to them 
(STIGLITZ and WEISS 1981, pp. 406-407). 
Welfare and policy implications will be treated in more detail below (section 
2.2.3). I now turn first to the question of how sensitive the previously presented 
model is to changes in assumptions. 
2.2.2 Theoretical robustness of equilibrium credit rationing 
This section aims to challenge the assumptions of the model presented in the 
previous section and to examine how plausible these assumptions are and how 
critical for the result of equilibrium credit rationing. Without claiming compre-
hensive coverage of the broad and still ongoing scientific debate spurred by the 
paper of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), I attempt to highlight some key contribu-
tions that are of importance for the topic of this thesis. 
A first line of criticism concerns the fact that even under the conditions assumed 
by STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), the existence of a bank optimal interest rate is 
only a possibility. In a recent study, NEYER (2000) demonstrates that, by assum-
ing normally distributed returns to projects, the existence of a bank optimal in-
terest rate crucially depends on a sufficient heterogeneity of projects (p. 100). A 
second objection is with regard to the availability of loanable funds. Only if 
there is some restriction of these funds – for example by an upward sloping sup-
ply of deposits – will rationing occur (BALTENSPERGER and DEVINNEY 1985, p. 
490). Provided that there is a fully elastic supply of deposits at a sufficiently low 
interest, banks would offer loans at rate R* until all borrowers desiring such a 
loan were served. However, the prevailing interest rate would be higher than in 
the full information case (this is discussed in detail by HILLIER 1997, chapter 2). 
Of course, both assumptions of a heterogeneous pool of borrowers and an ine-
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It is however striking that, in the model of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), the bank 
has an absolutely blind spot with regard to the riskiness of projects, whereas it 
perfectly knows the average return of projects. Since emphasis is on the (indi-
rect) screening effect of the interest rate, the possibility to directly screen bor-
rowers by other means is completely ignored in the model as presented so far. 
Though all borrowers have to provide collateral, they are all offered the same 
standard debt contract which is exogenously given. However, both the bank and 
the less risky borrowers will have an interest in some type of sorting mechanism 
that mitigates the negative effects of asymmetric information (see section 2.1.5 
above). 
The latter aspect is taken up by BESTER (1985), who shows that no credit ration-
ing will occur if banks use collateral as a screening device. This is possible if 
the bank offers different contracts as a self-selection mechanism. Let me exam-
ine BESTER’s (1985) model in some detail (partly following the exposition in 
FREIXAS and ROCHET 1997, pp. 144-147). 
BESTER maintains the assumption of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) that banks can-
not discriminate a priori between borrowers who hold projects with identical 
return but different, only privately observed risks. For simplicity, there are only 
two values for the risk parameter  { }) , ( b a θ θ θ θ ∈ , where  b θ  is a higher risk than 
a θ  in the sense of a mean preserving spread. In contrast to STIGLITZ and WEISS, 
however, the bank offers a menu of contracts  {} b a k k k k C R , ) , ( ∈ = γ  specifying, 
together with an interest Rk, a collateral requirement Ck which may be different 
for each contract. 
Two problems arise in modelling loans that are backed by collateral: (a) the op-
timal solution may imply a value of collateral equalling or even exceeding the 
volume of the loan plus interest,  C R ≤ , so that the loan is perfectly secured, or 
(b) the value of collateral demanded by the bank may exceed the wealth of the 
borrower. The second problem will be ignored for the moment, and will be taken 
up later again. The first problem leads to a situation where imperfect information 
essentially becomes irrelevant (FREIXAS and ROCHET 1997, p. 156, fn. 6). How-
ever, the case that  C R <  can reasonably be excluded, since then a borrower 
would never admit to being bankrupt and always prefer to repay R (BESTER 
1985, p. 851, fn. 6). The case of  C R =  can be made undesirable by introducing 
a cost of collateral, which implies that a unit of collateral costs more for the bor-
rower than what the bank will obtain from it.
30
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BESTER (1985) considers a competitive equilibrium on the loan market. Compe-
tition on each of the contracts offered by the banks results in expected zero 
profit for each of them (abstracting from costs of financial intermediation):  
o b b a a r = = ) ( ) ( γ ρ γ ρ , 
where  a ρ  is the expected return for the bank resulting from a’s distribution of 
projects’ returns, and accordingly for  b ρ .   is the bank’s cost of funds.  o r
There may be two types of Nash equilibria: a separating equilibrium, where dif-
ferent borrowers choose different types of contracts, and a pooling equilibrium, 
where both types of borrowers choose the same contract (see the general treat-
ment by VARIAN 1992, chapter 25). 
A separating equilibrium is defined as a pair of distinct contracts   that 
satisfy the following conditions: (a)   is preferred by low-risk firms and   is 
preferred by high-risk firms (these are the self-selection constraints expressing 
the incentive compatibility of the contract offer); (b) no bank is able to offer an-
other contract on which it obtains an expected return higher than  ; (c) the ex-
pected bank profit for each contract is zero, that is  . 
) , (
∗ ∗
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A pooling equilibrium is defined as involving a single contract preferred by both 
types of borrowers  . Analogue to the separating equilibrium, the 
expected return to the bank of the single contract  , denoted   and re-
sulting from the total distribution of projects’ returns, may not exceed  . 
∗ ∗ ∗ = = b a γ γ γ
∗ γ ) (
∗
+ γ ρ b a
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BESTER establishes that the only possible equilibrium entails no credit rationing. 
This can be seen in a diagram that displays possible combinations of interest and 
collateral (Figure 2-6). 58    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
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Source:  Adapted from FREIXAS and ROCHET (1997, p. 145). 
The figure shows two types of curves: zero profit curves of the bank (broken 
lines) and isoprofit curves of borrowers (solid lines). There are two zero profit 
curves for the bank: line AB denotes all contracts that imply zero profit for the 
bank if they were chosen only by type b borrowers, while line AC denotes all 
contracts with zero profit if they were chosen only by type a borrowers. Since 
type b borrowers have a higher default risk for the bank, they are charged a 
higher interest rate than type a borrowers. A denotes the point of perfect securiti-
sation  , with K the loan size. At A the default risk (and thus the 
problem of asymmetric information) becomes irrelevant. However, since there is 
a cost for pledging or seizing the collateral, the isoprofit curves of borrowers are 
steeper than the zero profit curves of the bank related to their respective risk. 
BB’ and parallels denote the isoprofit of type b borrowers, while CC’ and paral-
lels denote the isoprofit of type a borrowers. Isoprofit curves of type b borrow-
ers are steeper than and for a given profit always above those of type a borrow-
ers, since, for a given amount of collateral, the former are riskier and yield a 
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higher profit (as in the STIGLITZ-WEISS model).
31 Borrowers prefer less collat-
eral and lower interest rates, while the bank prefers more collateral and higher 
interest rates (see equations (2-1) and (2-2)). 
The problem analysed by STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) would imply to take the 
amount of collateral as given and to investigate the consequences of raising the 
interest rate along a parallel of the vertical axis. In fact, this means that, as soon 
as the isoprofit curve of type a borrowers that denotes zero profit is passed, all 
type a borrowers withdraw from the market, leaving only type b borrowers. 
However, the less risky borrowers are more profitable for the bank. Hence, even 
when there is an excess demand for loans, it may not be profitable for a bank to 
enter the market by raising the interest rate. There may be credit rationing in a 
competitive equilibrium, as long as the bank offers the same contract to all ap-
plicants. 
To prove that a pair of contracts   and   defines a separating equilibrium 
with no credit rationing first requires confirming that   is preferred by type a 
borrowers and   by type b borrowers (condition (a) above). Type a borrowers 
strictly prefer   given their lower risk. Notice that this implies some welfare 
loss as compared with the situation of full information and zero collateral, where 
type a borrowers would attain point C. Type b borrowers are indifferent with 











However, to see that the solution cannot be a pooling contract, consider condi-
tion (b) and Figure 2-7: a pooling equilibrium, if it were to exist, would lie on 
the zero profit line AD which satisfies  . For example, it would be 
. Since the riskier borrowers have steeper isoprofit curves, it is possible for a 
deviant bank to offer a contract in the shaded area that attracts only borrowers of 
type a and therefore results in a positive profit. This construction can be carried 
out at any point of the AD curve. On the other hand, if the indifference curve for 
type a borrowers that goes through   intersects the vertical axis at a point be-
low D (such that E is below D, other than shown in Figure 2-7), then a would 
strictly prefer a contract below AD, such as  , with the result of a separating 
equilibrium. Consequently, there is always a preferred alternative to the pooling 
contract, which is equivalent to saying that pooling is not viable against compe-
tition.








                                           
31  Isoprofit curves need not to be concave, this is only a possibility (see BESTER 1985, p. 
852). 
32    This was first established in an insurance market framework. See ROTHSCHILD and 
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Furthermore, no separating pair of contracts dominates   in Figure 2-6. 
 is the contract on the bank’s AB zero profit curve that type b borrowers pre-
fer most. However, for a contract   to be preferred by a and make zero profit, 
it should be on the left of   and on the AC curve. Therefore it would also at-
tract all type b borrowers and the bank would suffer a loss. 
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Source:  Author’s depiction, based on VARIAN (1992, p. 467). 
The argument that there cannot be rationing at   is as follows. A type a 
borrower is rationed at   only if his loan application is turned down although 
his project makes a positive profit. However, in such a situation, a competing 
bank could enter the market and raise R
) , (
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* by a small amount. All borrowers who 
are denied credit at   would apply for this offer. Since it yields higher returns 
to the lender than  , market entry would be profitable, so that an equilibrium 
cannot entail   (contradiction to condition (b)). Therefore, type a borrowers are 







Suppose that a type b borrower would be rationed at  . In this case, she would 
certainly apply for  , which results in pooling of different borrowers at  . 







Any existing equilibrium is thus a separating equilibrium in which type a bor-
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(c) above, since each contract is on the bank’s zero profit curve. In this equilib-
rium, no credit rationing will occur, because collateral is used in order to sort out 
the different, non-observable types of borrowers: 
In the BESTER (1985) model, the plausible assumption that banks employ 
non-price elements (collateral) in loan contracts to overcome problems of 
asymmetric information makes credit rationing disappear. 
A similar point is made by MILDE and RILEY (1988), who demonstrate that, as 
soon as the assumption of fixed loan sizes is relaxed, contract menus including 
different interest rates and loan sizes have the same effect of removing credit 
rationing. 
Is it therefore unlikely that credit rationing as an important phenomenon actually 
exists? This cannot be answered positively either, as further investigations of the 
problem have shown. 
First, both BESANKO and THAKOR (1987) and BESTER (1987) analyse the case in 
which the collateral demanded by the bank exceeds the wealth of the borrower. 
In this case, signalling is not feasible for all borrowers. The result is again a 
pooling of some borrowers, as in the STIGLITZ-WEISS model, which may exhibit 
rationing. 
Second, more generally, JAFFEE and STIGLITZ (1990, p. 867) claim that as long 
as the dimensionality of the space of borrower characteristics exceeds the di-
mensionality of the space of contracts, perfect screening of borrowers will be 
impossible and rationing may therefore occur. As candidates for additional di-
mensions they suggest the wealth or the risk aversion of borrowers. 
Subsequent contributions in the theoretical literature have taken up these sugges-
tions and continued to explore the conditions under which credit rationing will 
be likely to exist. Indeed, the explicit consideration of varying degrees of risk 
aversion in connection with asymmetric information make rationing equilibria a 
likely outcome, even if signalling devices are principally available to borrowers. 
An example is SCHMIDT-MOHR (1997) who demonstrates in a rather general set-
ting with divisible projects that loan-size rationing and self-selection of borrow-
ers may co-exist in equilibrium. On the other hand, no equilibrium involving 
collateral may exist (p. 1331). The latter point is also made by COCO (1999) who 
argues that collateral loses its role as a signalling device if more risk-averse bor-
rowers choose safer investment projects but are also more reluctant to pledge 
collateral. In this case, credit rationing re-appears as an effect of heterogeneous 
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As a supplement to the discussion of collateral, I want to briefly mention a num-
ber of theoretical studies that have examined other types of institutional ar-
rangements that potentially overcome problems of asymmetric information on 
loan markets. These may be broadly grouped into three categories, depending on 
whether they emphasise the role of joint liability, multiperiod effects, or inter-
linkage of credit with other transactions. Presented references highly selectively 
focus on primarily theoretical contributions. 
The first strand of literature refers to any sort of joint liability, also sometimes 
called ‘social collateral’. The basic idea is that the social and economic relation-
ship between the borrower and a third person (which may also be a borrower) is 
utilised to overcome the abundant incentive problems of giving credit. The third 
person may simply be an outside guarantor as in BESANKO and THAKOR (1987). 
Alternatively, it may be reasonable to form groups of borrowers who are jointly 
liable and thus have an incentive to monitor each other (‘peer monitoring’, see 
STIGLITZ 1990 and VARIAN 1990). This is practised in many developing coun-
tries (see the comprehensive treatment by GHATAK and GUINNANE 1999). More-
over, informational advantages of peers rationalise the existence of credit coop-
eratives, which allow a group of otherwise credit-constrained borrowers to raise 
outside finance (BANERJEE et al. 1994). 
Social sanctions available in credit cooperatives may also provide incentives to 
sustain long-term non-opportunistic behaviour of borrowers, which leads to the 
second category of literature stressing the importance of multiperiod effects. The 
threat of termination of the borrower-lender relationship can be used to encour-
age borrower behaviour that the lender finds desirable (STIGLITZ and WEISS 
1983). Borrowers in turn can develop a reputation for being creditworthy over 
time, which may improve access to funds (DIAMOND 1989). 
A third category of studies examines the case where credit exchange is tied to 
other types of transactions, also called ‘interlinkage’. The most well-known is 
the trade-credit interlinkage, or trade credit in short. Giving credit to trade part-
ners makes private information about business activities available to the lender 
at little costs. Screening and monitoring of potential borrowers may thus be 
greatly facilitated. Furthermore, enforcement of loan repayment may be easy by 
simply deducting it from the goods sold to or through the lender. The theory of 
tied credit has been studied both in the framework of developing (BELL 1988) 
and of developed countries (see the brief survey in PETERSEN and RAJAN 1997 
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Before closing this section, a final line of attack against the STIGLITZ-WEISS 
model needs to be introduced. It concerns the specific distributional assumptions 
underlying the pool of loan applicants. DE MEZA and WEBB (1987) demonstrate 
that a slight change of the distributional structure of loan returns suffices to turn 
the credit rationing plus underinvestment model in a model of overinvestment 
without rationing. They particularly focus on the welfare and policy implications 
of credit rationing; their results are therefore presented in more detail in the sub-
sequent section. 
Summing up, it can be concluded that the STIGLITZ-WEISS result of equilibrium 
credit rationing is to a large extent driven by the specific set of assumptions cho-
sen. Due to the high degree of abstraction from reality this is only to be ex-
pected. The model of BESTER (1985) yields the important insight that the possi-
bility of signalling and screening in the lender-borrower relationship is crucial to 
overcome credit rationing. Although there exists a host of mechanisms to reduce 
information asymmetries, these mechanisms are unlikely to work perfectly in 
reality, or may not be available at all. The theoretical prediction of later research, 
namely that credit rationing is an important phenomenon under a variety of set-
tings, appears thus quite plausible. How far the robustness of results extends into 
the domain of welfare and policy implications is the topic of the next section. 
2.2.3 Welfare and policy implications 
Does credit rationing due to imperfect information provide a theoretical justifi-
cation for government intervention on credit markets? It was noted above (sec-
tion 2.1.5) that many authors seem to suggest this, although policy advice based 
on theoretical reasoning is far from unambiguous. In the subsequent section I 
want to clarify this point and briefly outline the varying theoretical results in a 
partial equilibrium framework. 
As suggested by the previous discussion in this monograph, the usual bench-
mark for welfare comparisons is the neoclassical first-best world of perfect in-
formation and zero transaction costs (see section 2.1.2 above). The question of 
whether this is adequate will be ignored for the moment, but be taken up again 
in chapter 5. In line with a common sense understanding of the term credit ra-
tioning as explicated in section 2.1.1, a number of authors assume as a working 
hypothesis that informational asymmetries on loan markets and the presence of 
credit rationing necessarily result in too little investment as compared with a 
situation of perfect information (for example GALE 1990, p. 44; HUBBARD 1998, 
p. 197). Indeed, it can be shown in a slightly modified version of the STIGLITZ-64    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
WEISS model that underinvestment as compared with full information results 
from their assumptions. The following is based on DE MEZA and WEBB (1987) 
and HILLIER and IBRAHIMO (1993).
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Consider again a bank facing a group of observationally indistinguishable bor-
rowers on a competitive loan market. To obtain a tractable version of the 
STIGLITZ-WEISS model, I retain the assumption that each project has a common 
expected return  y. However, for simplicity, the project may either be successful, 
yielding a project-specific return   with probability  , or fail and yield zero. 
For all projects the following holds: 
s
i y i P
y y P
s
i i = , with  . (2-3)  ] 1 , 0 ∈ i P ]
Project i is said to be riskier than project j if, under the condition of (2-3), 
. All other assumptions of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981) as given in section 
2.2.1 remain unchanged except that I set the value of collateral to zero. This can 
be done without altering the results, since, in the STIGLITZ-WEISS framework, 
collateral is not used to sort out borrowers. 
j i P P <
Hence, the expected profit of any borrower i is given by: 
) ( ) ( R y P E
s
i i i − = π , (2-4) 
where R as before is fixed repayment to the bank (including principal and inter-
est). Rationally behaving, risk-neutral borrowers will carry out their project if 
and only if the expected profit exceeds zero, which is given if  . There-
fore, only projects with a sufficiently high   will be made. Since (2-3) holds, 
this is equivalent to say that only projects with a sufficiently low   will be car-
ried out. Consequently, as R rises, average   in the pool of realised projects will 
fall, and projects become riskier on average. This establishes the adverse selec-








Consider now the expected profit of a risk-neutral bank. The density of projects’ 
success is denoted  . In a pooling equilibrium with competition, the stan-
dard debt contract offered to all borrowers earns an expected return to the bank 
as follows: 
) ( i P g
∫ =
P
i i i dP P g P R E
~
0 ) ( ) (ρ , (2-5) 
                                           
33  A detailed coverage of the topic with numerical simulations is also provided by NEYER 
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where P ~  is the success probability of the marginal project. This is the project on 
which borrowers make just zero profit if there is no rationing.  
Suppose that at the equilibrium interest rate R* there are borrowers who could 
make positive profits but are denied loans. A necessary condition for this to be 
an equilibrium is that  0 / ) ( = ∂ ∂ R E ρ  at R*. In fact, a rise in R may have two op-
posite effects. On the one hand, a rising R increases  ) (ρ E  due to higher interest 
revenues. However, as a result of (2-3) and (2-4), a rising R also induces P ~  to 
fall, so that the average success probability of projects and hence  ) (ρ E  tend to 
fall. The sign of  R E ∂ ∂ / ) (ρ  is therefore ambiguous, depending upon which of 
the two conflicting effects dominates. A credit rationing equilibrium is possible 
if in this equilibrium the rate demanded by depositors is such that the supply of 
deposits is less than loan demand. The latter may well be the case under the 
STIGLITZ-WEISS assumption that deposit supply is not fully elastic. 
It is now possible to compare this outcome with a first-best situation of full in-
formation. In a ‘socially efficient’ world, all projects are financed that yield at 
least the safe return, to be denoted R ˆ  in the following (see the discussion in sec-
tion 2.1.2 above). That is, all projects must satisfy: 
R y P
s
i i ˆ ≥ . (2-6) 
In a first-best world, the marginal borrower makes zero profit. Furthermore, 
banks in a competitive environment would just break even on marginal loans. 
However, the latter is different in a STIGLITZ-WEISS world with imperfect infor-
mation as described previously. Due to the inherent asymmetry between banks 
and borrowers, all intra-marginal borrowers have success probabilities lower 
than  P ~  and thus higher profits than the marginal borrower (see (2-4) and the 
discussion in section 2.2.1). Would the bank just break even on the marginal 
loan, it would definitely expect losses on all intra-marginal loans. In equilib-
rium, therefore, investment must be less than the first-best level. Instead, since 
competitive banks are assumed to make zero profits in total and the marginal 
borrower has the highest success probability which, thus, yields the highest 
profit for the bank, this latter profit from the marginal borrower must be posi-
tive. In other words, marginal and near-marginal borrowers subsidise borrowers 
with low success probabilities to make the banks break even. 
DE  MEZA and WEBB  (1987) present a straightforward policy advice for this 
situation of underinvestment (p. 288): a subsidy on deposit interest rates. Such a 
subsidy on interest income will reduce the gross rate banks must pay on depos-
its. Banks can therefore expand the credit volume granted at a given loan rate R* 66    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
ideally up to the socially efficient level, since smaller profits made on the (near-) 
marginal borrowers will suffice to break even in total. 
The question remains whether restoring the first-best situation is in fact a desir-
able policy goal. DE MEZA and WEBB do not consider the way subsidies are fi-
nanced, and hence do not carry out a welfare analysis of government interven-
tion on credit markets. Since reality seldom is first-best, it is doubtful a priori 
whether an artificial, costly re-establishment of the first-best equilibrium is in 
fact worthwhile. In the following, therefore, an attempt is made to apply the tra-
ditional concepts of welfare analysis (see JUST et al. 1982) to the problem of 
credit rationing.
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Figure 2-8 relates capital quantities traded on the loan and deposit market (de-
noted K) to prevailing rates of fixed repayment R. Solid lines display supply and 
demand on the loan market with asymmetric information as well as deposit sup-
ply at the safe rate. The broken line denotes the first-best loan supply as ex-
plained below.  

















Source: Author’s  depiction. 
                                           
34  I am indebted to Peter WEINGARTEN for making a number of comments which (hopefully) 
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The downward sloping demand curve for loans is due to the fact that more and 
more borrowers drop out of the loan market as R increases (see equation (2-4)). 
It represents borrowers’ willingness to pay for loans, which for each borrower is 




As in the STIGLITZ-WEISS model, deposit supply at the safe rate is not fully elas-
tic and thus upward sloping. To allow a comparison, I sketched as a broken line 
the first-best supply of loans, which can be derived as follows. With symmetric 
information on the loan market, suppliers of capital would charge a borrower-
individual risk premium as part of the repayment R. The size of the risk premium 
would depend on the project-specific uncertainty of return. At higher R, projects 
become riskier and average individual risk premia increase. In such a  first-best 
world, all investment projects are financed for which   exceeds the risk-





eff being the efficient loan 
(and deposit) volume. In Figure 2-8, the broken line of first-best loan supply can 
be interpreted as displaying those interest rates required from lending to uncer-
tain projects which on average pay depositors the safe rate. It can be obtained if 
deposit supply at the safe rate is shifted upwards by the average risk premium 
required at each level of R. The slope of first-best loan supply thus has two 
components. It has a per se positive slope due to inelastic deposit supply. Fur-
thermore, the slope is additionally increased due to higher risk premia for higher 
R. 
In the presence of imperfect information as described previously, banks act as 
intermediaries between deposit and loan markets. While depositors demand a 
safe rate on their capital, exchange on the loan market is subject to the condi-
tions of the standard debt contract (fixed repayment in case of success). Since 
banks cannot discriminate between heterogeneous borrowers, they are only able 
to offer a single, average risk premium and hence a single interest rate to all 
loan applicants. Additional loans extended at the margin require higher interest 
revenues to meet the not fully elastic demand of depositors. Fully informed 
lenders could negotiate loan contract terms on an individual base, so that loan 
terms of all other borrowers were left unaffected. However, this is not possible 
under imperfect information, where a rise in interest rates affects all borrowers 
and thus leads to adverse selection. The interest rate required for banks to break 
even must therefore contain an extra premium to compensate for the lower suc-
cess probability of the entire borrower pool. This explains the increasing gap as 
R rises between loan supply under asymmetric information and first-best loan 
supply in Figure 2-8. As discussed above, it may even lead to a backward bend-68    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
ing supply of loans and credit rationing, as shown in the figure, where K* is the 
equilibrium loan volume. Since there is an excess demand of loans at R*, the 
loan volume K* has to be distributed to borrowers by non-price means. At the 
equilibrium rate R*, depositors obtain only the risk-free rate R
dep. As a result, 
there is underinvestment of the size  * K K
eff − . 
In case that loan supply and demand are intersecting (if loan supply was not 
backward bending), there would be no perceived rationing. However, interest 
rates on the loan market would still be above the first-best level and a situation 
of too little investment would continue to prevail. With reference to the earlier 
discussion in section 2.1.4, the difference between the actual and the (lower) 
fist-best interest rate might be regarded as an additional transaction cost compo-
nent, although the model does not suggest any real activities that could have 
caused these costs. 
Returning to the case of rationing, consider a subsidy on deposit interest rates of 
size S in Figure 2-9. As a result of this subsidy, the market relevant supply of 
deposits shifts from the initial position downwards (displayed with a light line). 
The increased deposit rate R
sub induces depositors to supply K
eff, the first-best 
volume of loans, at rate R
dep to the banks. Banks in turn offer K
eff at rate R* to 
borrowers (Loan supply 2), so that the first-best equilibrium is restored and ra-
tioning disappears.      2.2 Equilibrium credit rationing due to asymmetric information  69   





















Source: Author’s  depiction. 
For this result to obtain, it is irrelevant whether subsidies are paid to depositors 
per euro supplied or to banks per euro loaned.
35 In the first case, the net costs of 
attracting deposits for the banks drop, which offers space for credit expansion up 
to the new zero profit equilibrium. In the second case, the subsidy allows banks 
to make profits from additional loans as long as the extra subsidy exceeds the 
extra costs of deposits. However, due to competition, loan supply will be ex-
panded up to the new equilibrium, which implies the equality of total revenues 
and costs. As long as there is perfect competition, banks will therefore be unable 
to extract any rents from these subsidies. Instead, rents will flow completely to 
borrowers and depositors, as the following analysis shows. Government expen-
ditures as a consequence of interest subsidies amount to a volume of areas 
b+c+d. Depositors obtain an additional income on their funds in the size of ar-
eas b+c+d+e, of which d+e can be interpreted as the opportunity costs of sup-
plying deposits. Net of these opportunity costs, depositors thus obtain a rent of 
                                           
35  To the contrary, paying the subsidy to borrowers will change nothing, due to rationing. At 
(R*,K*), their willingness to pay for loans already by large exceeds the market interest 
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size b+c. Borrowers who are now able to carry out the full volume of investment 
obtain a rent of at least size a in case of success, assuming that borrowers with 
the highest willingness to pay are served under rationing. If the rationing scheme 
implies that the total loan volume K* is distributed randomly among borrowers, 
the area would be even larger. However, it has to be weighted by the individual 
success probabilities of the projects undertaken, since in case of project failure 
the rent for the borrower is zero. The precise magnitude depends on the expected 
return of the projects in the applicant pool. 
The overall welfare effect is thus a fraction of a minus d, which has an ambigu-
ous sign. Depending on the elasticities of loan demand and deposit supply and 
the success probabilities of the financed projects, there may be a gain in net wel-
fare as a result of government intervention. However, if success probabilities of 
projects are private information, a welfare analysis ex ante is impossible. Note 
that a+b+c could be viewed as the welfare loss (the agency costs) between the 
first-best world and a constrained situation of asymmetric information (follow-
ing FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1997, pp. 200; 248).
36
The main results of the previous analysis can be summarised as follows: 
In a competitive equilibrium on the loan market characterised by asymmetric 
information as described by STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), investment falls 
short of the first-best level with full information. This equilibrium may or 
may not entail credit rationing. In either case, subsidising deposit interest 
rates can restore the first-best level of investment (DE  MEZA and WEBB 
1987), which may imply a welfare improvement. 
                                           
36  A number of cases cannot be analysed in depth due to space constraints. First, a deviation 
from the situation as depicted in Figure 2-9 may be that the equilibrium interest rate on the 
loan market under rationing is above the first-best interest rate (loan supply is less strongly 
backward bending). This does not principally alter the result except that expanding deposit 
supply will lead to a fall in interest rates on the loan market. The additional rent borrowers 
obtain will thus be comparatively larger. Apart from that, the graphical analysis remains 
generally the same. Second, the equilibrium interest rate on the loan market under ration-
ing may be below the first-best interest rate. Under these circumstances, an interest subsidy 
can still ensure that the first-best volume of loans is supplied on the loan market, but there 
is still rationing (an excess demand for loans at the low equilibrium rate). It depends thus 
on the method of distribution whether all efficient projects are in fact carried out. Finally, 
deposit supply may be fully elastic. In this case (investigated in much detail by NEYER 
2000) there is no rationing, but interest rates on the loan market are higher than at the first-
best, so that certain efficient projects are not carried out. A subsidy can again restore first-
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How robust is this line of argumentation? The main contribution of DE MEZA 
and WEBB (1987) is the surprising insight that the underinvestment result is 
quite sensitive to the underlying distribution of projects’ risk.  
DE MEZA and WEBB replace the assumption of mean preserving spreads be-
tween projects by the assumption that projects are ordered by first-degree sto-
chastic dominance. All projects are supposed to have the same payoff   if suc-
cessful, although they differ in their probability of success  , which is privately 
observed. As before, unsuccessful projects yield zero. Under these circum-
stances, projects with a higher probability of success have a higher mean ex-
pected return than those with a lower success probability. Furthermore, borrow-
ers are assumed to have available a limited amount of wealth W either for in-
vestment in their project or in a safe asset. If I is the total amount to be invested, 
the borrower has to take a loan of size 
s y
i P
W I K − =  to carry out the project, since 
W<I. His expected profit  ) ~ ( i E π  under the changed distributional assumptions is 
thus: 
() ( ) ( ) W I r y P E
s
i i − + − = 1 ) ~ (π , (2-7) 
where r is the interest rate on loans. It is assumed that  . Profit 
maximising, risk neutral entrepreneurs apply for credit only if 
K r y
s ) 1 ( + >
W r E i ) ˆ 1 ( ) ~ ( + ≥ π , 
where r ˆ is the rate on safe assets. From (2-7) follows that  0 / ) ~ ( > ∂ ∂ i i P E π  and 
0 / ) ~ ( < ∂ ∂ r E i π . Hence, if r rises, to keep a minimum return in the magnitude of 
the safe rate on W requires a higher  . Under a rising r, borrowers with rela-
tively low   will therefore soon prefer the safe asset and drop out of the loan 
market first. The remaining borrowers are those with high success probabilities, 
which implies a favourable selection process for the bank! 
i P
i P
It is intuitively plausible that under these conditions there will be no rationing, 
since banks gain from a rise in interest rates in a twofold way: revenues are in-
creased by an increasing interest rate, and the default risk of borrowers declines. 
In a further step, DE MEZA and WEBB (1987) establish that, under the conditions 
just presented, investment exceeds the first-best level at the competitive equilib-
rium. In a first-best world, all projects are financed that satisfy the following 
condition: 
I r y P
s
i ) ˆ 1 ( + ≥ . (2-8) 
Again, the bank will just break even on the marginal project. Under favourable 
selection, however, the bank makes a positive profit on all intra-marginal pro-72    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
jects and thus a positive profit overall. Since in equilibrium all positive profits 
are competed away, banks will reduce loan rates even below the first-best rate. 
Banks thus incur losses from marginal and near-marginal projects, which are 
compensated by profits made from intra-marginal projects. Overinvestment re-
sults, because projects are funded which, if weighted with their success probabil-
ity, yield less than the safe rate. Thus, in contrast to STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), 
(near-)marginal projects are those which are implicitly subsidised by intra-
marginal projects with high success probabilities. Borrowers will invest in these 
marginal projects as long as the overall expected return   minus repayment 





In reversed analogy to the case of underinvestment, DE MEZA and WEBB propose 
a tax on deposit interest rates in order to remove overinvestment. This tax would 
make loanable funds more expensive for the bank, and in the ideal case it were 
just of such a magnitude that banks’ profits were exactly zero at the social opti-
mum.  
Whether this tax is in fact welfare improving with reference to an existing world 
of asymmetric information is again an open question. Due to space constraints, I 
will not carry out the graphical analysis in this case. In general, in contrast to the 
case of adverse selection, loan supply curves will be below the first-best loan 
supply, as a result of favourable selection. There may be a potential Pareto-
improvement if deposit supply is sufficiently inelastic, and if loan demand is 
sufficiently elastic and fraught with a high degree of uncertainty in the relevant 
areas. Inelastic deposit supply ensures relatively high tax revenues, and elastic 
loan demand or risky projects rather low losses of borrowers’ rent. Overall com-
pensation may therefore be feasible. 
Looking at the discussion in this section so far, the only certain insight is that 
asymmetric information leads to efficiency losses as compared with a first-best 
world of symmetric information. Apart from that, results are far from unequivo-
cal. Strikingly enough, an apparently small change in assumptions turns the pol-
icy implications of the whole model upside down. Even worse, this is already 
the case in a most abstract kind of model, in which characteristics of investment 
projects are greatly simplified. It is only to be expected that the introduction of 
more complex differences between observationally indistinguishable borrowers 
make a clear-cut judgement of the probable effects almost impossible. 
In a series of papers, DE MEZA and WEBB have continued to undermine the belief 
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policy action. In DE MEZA and WEBB (1988), they show that arguments both for 
subsidy or tax intervention lose their unambiguity as soon as the possibility of 
costly screening is introduced into the model. Furthermore, in subsequent con-
tributions, they demonstrate that the observation of credit rationing in the sense 
that some borrowers cannot get as much credit as they would like to at prevail-
ing interest rates does neither always imply a market failure, nor does it neces-
sarily imply underinvestment.  
In their 1992 paper, DE MEZA and WEBB make the case for an efficient form of 
loan-size rationing when information between market participants is symmetric. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose that borrowers are en-
dowed with an investment exhibiting decreasing returns to scale which either 
succeeds or fails. The bank obtains the entire return in case of failure. Suppose 
further that the interest rate charged on a competitive loan market depends on 
the loan size, which may vary between borrowers. Banks therefore receive the 
average product of the loan in the case of failure, which will be larger than the 
marginal product. Under competition, banks make zero profit, which drives 
down the marginal interest rate charged from borrowers. However, since bor-
rowers are only concerned with investment return in the success case, their mar-
ginal return on credit in the good state exceeds the overall fair, marginal interest 
rate. Borrowers would thus like to borrow more, although the marginal product 
of capital in good and bad states weighted by the success probability is equal to 
the marginal cost of funds, and social efficiency is thus warranted. The upshot of 
this model is that the mere observation of credit rationing does neither imply a 
market failure nor makes a case for government intervention. 
Finally, DE MEZA and WEBB (2000) establish that a credit rationing equilibrium 
may even be consistent with overinvestment as compared to a first-best world. 
They do this by combining moral hazard and favourable selection effects. As in 
part II of STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), borrowers are rationed due to moral haz-
ard, although rising the interest rate induces a favourable selection of loan appli-
cants, as in DE MEZA and WEBB (1987). It is intuitively clear that, under these 
circumstances, government intervention aimed at encouraging lending to credit 
rationed borrowers makes little sense if efficiency shall be restored.
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37  One may get the impression that any policy measure can be rationalised in the presence of 
asymmetric information, if only the model is appropriately chosen. Two examples in point 
are the papers by MANKIW (1986) and INNES (1991). MANKIW, by using a simple credit 
market model, argues that the government should secure loans to private borrowers in or-
der to increase overall efficiency. To the contrary, INNES, with a model that allows separat-74    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
On theoretical grounds, the fact that borrowers have only randomised access 
to credit or cannot borrow as much as desired at the going interest rate does 
neither necessarily imply too little investment, nor does it create a prima facie 
case for government intervention of any certain type. Generally, asymmetric 
information on loan markets is not sufficient for underinvestment, nor does it 
readily suggest a certain policy measure. 
A key message of this section is thus that credit rationing on the one hand and 
too little investment on the other need not go hand in hand and have to be treated 
separately from each other. Market failure in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation is likely to be too complex for straightforward policy advice. 
The theoretical analysis therefore leaves the pragmatic policy advisor with ap-
parently little substantial help. This is even more so if the limitations of the ap-
proach chosen above are considered. Formalisation necessarily leads to an ab-
straction from many relevant problems. These include the efficiency of the fi-
nancial intermediary itself, that is the real costs of intermediation as well as the 
quality and outreach of financial services; and the many administrative issues of 
potential government intervention on rural credit markets. For instance, even if 
one had identified a credit market equilibrium involving rationing, one major 
impediment to implement an efficiency-restoring interest subsidy would be that 
capital volume and interest rate of the first-best equilibrium are in fact unknown. 
Furthermore, it remains unclear how this subsidy shall be financed and whether 
it induces any general equilibrium effects. Other aspects of government activity 
such as prudential regulation or adequate supervision of the banking sector have 
not been mentioned at all (see STIGLITZ 1994). Some of these issues will be 
taken up again in the discussion of chapter 5. 
2.2.4 Summary and conclusions for further research 
In the course of this subchapter, a formal model of credit rationing as a conse-
quence of adverse selection was presented. Apart from rationalising a situation 
of absent market clearing, this model was also shown to undermine a number of 
other properties usually attributed to conventional, neoclassical markets, such as 
analytical independence of supply and demand or the impossibility of redlining. 
However, the credit rationing result was seen to be crucially dependent on the 
                                                                                                                                    
ing loan contracts, arrives at the conclusion that subsidising debt contracts may be welfare 
improving because it fosters self-selection of borrowers, while a public loan guarantee is 
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ability of market participants to overcome asymmetric information by screening 
and signalling activities, for example by the use of collateral. 
A probably surprising insight of the subsequent, formal welfare analysis was 
that credit rationing is not a per se undesirable situation in terms of social effi-
ciency. Moreover, asymmetric information may create a market equilibrium 
with either too little or too much investment, both possible with or without credit 
rationing. Accordingly, policy implications are fundamentally different depend-
ing on which state of affairs is present. Unfortunately, however, the predictions 
of the models are not based on something that can be measured with precision, 
but rather on theoretical assumptions regarding the distributions of uncertain 
investment outcomes (BESLEY 1994). In short, credit rationing does not neces-
sarily imply underinvestment, and it generally does not create a case for 
straightforward government policy. It seems therefore reasonable to analytically 
decouple the analysis of credit rationing as a privately perceived excess demand 
and underinvestment as a socially undesirable situation. 
Luckily, the fact that the fundamental research questions posed in subchapter 1.3 
cannot be answered satisfactorily by theory alone does not make theoretical rea-
soning superfluous. Building on the considerations presented in section 2.1.6, 
the following can be concluded from the analysis in this subchapter: 
1.  Asymmetric information between market participants can be an essential 
cause of privately and socially undesirable outcomes on credit markets. 
However, the precise way in which asymmetric information affects these 
outcomes cannot be judged a priori. 
2. The theoretical analysis suggests that credit rationing as private excess de-
mand is a likely outcome on markets with asymmetric information. Even so, 
theory does not provide unambiguous propositions regarding the welfare as-
sessment of credit rationing. An alternative could be to base the ultimate de-
cision concerning the presence of underinvestment on empirical grounds. In 
the ideal case, an empirical analysis will not only have to detect any con-
straints in the access to credit, but also whether these constraints lead to over- 
or to underinvestment. 
3.  However, to use any observable market interest rate as a benchmark for com-
parison will require much care. Apart from distortions due to government in-
tervention or explicit transaction costs, there may be additional biases as a 
consequence of asymmetric information. The more these distortions are rele-
vant in a given situation, the less likely is it that private excess demand coin-76    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
cides with socially undesirable underinvestment. Whereas an assessment of 
credit rationing in the perspective of a single borrower can take the interest 
rate as exogenously given, this is much more difficult with regard to an 
evaluation of underinvestment. 
4. The extent to which asymmetric information has harmful effects on invest-
ment outcomes depends on the availability of counteracting instruments or 
arrangements, such as collateral, joint liability, or reputation of borrowers. 
These elements should be included in any empirical analysis. 
5. Policy advice must consider the conditions and causes that are responsible 
for any undesirable market outcome, in case that this has been successfully 
identified. The way in which governments can improve on the instruments 
and arrangements mentioned in the previous paragraph (4.) and section 2.2.2 
will play a vital role in these considerations. 
The further analysis in this monograph will primarily aim at the investigation of 
credit rationing. The extent to which underinvestment can be empirically de-
tected at all and what can be said about the situation in Poland will be a topic in 
chapter 5. 
In line with these thoughts, the next subchapter will go a further step in the di-
rection of empirical analysis by theoretically modelling a credit-rationed farm 
household. These models will allow the further formalisation of the research 
problem and thus guide the econometric analysis of later chapters. 
2.3  Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models 
In this subchapter, I want to examine the effects of credit rationing on produc-
tion and investment decisions of farm households. I will take up again and de-
velop further the model of intertemporal choice already introduced in section 
2.1.2 of this monograph. A key modification concerns the explicit consideration 
of restricted access to credit. It will be seen that this results in similar complica-
tions as the introduction of positive transaction costs.  
In a first step, I formalise the two-period case which leads to the decision alter-
natives of production versus consumption (section 2.3.1). In a second step, I al-
low for an infinite planning horizon and investment activities (section 2.3.2). 
Since informational asymmetries as causes of credit rationing are not explicitly 
modelled in this subchapter, the credit constraint is taken as exogenously given 
in the first section. However, in the second section, this will be relaxed by allow-    2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  77   
ing the decision maker to influence his access to credit via the accumulation of 
equity.
38
2.3.1 Credit rationing in a two-period farm household model 
In this section, I discuss the effects a credit constraint has on optimal resource 
allocation in a neoclassical producer-consumer model. Particular attention will 
be paid not only to the separate impact on consumption and production deci-
sions, but also on their interdependencies if access to credit is limited. A farm 
household that both produces and consumes agricultural goods is probably the 
classical prototype for such a model. Accordingly, there exists a broad literature 
on agricultural household modelling on which I could draw (see e.g. SADOULET 
and DE JANVRY 1995; SINGH et al. 1986; WITZKE 1993). 
The starting point for the analysis is the formal model of a rational decision 
maker acting in a neoclassical environment of exogenous prices as outlined in 
section 2.1.2. Since the temporal dimension is important for the analysis, the de-
cision maker is supposed to maximise consumption in periods 0 and 1 as ex-
pressed by an intertemporally additive utility function. The utility function is 
assumed to be twice differentiable and quasi-concave, and defined over con-
sumption in period 0, c0, and in period 1, c1, so that  . z ) ; , ( 1 0
h z c c u =
h param-
eterises the utility function and summarises exogenous household characteristics 
such as number of people in each sex or age category. 
Agricultural production requires upfront financing such that expenses on x are 
due in period 0, while harvest occurs in period 1. To meet liquidity requirements 
for input purchases, the farmer can take a working capital loan of size K in pe-
riod 0, which has to be repaid in period 1. The production opportunities of the 
household are depicted by a twice differentiable, quasi-concave production func-
tion  . There are two types of variable inputs.  ) ; , (
y nk k z x x f y =
k x  represents a 
variable input that requires upfront financing (e.g. seed or fertiliser) and is thus 
subject to a liquidity constraint; 
nk x  is an aggregate of all other types of variable 
inputs. z
y stands for fixed and exogenous inputs, such as land and machinery.
39
                                           
38  The following exposition emphasises the household’s desire to finance current production 
and consumption expenses as well as physical investment activities as the central motiva-
tion for borrowing. Aspects of consumption smoothing and liquidity insurance are widely 
neglected; the reader interested in these issues is referred to BESLEY (1995) and DEATON 
(1992) and (1997, chapter 6). 
39  To avoid unnecessary clutter, I abstain from explicit vector notation. 78    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
The household faces a budget constraint in each period and a credit constraint in 
period 0. The budget in period 0 consists of initial endowment with liquid funds, 
E, an amount of credit taken, K, and exogenous public transfers  , assumed 
to be obtained only in period 0. In equilibrium, the sum of these is equal to the 
expenses for the variable input which requires upfront financing plus consump-
tion.  is expenses on the variable input, with   the price of the input, 
and   expenses on consumption in period 0, with   the (nominally con-
stant) price of the consumption bundle. The budget in period 1 entails revenues 
from production  , with   the price of the output. In equilibrium, this is 
equal to repayment of credit taken in period 0, consumption in period 1, and ex-









) 1 ( r K +  is repayment 
of credit, with r the interest rate,   expenses on consumption, and   
expenses on inputs, with   the price of the input not subject to upfront fi-
nancing. 
1 c p
c nk xnkx p
xnk p
Note that all prices may be understood to include a transaction cost component 
which adds to the nominal market price. For the decision maker, many of these 
costs are quite real, for example travelling or time expenses, although they may 
be difficult to quantify in order to obtain an objective measure of market effi-
ciency (see the discussion in subchapter 2.1). In particular, opportunity costs 
will have to be evaluated pragmatically (see section 4.2.2 below). 
It was demonstrated in previous sections that borrowers may be denied credit 
even on a competitive loan market. A simple way to introduce this into the farm 
household model is by considering an upper bound of credit  ) , (
y h z z K  the 
household can obtain. The availability of devices to overcome credit rationing is 
dependent on household and production characteristics z
h and z
y, for example 
collateral or borrowers’ reputation as discussed in section 2.2.2. 
The farmer’s problem can thus be formally summarised as follows: 
) ; , ( max 1 0
h z c c u  with respect to  , all > 0  K x x c c
nk k , , , , 1 0
subject to 
0 ) ( 0 = − − + +
k xk c h x p c p z T K E  (2-9) 
the budget constraint in period 0, 
0 ) 1 ( ) ; , ( 1 = + − − − K r x p c p z x x f p
nk xnk c y nk k y  (2-10) 
the budget constraint in period 1, and     2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  79   
0 ) , ( ≥ − K z z K
y h  (2-11) 
the credit constraint in period 0. The credit constraint may or may not be bind-
ing. 
To solve this optimisation problem, I form the Lagrangean as follows: 
) ; , ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ; , ( 0 1 0
y nk k y k xk c h h z x x f p x p c p z T K E z c c u L λ η + − − + + + =  
) ) , ( ( ) ) 1 ( 1 K z z K K r x p c p
y h nk xnk c − + + − − − µ  (2-12) 
The first-order conditions of the optimal solution are represented by the first de-
rivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to all decision variables and the La-
grangean multipliers. Since (2-11) is an inequality, I use the Kuhn-Tucker con-
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∂
∂
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Equations (2-13) and (2-14) characterise optimal consumption, equations (2-15) 
and (2-16) optimal production, (2-17) optimal credit demand, and (2-9), (2-10), 
and (2-18) are the side conditions that have to be satisfied by an optimal solu-
tion. Taken together, these equations constitute the structural form of the model 
(see SADOULET and DE JANVRY 1995, pp. 378-383). η,  λ, and µ  are the La-
grangean multipliers which denote the marginal value of the constraint in terms 80    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
of the objective function. In the present model, they are hence a measure of the 
marginal utility of the two budget constraints and the credit constraint, respec-
tively. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (2-18) are to be interpreted as follows. Ei-
ther the credit constraint is binding, in which case (2-11) holds with equality and 
0 > µ . In the other case, K does not exhaust the credit limit, so that (2-11) holds 
with inequality and  0 = µ . If all three conditions of (2-18) are satisfied simulta-
neously, always one of the two cases applies. 
I first examine optimal consumption and production if the credit constraint is not 
binding, that is  0 = µ . Equations (2-13) and (2-14) state that in both periods, the 
respective Lagrangean multiplier equates the marginal utility of the consumption 
good divided by its price, which is usually referred to as the marginal utility of 
money. This result is formally analogous to the standard two-good single-period 
consumption choice problem (see e.g. LAYARD and WALTERS 1978, p. 134). The 
only exception is that in the two-period model, there is a single nominal price of 
the consumption good but two different budget constraints. These are, however, 
connected by the credit variable, so that substitution of (2-17) into (2-13) and (2-
14) yields the following condition for optimal consumption over time if the 












This is simply the conventional optimality condition of intertemporal choice 
which implicitly emerged already from the analysis in section 2.1.2 (see also 
BRANDES et al. 1997, pp. 253-257; LAYARD and WALTERS 1978, pp. 327-335). 
The left hand of the equation is the marginal rate of utility substitution between 
consumption in periods 0 and 1, which is sometimes expressed also as the de-
rivative  . In equilibrium, this equals one plus the market interest rate, or 
the inverse of the real price relationship between   and   (  in period 1 is 
discounted by (1+r)). (2-19) also restates the separation result of section 2.1.2: 
optimal consumption solely depends on the utility function and the interest rate, 
given the household budget. In which relation the budget should be allocated to 
consumption in period 0 versus period 1 is thus independent of the production 
decisions of the farm household, and can be chosen separately from them. Pro-
duction decisions only determine the overall volume of the budget. 
0 1 /dc dc
1 c 0 c
c p
Equation (2-16) gives an immediate rule how inputs that require no upfront fi-
nancing should be allocated. The decision is not affected by the intertemporal 
nature of the household model, so that λ can safely be dropped. Due to the con-
cave production function, the result is the standard condition that marginal reve-    2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  81   











With regard to input 
k x  which requires pre-harvest liquidity, a procedure similar 
to the consumption analysis can be applied. Again, I substitute (2-17) into the 
















This is identical to (2-20) except that the output price has to be discounted by 
the interest rate, since expenses are due in an earlier period than revenues. If the 
input price is normalised to one by division through   in (2-21) and the equa-
tion is multiplied through by 1+r, the same rule which underlies Figure 2-1 in 
section 2.1.2 obtains, namely that in equilibrium the marginal return on produc-
tive investment equals the market interest rate. (2-20) and (2-21) are independ-
ent of the utility function or any household characteristics, which again demon-
strates separability of production and consumption choices as long as the credit 
constraint is not binding. 
xk p
The solution or reduced form of the model is a set of demand, supply and factor 
demand functions (SADOULET and DE JANVRY 1995, p. 379). I define M as the 

















) (  (2-22) 
The reduced-form equations are then given as follows: 
) , , , ( 0 0
h c z M p r c c =  (2-23) 
) , , , ( 1 1
h c z M p r c c =  (2-24) 
) , , , , (
y xnk xk y z p p p r y y =  (2-25) 
) , , , , (
y xnk xk y k k z p p p r x x =  (2-26) 
) , , , , (
y xnk xk y nk nk z p p p r x x =  (2-27) 
) , , , , , , (
y h xnk xk y c z z p p p p r K K =  (2-28) 82    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
By definition, all of the explanatory variables of reduced-form equations are ex-
ogenous, that is not under the control of the household. With regard to the de-
mand functions (2-23) and (2-24) this is only true if household demand is treated 
separately from the production side and M hence taken as exogenous, as in the 
standard consumer choice model. However, in the complete household system, 
M is determined by production decisions, and thus should be replaced by the ex-
ogenous variables of the production subsystem (prices and fixed factors) in or-
der to obtain a fully reduced form of the demand functions. Due to the fact that 
production behaviour affects consumption (but not vice versa) the household 
model without a binding credit constraint is also called recursive (SINGH et al. 
1986a, p. 20). 
I now turn to the case where optimal credit demand is effectively restricted by 
the credit limit. The implication is that (2-11) holds with equality and the credit 
constraint is binding. From (2-18), it has the immediate consequence that  0 > µ . 
The link between the budget constraints in both periods and the credit constraint 
is again given by equation (2-17), which now takes the following form: 
λ
µ η −
= + ) 1 ( r  (2-29) 
With regard to consumption choice, substituting (2-13) and (2-14) into (2-29) 















The previous equation defines a shadow interest rate under the binding credit 
constraint, which I denote r*. It is a measure of the household internal value of 
liquidity. Since µ  and λ are both strictly positive, the following holds: 
r r r > + =
λ
µ
*  (2-31) 
Under a binding credit constraint, the increased scarcity of liquid funds is thus 
reflected by a rise in the interest rate relevant for decision making. The optimal-
ity condition for intertemporal consumption choice under the credit constraint 
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Hence, consumption in period 0 becomes more expensive. The same relationship 
between r and r* can be derived on the production side. Solving (2-17) for η 



















Under consideration of the above definition of the shadow interest rate (2-31), 
















As a consequence, the condition for an optimal allocation of the liquidity-
requiring input formally remains the same under the binding credit constraint 
except that the marked-up shadow interest rate must be used. Since the produc-
tion function is concave in variable inputs, a reduced output price in  (2-33) re-
sults in a reduction of 
k x  in order to increase the value of the marginal product. 
The binding credit constraint has therefore the consequence that input use and 
hence output is reduced.  














The condition for the input not under upfront financing is in so far affected by 
the shadow rate that the marginal product of 
nk x  will drop as 
k x  is reduced 
(analogous to WITZKE 1993, p. 119). 
nk x  will therefore also be reduced. 
As a result, a new set of consumption as well as input demand and output supply 
equations under the binding credit constraint is created, which is linked by the 
discounted value of the household’s full income under the binding credit con-
straint M* as follows: 
1 0 * 1 * 1 * 1





















+ + ≡  (2-35) 
Note that an increasing r* will usually unambiguously reduce M*. As can be 
seen from the left-hand (production) side of the equality (2-35), a change in r* 
affects the relative prices of the output and the two types of inputs and hence 
profit. While a rise in r* reduces the relative price of the output by increasing 
the discount factor, it also reduces the price of the input not under upfront fi-
nancing. This is equivalent to a relative rise in the price of the input under the 
credit constraint. Since profits are nonincreasing in input prices (see VARIAN 
1992, p. 41), M* will usually decrease if r* increases, or at best remain con-84    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
stant.
40 Hence, the binding credit constraint not only reduces farm output but 
also the household’s income. 
It may be worth emphasising the effects of an increase in exogenous r or K , for 
example as a result of government policy or improvements in lending technol-
ogy. Both effects act in opposite directions by (2-31). A rise in r means an addi-
tional upward shift of r*, with the same results as before (M* drops). To the 
contrary, if K  increases, its shadow price µ  and eventually r* is reduced, M* 
therefore increases. 
A particular implication of the binding credit constraint is that it breaks the 
separability of consumption and production decisions. As a result, input alloca-
tion depends on household preferences and consumption choices depend on the 
production technology, both via the shadow rate of interest. This property of the 
interdependent household model can be used for an empirical test of market im-
perfections, as will be discussed in chapter 3. To demonstrate it formally, I ana-
lyse the effect that household characteristics z
h have on r* (the following paral-
lels the exposition in D. BENJAMIN 1992, pp. 292-295). 
The demand function for consumption in period 0 is defined by (2-32) as fol-
lows: 
) , *; *, ( 0 0
h c z p M r c c =  (2-36) 
The demand for the variable input under the liquidity constraint is determined by 
(2-33): 
) , , , *; (
y xnk xk y k k z p p p r x x =  (2-37) 
Taken together, the latter two equations form a liquidity equilibrium that implic-
itly defines the shadow interest rate as follows: 
) , *; *, ( ) ( ) , ( 0
h c c h y h z p M r c p z T z z K E − + +   
) , , , *; (
y xnk xk y k xk z p p p r x p =  (2-38) 
The left-hand side of this equation is household supply of liquid funds, and the 
right-hand side is farm demand for funds. Both are equated at the shadow inter-
est rate r*. Differentiation by the implicit-function theorem (see CHIANG 1984, 
                                           
40  A (rather unrealistic) case where M* remains constant is when x
k and x
nk are perfect substi-
tutes.     2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  85   
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The denominator consists of the negative compensated interest rate effect on 
consumption in period 0 times the price of the consumption good minus the in-
terest rate effect on input demand times the input price.
41 Both are negative: con-
sumption of   falls if by an increase of r* its real price increases relative to that 
of   (see (2-19)). The real price of the input likewise increases, which reduces 
input demand. Taken together, the denominator is unambiguously positive. The 
sign of the numerator depends on the total effect of a change in household char-
acteristics on the availability of credit, on the reception on transfers, and on con-
sumption of  . Transfers affect the numerator directly via liquidity creation and 
indirectly via expansion of M*. The overall effect of   on r* is thus ambigu-
ous. For example, the shadow interest rate rises if the net increase in consump-
tion in period 0 as the result of an increase in family members outweighs a po-





Implicit differentiation of (2-38) may also be used to illustrate a potential liquid-
























The denominator is the same as before; the numerator consists of the direct ef-
fect of increased transfers plus the household’s marginal propensity to consume 
(mpc) in period 0. The latter is  1 ≤  by definition, so that the numerator is always 
                                           
41  The compensated interest rate effect can be obtained by taking the total derivative of (2-


















= . The total effect 
on c0 of a change in r* consists of the indirect effect via M* and the direct effect as given 
by the partial derivative. Since dM*/dr* can be interpreted as the amount necessary to 
compensate the change in M* as the result of a change in r*, the total derivative is a Slut-
sky equation for the intertemporal choice problem (see LAYARD and WALTERS 1978, p. 
138). In this equation, dc0/dr* is the interest effect with utility held constant. 86    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
nonpositive. Usual values of the mpc will be smaller than 1, so that the numera-
tor is strictly negative. Hence, improved access to public funding reduces the 
shadow interest rate by relaxing the liquidity constraint. A smaller r* will rein-
force the use of inputs that require upfront financing and may result in an expan-
sion of agricultural output. This is in contrast to the textbook case of an alloca-
tively neutral effect of government transfers (see HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE 
1994, p. 190). 
It became clear that household characteristics play a central role in the determi-
nation of r* and hence in the optimal allocation of production inputs. As a con-
sequence, the household model is not separable any more. The binding credit 
ration leads thus to a similar effect as the direct incorporation of positive trans-
action costs into the model of intertemporal choice as presented in subchapter 
2.1. Under non-separation, all reduced-form equations of the model ultimately 
depend on all exogenous variables of both the consumption and the production 
side (see SADOULET and DE JANVRY 1995, p. 160; I drop subscripts of consump-
tion goods and superscripts of inputs): 
) , , , , , , , (
y h y x c z z K E p p p r c c =  (2-41) 
) , , , , , , , (
y h y x c z z K E p p p r y y =  (2-42) 
) , , , , , , , (
y h y x c z z K E p p p r x x =  (2-43) 
With respect to the further empirical analysis, it seems instructive to emphasise 
the difference between structural and reduced-form equations of the model (see 
BEHRMAN and OLIVER 2000). Structural equations include only right-side vari-
ables that have direct effects on the outcome. For example, the basic structural 
equation of the current model is the production function, which depicts the di-
rect relation between inputs and output. Right-side variables of structural equa-
tions are often endogenous to the model, which means that they are themselves 
determined as a part of the decision making process in response to other, exoge-
nous variables. They therefore give rise to particular problems of econometric 
estimation (see section 3.2.2 below). In contrast, the reduced-form equations 
provide the total (direct plus indirect) effects of exogenous explanatory variables 
on the demand or supply outcome. However, they cannot disentangle the exact 
pathways by which the household’s objective function and the production func-
tion influence behavioural outcomes (BEHRMAN and OLIVER 2000, p. 377). For 
example, the reduced-form output supply equation (2-42) displays the total ef-
fect of credit K  on output supply. Even so, it cannot reveal separately how     2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  87   
much credit affects output directly by financing fertiliser, as expressed by the 
production function, and how much credit affects output indirectly by providing 
liquidity for financing consumption expenditures which in turn make family la-
bour more (or less) productive. Credit may also be simply used for non-
productive purposes, so that there is no indirect effect on output apart from the 
mere diversion of funds. In line with these thoughts, the reduced-form output 
supply equation (2-42) has been a focus of interest in the empirical literature on 
credit rationing of farm households (see FEDER et al. 1990; SIAL and CARTER 
1996). 
It is therefore useful to derive a further magnitude which is closely related to the 
shadow interest rate. I call it the credit-rationed household’s marginal willing-
ness to pay for credit, * ρ . This magnitude is measuring the ability of the 
household to pay for credit in period 1 given the possibility that some credit was 
used for consumption purposes in period 0. The shadow interest rate correctly 
measures the marginal value of the last unit of liquidity provided it is used for 
purchasing inputs. To the contrary, the marginal willingness to pay for credit 
addresses the question: what interest is the farm household able to pay at the 
margin, given its preferred use of credit for both production or consumption? If 
some credit is used for consumptive uses, the shadow interest rate may overes-
timate the actual payment abilities of the household in period 1. To understand 
this idea, consider the utility maximising liquidity surplus of the household in 
period 1 under credit rationing, denoted Λ: 
() () ( ) ( )( )
nk xnk c k xk y nk k y x p T E c p x p r z x x f p − − − + + − ≡ Λ 0 1 ; . , . 
()
nk xnk y x p K r y p − + − = ) 1 ( .  (2-44) 
The liquidity surplus in the repayment period 1 is the revenue of the household 
in period 1, given as the value of the optimal production volume, minus credit 
repayment and interest and minus input purchases not under the credit con-
straint. Credit is equal to the gap between the value of input purchases and con-
sumption in period 0 on the one hand and available endowment plus transfers on 
the other.  
The partial derivative of the liquidity surplus with regard to credit indicates what 
the household is marginally able to pay in excess of the market interest rate. For 
the moment it is assumed that there are no effects of an increased K  on the not 
credit-financed input 
nk x , that is  0 = ∂ ∂ K x p
nk xnk . The partial derivative can 






























To enable a direct comparison with the market interest rate, I define the house-




























y ρ . (2-46) 
A comparison with (2-34) reveals that  * ρ  is a measure of the actual interest 
payment ability which takes into account the possible use of credit for consump-
tive purposes. Under the restrictive assumption that credit is fully used for pur-
chasing inputs, that is  1 = ∂ ∂ K x p
k xk , it follows that  * * r = ρ . However, if 
some credit is used for consumption in period 0, it follows from  1 < ∂ ∂ K x p
k xk  
that * * r < ρ . If there is no rationing, the marginal willingness to pay for credit 
is equal to the market interest rate r. In an extreme case of diversion,  * ρ  might 
even become smaller than r, so that the household cannot fully pay the interest 
of the debt.  
Note that in case of  0 > ∂ ∂ K x p
nk xnk , (2-46) overestimates the actual payment 
abilities of the household in period 1. Whether such an indirect effect of credit 
on the not credit-financed input can be borne out empirically will be addressed 
in the econometric analysis below, section 4.2.1, pp. 172 et seq. 
Since consumption of credit funds is both likely to be relevant in reality (see 
Section 1.2) and has important consequences for the actual repayment capacity 
of households, the empirical approach in this study focuses on estimating  * ρ  
rather than r* (see the further discussion in sections 3.1.3 and 3.3.4, pp. 149 et 
seq.). 
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Figure 2-10: Liquidity allocation in the farm household with 
credit rationing 




























Source:  Author’s depiction based on D. BENJAMIN (1992, p. 296). 
The allocation decisions within the farm household can be depicted graphically 
as shown in Figure 2-10. The bold axes in the figure measure the budget (the 
volume of liquidity) in the two periods available for household consumption. 
The light axes depict production opportunities, given by a revenue curve that 
relates the value of input supplied to revenue from farm production, with exoge-
nous input and output prices. The output price has been normalised by the price 
of the input under the credit constraint. This input yields a given revenue in pe-
riod 1 and has thus a price of one, so that the value of input is simply denoted by 
x on the light horizontal axis. The household has preferences for consumption in 
period 0 and 1 as shown by the indifference curve. Note that consumption in pe-
riod 0 is measured from the right to the left on the bold horizontal axis, while in 
period 1 it is measured from bottom to top on the bold vertical axis. 
The farm household has available a limited amount of credit K  in period 0 
which must be repaid in period 1 including the market interest r. Credit has two 
effects that are illustrated in the figure by the inward position of the bold con-90    2 Credit rationing in theoretical perspective 
sumption axes relative to the production axes. First, it increases the liquidity po-
tentially available in period 0 beyond endowment E plus transfers T, which is 
why both horizontal lines of the consumption and the production budget are 
shifted to the right. Second, while credit expands the production opportunities, 
consumption in period 1 is now subject to loan repayment. Therefore, the con-
sumption axes are shifted upwards by the volume of repayment  ) 1 ( r K + , 
whereas production revenues in period 1 are used for credit repayment. Costs of 
other inputs not under the credit constraint are neglected in the figure, for rea-
sons of simplicity. 
Optimal consumption and production decisions of the utility maximising house-
hold are finally determined by the slope of the interest rate line. With variable 
credit access, the optimal volume of input 
eff k x  would be given by the point 
where the interest line touches the revenue curve, regardless of initial endow-
ment E and transfers T. The point of optimal consumption could be determined 
without knowledge of the input allocation decision; it would lie somewhere on 
the solid interest rate line. The only effect of production on consumption would 
be via the budget available in period 1. 
If the credit constraint is binding, the interest rate relevant for the household-
internal allocation decisions increases, as was shown above. Therefore, the slope 
of the interest line increases as well, which is illustrated by the broken line in 
Figure 2-10. It is now optimal for the household to reduce the use of the input 
which is subject to upfront financing to 
k x . Since the budget in period 0 is fixed 
by the sum of K , E, and T, optimal consumption is now simultaneously deter-
mined. Optimal consumption bundles are given by the point where the indiffer-
ence curve touches the broken line denoting the shadow interest rate, as shown 
in the figure. 
This section will be an important background for the empirical approach to be 
discussed in chapter 3. It has picked up a number of earlier results and may be 
summarised as follows: 
In the two-period producer-consumer model, a binding credit constraint re-
sults in a household-internal shadow interest rate which is above the market 
interest rate of a first-best situation. Therefore, input use is reduced, which 
implies an output reduction as compared with a first-best situation. Further-
more, household income will usually decline as well. Production and con-
sumption decisions are no longer analytically separable from each other. As 
a consequence, an increase in public transfers the household receives may re-
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household’s marginal willingness to pay for credit measures its interest pay-
ment abilities in the repayment period. 
2.3.2 Credit rationing in a multi-period farm household model 
In this section, the step from a two-period to an infinite-period planning horizon 
will be taken, whereas the formal framework of a producer-consumer model re-
mains the same. This step will be used to extend the results of the previous sec-
tion in a number of directions. First, I want to re-examine the interdependence 
between intertemporal consumption and investment decisions by introducing an 
explicit link between these decisions and access to credit. Although, due to the 
intertemporal nature of the problem, input allocation as portrayed in section 
2.3.1 might be interpreted as investment activity, it seems useful to make the 
investment problem more visible by expanding the number of periods. Further-
more, it will be possible to establish a relationship between financial variables of 
the farm and its investment demand, which stands in marked contrast to the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem mentioned in section 2.1.2. In addition, the type of 
model presented below will rationalise the slow adjustment of productive capital 
stocks observed in the real world, which is difficult to explain within the stan-
dard neoclassical theory of the firm.
42 Finally, this section will provide a theo-
retical underpinning for the empirical implementation of an investment equation 
in chapter 3. 
Investment analysis has been a long standing issue in economics, and the related 
literature is immense. Therefore, I confine myself to sketching a few lines of 
thought, whereas the interested reader is referred to recent surveys.
43 An early 
and quite general approach was to condition the optimal capital stock of a firm 
on the observed level of output, which results in a (static) accelerator model. 
Investment hence depends on output growth (see KRELLE 1978). To improve the 
flexibility of this model, the relation was later made time-dependent by introduc-
ing a distributed lag, according to which current investment is determined by 
                                           
42  The discrepancy in this respect between the neoclassical model world and reality is best 
illustrated by the following quotation: “Thus a restaurateur from this particular world who 
had more customers on weekends as opposed to weekdays would be observed to buy a 
small restaurant for weekdays but would sell it on Friday nights and purchase a large res-
taurant for the weekend, reselling it on Monday mornings” (NICKELL 1978, p. 9, cited in 
WITZKE 1993, p. 190). 
43  These include from a general point of view CABALLERO (1999); CHIRINKO (1993); COEN 
and EISNER (1991); KRELLE (1978); LENSINK et al. (2001); and from an agricultural eco-
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current and previous levels of output (on distributed lags see KRELLE 1978, pp. 
276-278). The latter type of model was called the flexible accelerator. Written in 
a general form, the flexible accelerator relates investment I(t) to the difference 
between the desired and the actual capital stock at the beginning of the period, 
denoted Z* and  Z(t), respectively: 
[ ) ( * ) ( t Z Z B t I − = ]  (2-47) 
with B an adjustment coefficient (KRELLE 1978, p. 283). A crucial question is 
how the desired capital stock should be operationalised. Inspired by the neoclas-
sical theory of the firm, JORGENSON (1963) deviated from the earlier approach to 
proxy desired capital by output and made the optimal capital stock being deter-
mined by prices of outputs and inputs, and, in particular, the user cost of capital. 
The latter is the cost per period of holding and maintaining one unit of capital.  
Despite some empirical success, a problem with the flexible accelerator models 
is their weak theoretical foundation (CABALLERO 1999). A finite demand for in-
vestment is obtained in a rather ad hoc way by imposing a largely arbitrary dis-
tributed lag structure. The major challenge of explaining any lagged adjustment 
of capital stocks cannot be solved by neoclassical production theory since it is 
inherently static. However, competing theories until the late 1970’s had been 
devoid of fundamental explanatory power as well (CABALLERO 1999, p. 817). 
This situation naturally stimulated the emergence of new theories of investment 
over the previous two decades, which I want to group according to their main 
explanatory element: (a) adjustment costs, (b) financial constraints, and (c) un-
certainty. 
The basic tenet of the adjustment costs literature is that firms forego a certain 
amount of output by diverting resources from production to investment activities 
(see MACCINI 1991 for an overview). For example, resources may be necessary 
for planning and installation of investment. Hence, the conventional neoclassical 
production model is augmented by a strictly convex adjustment cost function. A 
crucial and controversially discussed assumption is that adjustment costs are 
marginally increasing with the level of investment to obtain the result of lagged 
adjustment; otherwise the firm will close immediately any gap between desired 
and actual capital stocks. It may be possible to interpret adjustment costs as a 
sort of transaction costs stemming from the search for adequate financing of in-
vestment as discussed in section 2.1.4, an interpretation that is however not ex-
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are much more likely to be concave rather than convex, since they usually entail 
a fixed cost component. 
An approach that avoids this problem and provides the link to the context of this 
monograph is the financial constraints model advanced by E. HOCHMAN et al. 
(1973) and STEIGUM (1983). This model explicitly considers credit rationing in a 
dynamic optimisation framework and will be presented below in more detail. 
Though not explicated by these authors, it is easy to see the connection between 
the theoretical developments in the credit market literature as discussed in sub-
chapter 2.1 and the incorporation of financial constraints in the investment lit-
erature. 
A third important field of theoretical progress has recently evolved around the 
problem of uncertainty in investment (for an overview see LENSINK et al. 2001, 
part two). This group falls in a more traditional branch that considers adjustment 
costs and the risk attitude of the investor, and a more recent branch that is also 
called the real option approach to investment. An earlier result of the first 
branch is that investment may be negatively affected if the decision maker is risk 
averse (NICKELL 1978). Later research went into the direction of dynamic opti-
misation models under uncertainty, which could also incorporate elements of the 
adjustment cost approach (for example ABEL 1983, see also section 3.1.3 be-
low). The second branch emphasises the value of waiting if investment is 
(partly) irreversible and can be delayed in order to obtain additional information 
about the future (DIXIT and PINDYCK 1994). In a world of uncertainty, it pays the 
decision maker to wait for the optimal time to exercise his (real) investment op-
tion. 
All three approaches partially had stimulating effects on each other and continue 
to develop, but in some respects also appear to be mutually incompatible. For 
example, the contingent claim analysis of the DIXIT-PINDYCK model is implicitly 
based on perfect financial markets (LENSINK et al. 2001, pp. 115-6), and thus in 
conflict with the assumption of limited credit access made by the financial con-
straints model. I will go on to elaborate on the latter since it illuminates a num-
ber of effects credit rationing has on the dynamic allocation decisions of house-
holds. Furthermore, it provides an intuitive extension of the model described in 
the previous section. 
There are four major changes to the two-period model presented in section 2.3.1. 
First, due to the multi-period planning horizon, the objective function of the de-
cision maker has to be modified in order to account for the utility derived from 
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an analytically convenient and thus frequently applied objective function is de-
fined as the integral of instantaneous utility discounted by a positive, subjective 
time preference rate, δ , over an infinite planning horizon (see WITZKE 1993, p. 
252). The infinite planning horizon avoids the arbitrary choice of a terminal 
state and can be regarded as including the utility of future generations. Since the 
decision now has to be made about consumption paths and no longer about dis-
crete consumption bundles, one speaks of an objective functional instead of an 
objective function (CHIANG 1992, p. 7). 
A second key modification concerns the endogenisation of the capital stock Z in 
order to make investment a decision variable of the farmer. Investment is the 
change of capital over time,  I Z = & , where the dot denotes marginal change over 
time. As in the previous section, the financial constraint restricts the adjustment 
of the capital stock to its long-term optimal level.  
Third, the farmer is now able to influence his access to credit as the available 
credit ration is made dependent on the farm’s equity, E. This is motivated by the 
screening and/or signalling function equity as a general form of collateral may 
have on imperfect loan markets (see the discussion in subchapters 2.1 and 2.2). 
Equity in turn is determined by the consumption choices of the farm household. 
Principally, there are several possible ways in which credit access can be made 
dependent on equity. STEIGUM (1983) introduces an interdependency between 
the interest rate and equity by conditioning interest on the debt-equity ratio r = 
r(K/E). However, this formulation rules out credit rationing as a quantity restric-
tion as it is understood in this monograph so far. I therefore choose a specifica-
tion in which the credit ration is a direct function of equity, as in CHAMBERS and 
LOPEZ (1984). This version stresses the quantity aspect of credit rationing and 
assumes an exogenous, fixed interest rate. Under the assumption of a binding 
credit constraint, the choice of equity in a given period simultaneously deter-
mines (short-run) optimal capital and hence investment (CHAMBERS and LOPEZ 
1984, p. 150). I introduce an access to credit function K(E), which is assumed to 
be concave in E, hence  0 ) ( ' > E K  and  0 ) ( ' ' < E K . The implication is that more 
credit is dependent on the availability of equity, whereas the marginal credit in-
crement decreases with increasing equity. 
Finally, since the financing problem is now related to investment activities, vari-
able inputs are neglected. Furthermore, household characteristics are for the 
moment assumed to be condensed in the time preference and are not otherwise 
considered explicitly. Since it plays no distinctive role in the analysis, the price 
of the consumption bundle is also dropped and assumed to be normalised to one.     2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  95   
The resulting model can be formalised as follows:
44




)) ( ( max
δ  with respect to c and Z, both > 0, 
subject to 
c T p E M E − + = ) , ( &  (2-48) 
the budget constraint in each period, and  E E = 0 , the initial level of equity. T 
denotes public transfers, c is consumption in time period t,  p denotes the output 
price, and  (.) M  is farm income. The latter is defined as follows: 
) ( ) ( ) , ( E rK Z pf p E M − =  (2-49) 
) (Z f  is the production function which is monotonous and concave in capital. 
For reasons of simplicity, depreciation and the price of capital goods are ig-
nored. According to (2-48), each period’s total income is hence allocated to ei-
ther consumption, c, or savings (equity formation), E & . The credit constraint is 
expressed by the following equation: 
0 ) ( ≤ − − E E K Z  (2-50) 
The maximum level of capital is thus constrained by the sum of equity plus 
credit. All variables take on different values through time, however, again for 
reasons of simplicity, I neglect time subscript notation in the sequel. 
The previous optimisation problem does not suggest that the household formu-
lates an optimal plan in the base year and follows that plan in perpetuity 
(CHAMBERS and LOPEZ 1987, p. 370). A more appropriate interpretation is that 
the initial plan reflects the information available at that time, which is continu-
ously updated and thus leads to a reformulation of the optimal plan. Apart from 
that, there is no explicit account taken of uncertainty, that is expectations are 
assumed to be static (for a discussion of this assumption see e.g. CHAMBERS and 
LOPEZ 1984, pp. 152-3). 
The above model can be solved by methods of optimal control theory (KAMIEN 
and SCHWARTZ 1991; CHIANG 1992). By the maximum principle, a solution 
maximises the so-called Hamiltonian function, H, with regard to the control 
variables c and Z, for which optimal paths are sought. These control or decision 
                                           
44  I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments Heinz Peter WITZKE made on an earlier 
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variables influence the state variable E, whose motion is determined by the con-
straint (2-48). Similar to the Lagrangean multiplier in the static optimisation 
procedure applied in section 2.3.1, a costate variable λ is introduced which de-
notes the shadow price of the associated state variable. Other than the conven-
tional static Lagrangean multiplier, in the current dynamic model, λ may take 
on different values in different periods. 
In order to solve the above model I make one further assumption. I only consider 
cases in which the credit constraint is exactly binding, so that (2-50) becomes an 
equality (see CHAMBERS and LOPEZ 1984, p. 150). This allows to substitute (2-
50) into the income function, which considerably simplifies the solution. As a 
consequence, Z is effectively fixed in the short run and can only be influenced by 
dynamic changes in E. The only remaining control variable is consumption c. 
I employ the current-value Hamiltonian (CHIANG 1992, pp. 210-214) which is 
devoid of the discount factor and can be written as follows: 
) ) , ( ( ) ( c T p E M c u H − + + = λ  (2-51) 
A solution if it exists must obey the first-order condition for a maximum, the 
equations of motion of the state and the costate variable, and the initial condition 
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The intuition behind the structure of the model can be explained as follows. The 
dynamic problem is to choose between consumption now versus saving for con-
sumption in future periods. This is visible in the current-value Hamiltonian, 
which is the sum of the utility from current consumption and the value of equity 
formation in terms of utility units evaluated at the shadow price λ. Equation (2-
52) implies that in the optimum, the marginal rate of substitution between equity 
formation and consumption equals one. 
Maximised income plus transfers in connection with current consumption choice 
in each period yield a path of equity accumulation via (2-48) and (2-53). While 
(2-48) simply restates the budget constraint according to which equity formation 
is the residual of income minus consumption, the motion of λ determines how     2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  97   
the dynamic decision problem is balanced over time. As long as the opportunity 
costs of foregoing consumption (or equity formation) as expressed by the time 
preference rate δ  exceed the marginal income from equity  E M ∂ ∂ / ,  λ will 
grow and vice versa. Hence, equity will be accumulated (reduced) until a steady 
state equilibrium is eventually reached, in which  0 = = λ & & E . In the long run, the 
farmer chooses an equity level that maximises the difference between current 
utility from consumption plus future utility from equity formation on the one 
hand and the opportunity costs (in terms of utility) of acquiring that equity on 
the other (CHAMBERS and LOPEZ 1987, p. 372).
45
Of particular interest here is the effect of the credit constraint on the household’s 
investment behaviour. In case of a perfect capital market, the farmer could hire 
any amount of capital at the constant rate r and there were no restriction on Z. 
This would result in an optimality condition for Z identical to that for a variable 
input in the two-period model as discussed in the previous section. Under these 
conditions, no equity formation would be necessary, and current consumption 
would be entirely determined by farm income and public transfers. 
I examine the case where credit access is marginally dependent on equity. (2-50) 
as an equality defines the relation between equity and capital, Z(E). The deriva-
tive of the latter is: 
0 1 ) ( ' ) ( ' > + = E K E Z  (2-54) 
Z(E) is thus increasing in E and investment has the following relation to equity 
formation (differentiate  ) (E Z Z =  with regard to t, application of chain rule): 
E E Z Z & & ) ( ' =  (2-55) 
If the farmer is a net borrower, that is  E Z & & > , (2-55) also determines the change 
in debt as  E Z K & & & − = , which might be positive or negative.   and  K Z & &, E &  all 
move in the same direction. STEIGUM (1983, p. 643) has shown in a slightly dif-
ferent framework that (2-55) can be approximated by a flexible accelerator (see 
(2-47)), with a speed of adjustment coefficient B determined by the parameters 
of the utility function and the income generation opportunities: 
                                           
45  If analysed in a two-variable phase diagram, the presented dynamic problem yields a sad-
dle point equilibrium (CHIANG 1984, p. 633). The problem is a simplified version of mod-
els discussed in CHAMBERS and LOPEZ (1987) and WITZKE (1993, pp. 250-267). Both ref-
erences provide a detailed graphical analysis; the latter also covers extensive formal com-
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[ ) ( * ) ( t Z Z B t Z − = & ]  (2-56) 
In this equation, Z* is the long-term, steady state capital stock. As STEIGUM 
(1983) notes, this results in an algebraically quite complex expression for B. It is 
however clear that the optimal capital stock is reached only after several periods 
of equity accumulation. The presence of financial constraints (or credit rationing 
in previous terminology) thus hampers investment and provides an explanation 
for slow capital adjustment. 
Any effects of changes in parameters of the above model will induce the farmer 
to gradually approach the new steady state equilibrium over several periods, 
according to (2-53). This can be seen as follows. Substitution of the credit con-
straint into the income function results in the following: 
) ( ) ) ( ( ) , ( E rK E E K pf p E M − + =  (2-57) 
Differentiating (2-57) with regard to E yields: 
()' 1 ' ' rK K pf
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For this expression holds that  0 / > ∂ ∂ E M  and  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ E M , since due to the 
credit constraint  r pf > '.   
Parameter changes can hence be analysed as follows. In a long-term or steady 
state equilibrium, the marginal income from equity equals the time preference 
rate,  δ = ∂ ∂ E M / , see (2-53). Parameter changes affect the marginal income 
from equity, via (2-58), which now differs from δ . The household hence adjusts 
its consumption choices in such a way that the resulting equity formation brings 
E M ∂ ∂ /  back into equilibrium with δ . Since the latter is exogenous, steady 
state capital and equity stocks are only affected by changes in those variables 
which influence short-run production. With regard to other variables (for exam-
ple public transfers), there exists a type of long-term separability, although the 
capital market is imperfect (WITZKE 1993, p. 262). 
It is now possible to analyse several effects of parameter changes in the model. I 
confine myself to verbal exposition, formal treatments of similar models are 
given by STEIGUM (1983), CHAMBERS and LOPEZ (1987), and WITZKE (1993, pp. 
260-66). I assume that the system is in steady state equilibrium initially. In the 
framework of static price expectations, a change in output price acts like a shift 
in farm technology. The effect is intuitively as follows: an increase in the output 
price (an improvement of farm technology) immediately increases the marginal 
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the given time preference, it is optimal for the household to gradually increase 
the equity stock in the long run. Resources are hence diverted away from current 
consumption towards equity formation. This in turn relaxes the credit constraint, 
which leads to positive investment until the new steady state equilibrium is 
reached. The effect of an output price increase on investment is thus positive. 
Next I consider an improvement in access to credit in the sense that the same 
equity level implies a larger credit ration. In a graph, K(E) would hence be 
shifted upwards. Initially, this leads to a (mechanistic) expansion of the capital 
stock by debt financing. Since the credit constraint is assumed to be permanently 
binding, more capital is always desirable. In contrast to the previous paragraph, 
however, the effect on equity formation is negative. The reason is as follows. 
Positive investment results in a lower marginal product of capital.  E M ∂ ∂ /  
therefore drops. This tends to reduce equity formation in the long run, according 
to (2-53). The credit constraint hence tightens, and Z is reduced again. Im-
provements in access to credit have therefore conflicting short- and long-term 
effects on investment. This result is due to the fact that investment activities are 
only carried out to secure consumption in the future, they are no end in itself. If 
a larger share of funds comes from the debt market, equity is reduced accord-
ingly. The net effect of an improved credit access on investment is ambiguous, 
depending on the magnitude of the credit shift and the precise shape of the pro-
duction function. 
An increase in government transfers T similarly has conflicting short- and long-
term effects on investment. A discrete rise in T immediately provides additional 
equity for the household, which instantaneously reduces λ. According to (2-52), 
the additional funds are allocated to consumption and equity formation.
46 In-
creased equity makes capital less expensive and thus induces investment. How-
ever, a rise in equity also reduces  E M ∂ ∂ / . As a consequence, by virtue of the 
long-term equilibrium condition (2-53), λ rises again. Equity is thus diverted 
away from the production sphere, which also reduces investment. By the condi-
tion that (2-53) equals zero, the additional transfer income is completely used up 
for consumption in the long run, and E again attains its initial level. Hence, as in 
the two-period model of section 2.3.1, short-term liquidity effects of an increase 
                                           
46  An increase in equity formation is the more plausible reaction which, in an analogous dis-
cussion of the effects of a consumption tax, is assumed to hold in general by CHAMBERS 
and LOPEZ (1987, p. 374). WITZKE (1993, p. 263), however, shows that the immediate ef-
fect of an increase in T on equity formation is undetermined a priori. This is due to the 
theoretical possibility that the direct expansion of the budget constraint (2-48) is overcom-
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in public transfers are likely, but these effects are counteracted by a contraction 
of output in later periods. Since the increase in public transfers reduces the need 
for on-farm income generation, the new steady state shadow price of equity will 
be lower than before. 
The main points of this section may be summarised as follows: 
In the dynamic financial constraints model, credit rationing causes a lagged 
adjustment of capital stocks to the steady state equilibrium. Optimal invest-
ment is dependent on equity formation of the household in terms of profit re-
tention or savings. Investment is thus neither separable from consumption 
decisions nor independent of the equity position of the farm. Improvements 
in access to credit have ambiguous short- and long-term effects on invest-
ment. Output price increases unambiguously stimulate farm investment. Pos-
sible short-term liquidity effects of government transfers are counteracted by 
a subsequent contractive adjustment of farm output.  
2.3.3 Summary and conclusions for further research 
In this subchapter, I investigated how credit rationing affects production, in-
vestment, and consumption decisions in the framework of a two- and a multi-
period farm household model, respectively. Furthermore, the effects of changed 
parameters on the optimal plan were studied. In contrast to the previous sub-
chapter, the ultimate reasons for and mechanisms of credit rationing were disre-
garded and were taken as exogenously given. Only in the multi-period model, 
the farmer was able to influence his access to credit by means of equity (sav-
ings) formation. 
In the two-period model, the introduction of a binding credit constraint led to 
similar problems as already outlined in subchapter 2.1 in the context of transac-
tion costs. The market interest rate loses its relevance for household internal al-
location of funds and is replaced by an endogenous, unobservable shadow inter-
est rate. Compared with a first-best world without credit rationing, the house-
hold will reduce output, which implies a loss of income. An increase in govern-
ment transfers relaxes the liquidity constraint and thus has positive effects on 
farm output. 
In the multi-period model, credit rationing results in a positive shadow price of 
equity, since equity (for example as collateral) has a value for financing produc-
tion in the future. Investment cannot immediately attain its optimal level due to 
credit rationing. The household thus reduces current consumption in favour of 
equity formation, which would be superfluous in the presence of a perfect capi-    2.3 Credit rationing in intertemporal farm household models  101   
tal market. Since the ultimate goal of the household is current and future con-
sumption, possible liquidity effects on production as a result of increased public 
transfers are only of a short-term nature. Additional funds are likely to be con-
sumed in the long run. 
The presence of a perfect capital market allows the convenient separation of 
production or investment decisions on the one hand and consumption decisions 
on the other. Both models suggest that this cannot be maintained under a bind-
ing credit constraint, which has two important consequences. First, there is no 
objective criterion anymore which allows to assess the (private) efficiency of 
input use or investment activities. Both decision complexes can only be made 
simultaneously with the household’s consumption plan and are thus affected by 
the household’s preferences. Second, any empirical production or investment 
analysis has to take these interdependencies into account. Household prefer-
ences have to be made amenable to measurement and must not be neglected in 
the analysis. 
Generally, the models presented in this subchapter provide a number of starting 
points for the further empirical analysis. These include household demand and 
supply functions as well as production functions which can be quantified by 
econometric methods. Furthermore, the postulated interdependencies between 
the consumption and the production/investment sphere of the household can be 
subjected to empirical tests. Both strategies are aimed at a quantification of 
credit rationing effects on the sector level and will be explained in the following 
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3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The goal of the present chapter is to explain the methodological approach of the 
empirical investigation conducted in this research. The chapter is guided by the 
aim to make the theoretical considerations of the previous chapter fruitful for the 
analysis of the real world problems outlined in the introduction to this mono-
graph. This requires the discussion of a number of methodological issues in-
volved in the empirical analysis of credit rationing. I proceed as follows. First, in 
subchapter 3.1, I will clarify the objectives of the empirical investigation and 
provide some methodological background information. This will inter alia make 
clear that any empirical methodology is intimately linked to the availability and 
quality of the data it draws on. Data issues are therefore considered next, in sub-
chapter 3.2. The latter paves the way for subchapter 3.3 in which the approach 
chosen in this research is presented and discussed. 
3.1  Research objectives and methodological background 
In this subchapter I want to specify the objectives of the empirical investigation 
and explain the background of the chosen research strategy. The latter will in-
clude a brief discussion of major approaches found in the literature. 
3.1.1 Objectives of the empirical investigation 
The empirical analysis of this research aims at addressing the issues raised in the 
introduction by a theoretically and methodologically informed examination of 
real world observations. Apart from the initial research questions posed in sub-
chapter 1.3, p. 11, the theoretical findings as summarised in sections 2.1.6, 2.2.4, 
and 2.3.3 are of particular relevance in this respect. The objectives of the em-
pirical research can be restated as follows: 
1. A first fundamental objective of the empirical analysis is to detect whether 
there is any credit rationing of Polish farm households at all. From a meth-
odological point of view this requires to develop an operational definition of 
credit rationing and a strategy how this definition can be made useful for an 
empirical analysis of credit rationing. 
2.  A second objective concerns the investigation of the causes of credit ration-
ing if its presence has been successfully detected. These causes will be of de-
cisive relevance for any policy advice with regard to future government ac-
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3. Finally, based on a theoretical understanding of how credit access affects 
economic decisions of farmers, the empirical analysis shall quantify the ef-
fects of credit rationing on production and investment outcomes of Polish 
farm households. At the same time, this should allow an assessment of the 
current policy environment on rural credit markets in Poland with regard to 
the performance of farms. 
The methodological implications of these objectives will be discussed in the fol-
lowing sections of this chapter. To ease the understanding of these implications, 
I continue with some comments on the location of my approach in the wider 
field of social science methodology. 
3.1.2 On the methodological foundations of (agricultural) economics 
In 1776, Adam SMITH published his thoughts on how individual behaviour of 
economic agents steers the resource allocation of society in the classical text 
‘The Wealth of Nations’ (see section 2.1.2, p. 24). This is commonly regarded as 
the birthday of modern economic science and happened at a time where success-
ful research in the natural sciences begun to provide the basis for the industrial 
revolution and thus had a large influence on daily life. Not by chance, the prac-
tice to discover physical laws – of which the axioms of Newtonian physics are a 
prominent example – by experimental research had a lasting effect on the young 
profession of economics. There was a widely held view among the classical 
economists that the social and economic system of society should obey general 
laws similar to those found in the natural sciences (ALBERT 1979, pp. 52-53). 
The research methodology of the natural sciences thus soon became a blueprint 
for economics as a scientific enterprise.
47
According to this methodology, for example as formalised in the famous scheme 
due to HEMPEL and OPPENHEIM, the process of scientific explanation involves 
the logical deduction of a statement about some real world event from a descrip-
tion of a set of initial conditions plus a universal law (see BLAUG 1992, pp. 4-
5).
48 This methodological view holds that any scientific explanation at the same 
                                           
47  RICHTER (1994, p. 592), in a retrospective on the methodological views held among 
economists in Germany in the 1960’s, reports the following: “We were marked by the de-
sire to apply the analytical style of the natural sciences [...] to our subject area, so as in that 
way to emulate the great successes of the natural sciences”. 
48  For example, the universal law may take the form: “in all cases where event A occurs, 
event B also occurs.” The initial condition may be: “event A occurs”. Taken together, by 
way of deductive logic, it is possible to explain the occurrence of an observed event B by 
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time allows the prediction of future events, as soon as the initial conditions and 
the universal law are known. As a consequence, a first crucial question is under 
what circumstances a postulated law may claim to be universally true. An influ-
ential view in the philosophy of science maintained by representatives of a posi-
tivist tradition is that there is only one criterion decisive for the truth content of a 
proposition: the empirical evidence. Only statements that are backed by empiri-
cal observation or experiment may claim to be universal laws and thus deserve 
to be called ‘scientific’. This implies a second important question: how can the 
required empirical evidence be furnished? Again, there is a widely acknowl-
edged position laid down in Karl POPPER’s ‘Logic of Scientific Discovery’ 
(‘Logik der Forschung’ in German, (1994 [1934])) and known under the labels 
of ‘falsificationism’ or ‘critical rationalism’, which will be outlined briefly.  
The key to POPPER’s methodology is his assertion that the empirical content of 
theories can only be tested by attempting to falsify them, since conclusive verifi-
cation is logically impossible (see BLAUG 1992, pp. 12-26). A theory is the more 
corroborated and hence scientific the more empirical tests it has resisted without 
refutation. Although (or because) there are no ‘crucial experiments’ which once 
and for all refute theoretical propositions (the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis), 
POPPER recommends to be as precise about the circumstances (empirical events) 
under which a theory can be regarded as falsified. In a Popperanian view, it is 
thus good scientific practice to maximise the empirical testability of scientific 
statements. On the other hand, such auxiliary hypotheses are to be avoided 
which reduce the applicability or testability of the theory, for example in the 
form of unspecified ceteris paribus clauses or ad hoc modifications. 
A cursory glance at the major economics journals today (and probably also at 
several previous sections of this monograph) leaves the impression that the pre-
cision of mathematically formulated, universal laws is what indeed characterises 
the research process in economics. Furthermore, the branch of econometrics ap-
parently offers the promising opportunity to subject any theoretical reasoning in 
economics to a rigorous empirical test. Probably for one or both of these rea-
sons, the majority of economists seems to implicitly or explicitly accept 
POPPER’s critical rationalism as the relevant research methodology.
49
                                           
49  This might be exemplified by a look at an arbitrary selection of widely used economic text-
books. In the third edition of their ‘Structure of Economics’, SILBERBERG and SUEN (2000) 
assert that (p. 6, italics by myself): “[E]conomics is that discipline within social science 
that seeks refutable explanations of changes in human events on the basis of changes in 
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But do economists in fact practice what they preach? And can they? There is an 
ongoing debate concerning both questions, and the alternative methodological 
positions are more or less fundamentally different from the mainstream, depend-
ing on whether only the first or both questions are answered negatively. I will 
briefly present a number of positions in the following. 
BLAUG (1992) is one of the most articulate contributors in favour of a stronger 
commitment to falsificationism in economics.
50 Though he obviously believes 
that economists can practice falsificationsim (p. xv), he complains that they 
                                                                                                                                    
simplifying assumption that the unmeasured variables (‘tastes’) remain constant.” LIPSEY 
and CHRYSTAL (1995), in the eighth edition of ‘Positive Economics’, write (p. xii): “Eco-
nomic theory is meant to be about the real world. Economists seek, by the use of theory, to 
explain, understand, and predict real-world phenomena, and theory must therefore be re-
lated to, and tested by, empirical observations.” PINDYCK and RUBINFELD (1995), in the 
third edition of their ‘Microeconomics’, note that (pp. 4-5; italics in the original): “Like 
any science, economics is concerned with the explanation and prediction of observed phe-
nomena. [...] The usefulness and validity of a theory depend on whether it succeeds in ex-
plaining and predicting the set of phenomena that it is intended to explain and predict. 
Consistent with this goal, theories are continually tested against observation. As a result of 
this testing, theories are often modified or refined or even discarded. The process of testing 
and refining theories is central to the development of economics as a science.” German 
textbooks are even more explicit. WOLL (1993), in the eleventh edition of ‘Allgemeine 
Volkswirtschaftslehre’, ascertains (p. 13): “Unsere Kenntnis von der Realität wird vor al-
lem dadurch gefördert, daß an die Stelle bisher unsicherer Theorien neue, empirisch hin-
reichend bestätigte Aussagensysteme treten. Dazu ist es nötig, die vorhandenen Theorien 
ständigen Falsifizierungsversuchen zu unterwerfen. (Our knowledge of reality is particu-
larly improved by replacing previously uncertain theories by new, empirically sufficiently 
corroborated systems of statements. To achieve this goal, existing theories must be con-
tinuosly subjected to falsification attempts (translation by myself).)” He continues on p. 
27: “Die empirische Überprüfung ökonomischer Hypothesen [...] fällt in das Aufgabenge-
biet der Ökonometrie. (the empirical testing of hypotheses [...] falls in the domain of 
econometrics).” Finally, KOESTER (1992), in the second edition of ‘Grundzüge der land-
wirtschaftlichen Marktlehre’ spends more than six pages (pp. 5-11) on explaining how 
POPPER’s methodological positions define the empirical approach of agricultural econom-
ics. He opens his considerations with the statement (p. 5; italics in the original): “Nach den 
grundlegenden Ausführungen von Popper wird heute allgemein mit Hilfe der deduktiven 
Methode gearbeitet und das im folgenden dargestellte Vorgehen akzeptiert. (following the 
fundamental considerations of Popper today’s scientists commonly work with the deduc-
tive method and accept the approach presented in the sequel (translation by myself).)” 
50  In Germany, a methodologically similar position is held by BRINKMANN (1997). FOX and 
KIVANDA (1994) support a falsificationist view with regard to production analysis in agri-
culture. See also the comment by CLARK and COYLE (1994). 106    3 Empirical research methodology 
don’t (p. 111). After rigorously examining the methodological background of 
many important fields of economics in the sequel, he sums up his criticism in the 
form of two major conclusions (p. 238): (a) economic theories are not formu-
lated in such a way that they yield empirically refutable implications, and 
(b) there generally is too little empirical testing of economic theories. BLAUG’s 
position may be illustrated by the following passage on general equilibrium 
(GE) theory, which was already mentioned in section 2.1.2 as a presumed land-
mark of economic thought (BLAUG 1992, p. 169): 
“Enormous intellectual resources have been invested in its [GE theory, M.P.] 
endless refinements, none of which has even provided a fruitful starting point 
from which to approach a substantive explanation of the workings of an eco-
nomic system. Its leading characteristic has been the endless formalization of 
purely logical problems without the slightest regard for the production of falsifi-
able theorems about actual economic behaviour, which, we insist, remains the 
fundamental task of economics. The widespread belief that every economic the-
ory must be fitted into the GE mold if it is to qualify as rigorous science has per-
haps been more responsible than any other intellectual force for the purely ab-
stract and nonempirical character of so much of modern economic reasoning.” 
In contrast, agricultural economists were supposed to have always maintained a 
close relationship to the research field they were studying; probably more than 
economists of other branches. This was made almost proverbial by the assess-
ment of LEONTIEF (1971, p. 5), according to whom agricultural economists, 
“[w]hen they speak of crop rotation, fertilizers, or alternative harvesting tech-
niques, they usually know, sometimes from personal experience, what they are 
talking about.”
51 Agricultural economists hence can hardly be accused of being 
entirely abstract and non-empirical. Despite this commendatory assertion, there 
is a growing scepticism in this applied tradition with regard to the value of eco-
nomic theory for the understanding and prediction of real world phenomena. A 
prominent example in the German context is BRANDES (1985; 1989). 
A major aim of BRANDES is to point to the limitations of what he calls ‘armchair 
economics’ (‘Schreibtisch-Ökonomie’ in German). By taking the agricultural 
sector as example, he demonstrates that current economic theories of farmers’ 
behaviour are not capable of accurately predicting individual response to chang-
ing environments (BRANDES 1985, pp. 60-62; 1989, p. 334). On the sectoral or 
aggregate level, the reliability of forecasting may improve, however, also the 
danger of mutually compensating errors in the analysis increases (1985, p. 110).  
                                           
51  In a recent comment on the broadening of research fields agricultural economists deal 
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In his considerations on scientific methodology, BRANDES’ initial position seems 
to be basically Popperian since he emphasises the search for an empirically 
grounded, scientific explanation of economic behaviour (1985, pp. 114-120; 
144). At the same time, he is fully aware of the fact that it is fraught with prob-
lems to follow this path in economics. I list three major groups of arguments 
why it is so difficult to make economics a ‘hard science’ (an expression used by 
MAYER 1980), since they are of relevance for the further discussion (I refer to 
BRANDES 1985, pp. 76-81; 123-130; 156-159): (a) it is usually regarded as being 
impossible to devise controlled experiments in economics, it is hence quite diffi-
cult to test a given hypothesis in isolation from the surrounding auxiliary as-
sumptions; (b) in economics, there are no constant numerical relationships as in 
physics, and any ‘laws’ are only of a stochastic nature; (c) there is a wide range 
of possibilities to manipulate empirical models in order to obtain a desired re-
sult, a practice also called ‘data mining’. The latter means the arbitrary and in-
transparent choice of the researcher to publish his favourable result out of a pool 
of estimates with possibly largely diverging implications. 
All three points in some respect concern the role econometric analysis plays in 
the methodological approach of economics. As a supplement to the assessment 
by BRANDES, I want to highlight a number of reasons why it must be seriously 
doubted that econometrics can play the empirical judge for economic theories 
(see SCHOR 1991, pp. 54-56; 151-152): 
1.  The first step of econometric analysis concerns the operationalisation of the 
theory to allow its connection with observable data. Often the data employed 
in the empirical model corresponds only crudely to the concepts in the theory, 
or relevant and reliable data may not be available at all. Several frequently 
used concepts have no measurable counterpart, for example risk aversion or 
technical progress. Astonishingly, the various sources of error in data collec-
tion are often neglected even by applied economists (BRINKMANN 1997, pp. 
176-189; a comprehensive description of these errors is GROVES 1989). 
2.  In a second step, the econometric model to be tested is specified, that is the 
precise qualitative structure of the relationship between right- and left-hand 
variables is determined. A premise for this specification is the assumption 
that one knows the true qualitative nature of the underlying structure. How-
ever, this is usually not the case. Correlation is not causation (DEATON 1997, 
p. 65), and a given theory may be represented by a variety of models or func-
tional forms. There is a substantial danger that relevant exogenous variables 
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gression analysis due to specification error. LEAMER (1978) has criticised the 
intransparent search for the ‘best’ fit (the one that confirms the theory – or 
falsifies it?) as ‘ad hoc inference’ without any clearly articulated procedure. 
If there is no criterion determining which of the models is correct, it is im-
possible to conclusively reject any theory based on the obtained estimates.  
3.  Next, the parameters of the empirical model are quantified by employing an 
appropriate estimator. The estimation may often be impossible without vari-
ous auxiliary assumptions or simplifications. An example is the identification 
problem if systems of equations are underidentified, which necessarily re-
quires additional theoretical assumptions (HSIAO 1983). It is clear that the va-
lidity of a theory cannot be tested if it is the constituting assumption of the 
test. Identification may also be increasingly difficult if, as a measure to im-
prove model precision, formerly exogenous variables are endogenised and 
hence explained by other exogenous variables. 
4.  A final remark concerns the use (or abuse) of significance tests in economet-
rics. It must be stressed that there is no objective criterion that allows to 
maintain or reject a certain hypothesis. If probabilistic relationships are ex-
amined, there is a clear trade-off between the risk of committing a type I er-
ror (reject a correct hypothesis) and a type II error (accept a false hypothesis). 
Both are relevant, though the latter is usually neglected (see MAYER 1993, 
pp. 132-151). The commonly used levels of statistical significance are only 
based on convention, and thus a completely arbitrary choice. MCCLOSKEY 
(1985), by asking the question ‘how large is large?’ (p. 142), stresses that 
whether or not a coefficient is significant is not a statistical problem (p. 163). 
Instead, he emphasises the importance to evaluate the benefits or costs for 
society if a certain hypothesis is rejected or accepted, for example by specify-
ing a loss function (p. 158). This, in turn, will clearly involve several norma-
tive judgements. As a consequence, there is no ‘objective’ line between sci-
ence and non-science left. 
The purpose of this is of course not to banish econometrics from the toolbox of 
the economist. Econometric analysis remains a powerful instrument to confront 
economic theories with empirical facts. What should be acknowledged, how-
ever, is the following: 
It seems expected far too much of econometrics to be the fundamental 
benchmark for the falsification of theories. Because econometrics is regarded 
as the only convincing tool to potentially falsify theories (BLAUG 1992, p. 
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able for economics. Furthermore, even if the demand on econometric analy-
sis is more modest, a good deal of openness and honesty is required to make 
any results credible. 
At this point of the examination, it appears useful to refer to the conclusions 
BRANDES arrives at, which are in my view as follows:  
1. It is necessary to overcome the  existing theoretical deficit by developing 
theories that are more capable of explaining economic behaviour in the real 
world (BRANDES 1985, p. 167). At the same time, economists should become 
more humble with respect to the performance of their profession (1985, p. 
216). 
2. More attention should be paid to empirical work. This includes on the one 
hand more transparency and openness in the publication of conventional ap-
proaches, particularly in econometrics (1985, pp. 183-188). On the other 
hand, it also implies to increase efforts to directly investigate economic be-
haviour, for example by field studies or experiments (1985, pp. 168-172; 
188-200). 
3. The aim of economics to be a hard science that produces objective knowl-
edge must be questioned (1989, p. 336) because it is regarded as impossible 
to follow the strict rules of falsificationism (1985, p. 124). The belief in a 
universally accepted, ‘scientific method’ should thus be openly replaced by a 
more subjectivistic and pragmatic attitude (1985, pp. 130-136; 162-164).  
It would be a rewarding task to analyse the development of the past fifteen years 
since BRANDES’ (1985) publication in the light of his previously summarised 
critique. However, from the perspective of my own work, I confine myself to the 
following remarks. 
With regard to theory, I have already stressed the increasing willingness of 
economists to adapt their models to the ‘irritating observations of the real world’ 
(WITZKE 1993, p. 53), see section 2.1.3, p. 30. Of particular importance for this 
monograph is the rapidly growing field of the ‘New Institutional Economics’ 
(NIE), of which a selection of results was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Whether the deviation from the neoclassical benchmark is merely gradual or 
principal is a second question (see BRANDES et al. 1997, p. 320); currently there 
exist efforts to push the frontier of knowledge in both directions (see section 
5.2.2, pp. 201 et seq. below). 
Unfortunately, the hope that the closer proximity to real world phenomena im-
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TERBERGER (1994, pp. 143-151) argues, the empirical testability of NIE con-
cepts may even have decreased in comparison to that of the orthodox neoclassi-
cal tradition: (a) unobservable factors play an even larger role in NIE, for exam-
ple the general assumption of utility instead of profit maximisation, the informa-
tional status of agents, or the possibility of bounded rationality; (b) as a result of 
these modifications, even less observable events can be excluded by theoretical 
arguments (see the diverging effects of various forms of information asymmetry 
on credit market outcomes in section 2.2.3, pp. 63 et seq.); (c) concepts that ap-
pear to be simple to operationalise at first sight turn out to be rather vague after a 
second thought (see the reflections on ‘transaction costs’ at the end of section 
2.1.5 above). In addition, several reservations concerning econometric analysis 
as expressed above apply even more for models derived from NIE theories. This 
particularly concerns the risk of specification errors, since postulated relation-
ships may be highly non-linear, and even less might be known about functional 
forms in institutional economics than it is, for example, in applied production 
analysis. The further discussion in this chapter will illustrate these points. 
On the other hand, it seems fair to say that contemporary econometricians care a 
lot more about the sources of error outlined above than it was the case a few 
decades ago (see MAYER 1993, p. 145). It is now an emerging standard in intro-
ductory econometric textbooks to refer to the danger of data mining and to ac-
quaint the reader with available testing procedures (see for example JOHNSTON 
and DINARDO 1997, chapter 4, particularly pp. 109; 112). At the same time, ex-
pectations with regard to the power of causal interference in econometrics have 
become more modest, and increasing attention is paid to the procedures of sur-
vey design and data collection. This is particularly true for researchers who deal 
with large sets of micro-data. A case in point are the huge amounts of data col-
lected by the World Bank in the framework of the Living Standards Measure-
ment Study. DEATON (1997, pp. 65-66), in his textbook on survey data analysis, 
comments on the problems involved by citing FREEDMAN (1991):   
“‘[...] statistical technique can seldom be an adequate substitute for good design, 
relevant data, and testing predictions against reality in a variety of settings.’ ” 
DEATON continues his introduction to econometric methods as follows: 
“One of my aims [...] is to clarify the often rather limited conditions under which 
the various econometric techniques work, and to indicate some more realistic al-
ternatives, even if they promise less. A good starting point for all econometric 
work is the (obvious) realization that it is not always possible to make the de-
sired inferences with the data to hand. Nevertheless, even if we must sometimes 
give up on causal inference, much can be learned from careful inspection and 
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Again, this is not to say that causal interference in econometrics is an undesir-
able goal. Much of what follows in this monograph is still committed to this 
kind of analysis. However, it again demonstrates the possible limitations of em-
pirical analysis in economics.
52
This brings me to the last point in this section, which concerns the adequate 
methodological standpoint in economics. If critical rationalism cannot be the 
benchmark for economists, the natural question arises what will take its part. I 
will not review the entire and rather dispersed field of current thinking about 
economic methodology (the interested reader is referred to surveys such as 
BLAUG 1992 or CALDWELL 1994).
53 However, I want to point the reader to an 
influential strand of thought introduced by MCCLOSKEY (1983) as ‘rhetoric of 
economics’ and developed further towards a methodological position of ‘prag-
matic instrumentalism’ by SCHOR (1991). 
MCCLOSKEY (1983, 1985) shares most of the critique of traditional methodology 
in spirit of the natural sciences as outlined above; a methodology he calls ‘mod-
ernist’. He insists that the ‘modernist’ rules of scientific reasoning are not co-
gent, are counterproductive to any scientific progress in economics, and, in par-
ticular, are not followed by economists (1983, pp. 484-493). The problem he 
sees is that economists do not recognise the fact that the prescriptions of tradi-
tional methodology “are apparently not the grounds for their scientific convic-
tion” (p. 482). What economists in fact practise, MCCLOSKEY argues, is per-
suading their auditorium by a specific rhetoric of economics. Following BOOTH, 
he understands rhetoric as “ ‘the art of probing what men believe they ought to 
believe, rather than proving what is true according to abstract methods.’ ” In his 
view, this ‘unofficial methodology’ is neither sufficiently acknowledged nor ex-
amined more closely by the profession, although it should. A central claim of 
MCCLOSKEY is that economists should become aware of the rhetoric they are 
using, which to a substantial extent consists of metaphors, even if the language 
of mathematics is used. He takes the production function as an example (1983, 
pp. 505-506): 
                                           
52  It should be noted that conducting laboratory experiments has become a quite widespread 
methodological approach in economics which clearly has left the stage of infancy (for an 
overview see KAGEL and ROTH 1995). Vernon L. SMITH as a major proponent was 
awarded the Nobel prize in 2002. However, in my opinion, an important problem not yet 
solved in a satisfying way is how results gained in the laboratory can be generalised to be 
valid in given real world situations (the problem of external validity, see FRIEDMAN and 
SUNDER 1994, pp. 15-16). 
53  A brief and up-to-date overview is HANDS (2001). 112    3 Empirical research methodology 
“Consider [...] the theory of production functions. Its vocabulary is intrinsically 
metaphorical. ‘Aggregate capital’ involves an analogy of ‘capital’ (itself ana-
logical) with something – sand, bricks, shmoos – that can be ‘added’ in a mean-
ingful way; so does ‘aggregate labour,’ with the additional peculiarity that the 
thing added is no thing, but hours of conscientious attentiveness; the very idea 
of a ‘production function’ involves an astonishing analogy to the subject, the 
fabrication of things, about which it is appropriate to think in terms of ingenuity, 
discipline, and planning, with the modifier, a mathematical function, about it is 
appropriate to think in terms of height, shape, and single valuedness.” 
If metaphors are essential to economic thinking, MCCLOSKEY continues, these 
metaphors should be openly recognised and examined, but not be banished. For 
him the consequence to draw from a better understanding of economists’ rheto-
ric is to avoid any discrimination of allegedly ‘non-scientific’ arguments, and to 
open economics “to a wider range of discourse” (p. 493). What counts in the end 
is the persuasiveness of argument: “There are some subjective, soft, vague 
propositions that are more persuasive than some objective, hard, precise proposi-
tions” (p. 511). MCCLOSKEY concludes that the recognition of this fact will, due 
to more transparency and honesty, also contribute to a better quality of research 
and teaching (pp. 512-515). 
SCHOR (1991) takes these rather provocative claims as a starting point for the 
development of a more fully articulated, methodological position of what he 
calls ‘pragmatic instrumentalism’ (pp. 103-140). According to its very name, the 
key characteristics of this position are (a) a close proximity to the object of in-
vestigation (in opposition to an abstract ‘scientific rule’ of positivist methodol-
ogy), and (b) the recognition of scientific reasoning as an instrument of argu-
mentation within the scientific community (rather than a universally valid ex-
planation of the real world). A major stepping stone in SCHOR’s argumentation 
is the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in the philosophy of science, according to which 
there is no real world existing independently of a system of language, and the 
relationship between language and real world cannot be examined without refer-
ring to the context in which a speech product originated (SCHOR 1991, p. 106).
54 
It is hence regarded as impossible to assess an abstract theory without reference 
to the individuals by whom it is constructed and employed. The purpose of theo-
ries is no longer to formalise truth claims, but, more modestly, to structure and 
                                           
54  Since my exposition at this point has more the form of a digression, it must necessarily be 
crude and simplifying. The reader interested in the broader background of the philosophy 
of social science is referred to the recent introductory survey by BENTON and CRAIB 
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communicate relevant problems identified by the scientist in a way that others 
find plausible or persuasive. 
A question largely left unanswered so far is what makes an argument plausible. 
If producing plausible statements about some real phenomena is the purpose of 
economic reasoning, it is natural to ask what kind of benchmark distinguishes 
plausible from less plausible statements. SCHOR (1991, pp. 119-124) claims that 
a theory is plausible if its user recognises the correspondence between the the-
ory and his subjective knowledge or understanding of the real world. Subjective 
knowledge consists both of individual perception (for example based on intui-
tion or introspection) and empirical facts (for example based on experimental 
measurement or observation). A plausible theory connects its content with the 
user’s subjective knowledge by means of analogy or metaphors. There are no 
formal or objective criteria determining whether an analogy is valid, this is de-
cided upon by the subjective perception of the auditorium alone. However, ac-
cording to SCHOR, a theory is to be preferred among others with otherwise the 
same properties if it has a larger target area for questioning its premises and 
implications (p. 134). A good theory hence promotes the interaction process be-
tween its content and the auditorium, for example by the use of well chosen 
metaphors.
55
Against this background, the ‘traditional’ methods of economic reasoning are 
relieved from the burden of being imperfect tools for a positivist methodology. 
However, in the view of pragmatic instrumentalism, their specific strengths is 
now ascribed a new quality (SCHOR 1991, pp. 162-176). The widespread use of 
mathematical models in economics, for example, may be regarded as an obvious 
hint for the reader that this is no description of reality but a fiction, an idealising 
metaphor of real world events. By formulating a theory in mathematical terms, 
the degree of unambiguity and consistency is clearly raised, which in turn in-
creases the target area for questioning and probing. Furthermore, mathematical 
language has the advantage of being easily communicated and widely under-
stood. All this is desirable for a methodology of pragmatic instrumentalism. 
Similarly, econometric modelling is now assessed with regard to its persuasive-
ness and plausibility, but no longer seen as the fundamental judge for the falsifi-
                                           
55  To elaborate on the philosophical debate about the interconnection between social reality 
and language is beyond the scope of this monograph. Inter alia, SCHOR (1991) draws on 
work by HABERMAS who, roughly speaking, takes language as a model for democracy. The 
properties of language can be used to derive an ‘ideal speech situation’, which creates a 
standard for assessing real world communication processes (BENTON and CRAIB 2001, p. 
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cation of theories. The assumption that one knows the real structure of an 
econometric model simply serves as a means of argumentation, but does no 
longer claim any universal validity or truth. However, econometricians should 
be aware of the rhetoric they are using, which implies to make transparent the 
limitations of the employed statistical techniques. 
I would like to conclude this section with a more personal statement. When I 
started the empirical work for this thesis, I was fascinated by the Popperian view 
of critical rationalism and its methodological rules of putting theories to the em-
pirical test, and I still am. However, when writing these lines, I am convinced of 
the following two points: neither does this research pursue a falsificationist ap-
proach, nor can falsificationism be regarded as the mainstream method that is 
practised by the majority of economists. It is presumably much closer to the 
truth that this research (even more so as a doctoral thesis) does what contempo-
rary agricultural economists find plausible, and thus follows a much more prag-
matic and instrumentalist track.
56
3.1.3 A survey of methods
57 
After the digression of the former subchapter I now return to the more narrow 
objectives of the thesis. In this section, I want to fit the research into the frame-
work of empirical economic analysis constituting the background of this study. I 
therefore review the available literature on the topic. In the following section, I 
will explain the choice of the empirical approach for my own research, which 
will be further developed in subchapter 3.3, pp. 144 et seq. 
                                           
56  In how far this entire debate has been acknowledged by agricultural economists in Ger-
many is an open question. HANF (1996, pp. 47-48) suspects that the critical writings of 
MCCLOSKEY and others have contributed to the decision of a number of (European) re-
searchers to leave the conventional formulation of the neoclassical theory of the firm in fa-
vour of a more comprehensive household modelling approach. Among others, HANF men-
tions the work of HENNING (1994) and WITZKE (1993). This conjecture might be doubted 
on two grounds. First, the household modelling framework can safely be regarded as one 
of the most modest modifications of traditional theory (see section 2.1.3 above and the fol-
lowing discussion in this monograph). Accordingly, WITZKE (1993, p. 17) sees the modifi-
cations he discusses primarily as extensions of (and not alternatives to) standard microeco-
nomic theory, so that HANF’s examples lend no support to his claim. Second, HENNING 
(1994, p. 21) himself openly declares his commitment to critical rationalism at the outset 
of his thesis. Although the consequences of this commitment are not particularly visible in 
the thesis, this is clearly a position opposite to MCCLOSKEY. 
57  This section is based on PETRICK (2004b). It benefited from helpful comments by Stephan 
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Before examining the recent literature, it seems useful to develop a number of 
criteria on which to base the choice of method. In line with the research objec-
tives stated in section 3.1.1, p. 102, and the theoretical consideration of the pre-
vious chapter, I establish the following standards: 
1.  Based on an operational definition, the approach should allow the empirical 
measurement (quantification) of credit rationing of farm households. 
2.  The approach should somehow address the problem of defining an appropri-
ate efficiency concept of financial intermediation on rural credit markets. 
3.  It must take into account the (non-)availability of data on Polish farm house-
holds. 
4. It should lend itself to plausible methods of data analysis that allow the ex-
amination of causes and effects of credit rationing and how credit rationing is 
itself influenced by the structural and policy environment of farm house-
holds. 
In my opinion, the recent literature on the topic allows to distinguish six ap-
proaches to the empirical investigation of credit rationing: 
1.  A direct method based on measurement of loan transaction costs, 
2.  a direct method based on qualitative information collected in interviews, 
3.  a direct method based on the credit limit concept, 
4.  a direct method based on spill-over effects, 
5.  an indirect method based on econometric household modelling, 
6.  an indirect method based on an econometric analysis of dynamic investment 
decisions. 
Direct methods are characterised by the fact that they immediately utilise obser-
vations made in the field, while indirect methods analyse the consequences of 
credit rationing by means of econometric modelling. However, there are a num-
ber of interdependencies between both types, because the two indirect methods 
usually are dependent on additional information provided by direct methods. I 
briefly explain the six approaches in the following. I will focus on applications 
to rural credit markets and refer to the general literature only where it seems ap-
propriate. How far the previously used methods comply with the above criteria 
will be examined as a part of the subsequent discussion, which will in particular 
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the econometric methods mentioned in the sequel are explained in more detail in 
subchapters 3.2 and 3.3. 
Approach 1: Direct measurement of loan transaction costs 
This method prescribes to directly collect information about additional, loan 
specific transaction costs borrowers face apart from nominal interest rates, such 
as costs of information collection, loan application, insurance of collateral, etc. 
The approach was already introduced in section 2.1.4 above, pp. 32 et seq., to-
gether with a number of applications mainly in developing countries. Observed 
transaction costs may well make investment unprofitable and thus lead to exclu-
sion of borrowers who might have been in a position to repay nominal interest 
rates. The explicit reason for credit rationing in this approach is thus that the 
price a borrower faces is effectively too high for him to pay.
58 In case that these 
non-interest transaction costs are not ‘naturally’ associated with financial inter-
mediation (ADAMS 1993, p. 4), they may be taken as an indicator for the effi-
ciency of credit markets (as proposed by R.L. MEYER and CUEVAS 1992, p. 
310). Which transaction costs are necessary is of course difficult to distinguish; 
ADAMS (1993) argues that costs associated with regulation or loan targeting do 
not fall under this category. 
CUEVAS and GRAHAM (1986) provide an analysis of determinants of transaction 
costs of a sample of farms in Honduras, based on a generalised power function. 
Their results indicate that transaction costs as percentage of loan amount de-
crease with loan size, decline with increases in the interest rate, and are higher 
for private bank loans than development bank loans (p. 685). 
SAITO and VILLANUEVA (1981) in their examination of the Philippine credit 
market take a slightly different approach in that they analyse capital and transac-
tion costs of small farm lending that are internal to the bank. They conclude that 
                                           
58  Initially, high transaction costs have appeared as an argument for credit rationing in envi-
ronments where there are governmentally imposed interest rate ceilings (see section 2.1.4 
and LADMAN 1984, p. 107). Later contributions use this argument in a more general con-
text of financial intermediation that seems to be independent of certain interest policies 
(e.g. CUEVAS and GRAHAM 1986; R.L. MEYER and CUEVAS 1992). The following quote 
documents that the literature on the current approach is imprecise with regard to the ques-
tion of whether credit rationing works through a quantity or a price mechanism: “In this 
paper we investigate the role of transaction costs of borrowing as a rationing mechanism in 
the agricultural credit markets of five less-developed countries. We show that borrowing 
transaction costs become an effective non-price rationing device in these markets” 
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these costs are much higher than for large-scale industry lending, which should 
be reflected in nominal interest rates.  
A crucial question in assessing the value of this method for measuring credit ra-
tioning is thus how far transaction costs are included into the nominal interest 
rate, and how far these costs are inevitable. More liberal government policies 
may imply that transaction costs are in fact included in nominal interest rates, 
which says little about whether they are inevitable or not (see BESLEY 1994, 
1995). If they are included, an efficiency analysis has to start with the financial 
intermediaries themselves (see KHITARISHVILI 2000 for such a study on Polish 
co-operative banking). 
The method is assessed as follows: 
─  The method requires collection of specific information in field surveys. Non-
interest transaction costs should be included in the calculation of the effective 
costs of each borrower to obtain a relevant price variable. Their collection is 
therefore highly recommendable. At the same time, this procedure is less sat-
isfactorily on theoretical grounds, since opportunity costs are almost impos-
sible to measure (see section 2.1.5 above, pp. 38 et seq.). A pragmatic opera-
tionalisation is thus necessary. 
─  Furthermore, the validity of the share of transaction costs in total lending 
costs as an indicator of market efficiency depends highly on the pricing pol-
icy of the respective bank (that is which costs are effectively passed on as 
part of the nominal interest rate and which accrue in addition to that). Since 
this is likely to be different for different banks, comparisons cannot necessar-
ily be made and the indicator is thus of limited value.  
─  The absolute value of effective interest rates is also a difficult measure since 
it might be impossible to distinguish which costs reflect real expenses neces-
sary for loan appraisal, monitoring, etc., and which are simply slack in the in-
termediation process. The theoretical discussion in chapter 2 suggests that 
there is no agreement in the literature how far certain costs are in fact avoid-
able. 
As a conclusion, this approach rightly stresses the importance of transaction 
costs in rural credit markets. However, in my opinion, it provides no adequate 
method to measure credit rationing. Due to its conceptual difficulties, it is re-
garded as inappropriate to analyse the determinants of credit rationing in terms 
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Approach 2: Analysis of qualitative information collected in interviews 
The idea of this method is to directly ask borrowers whether they would have 
liked to borrow more at the prevailing interest rate. In case of a positive answer, 
respondents are classified as ‘credit-constrained’. The same applies to non-
borrowers who respond that they could not get credit although they liked to. 
This method to my knowledge was first applied by FEDER et al. (1989 and 1990) 
and, presumably independently, by JAPPELLI (1990). FEDER et al. (1989) provide 
empirical evidence that this indicator is a reliable measure of liquidity shortages 
in their sample of 600 Chinese farm households, where liquidity is defined as 
the sum of savings, cash, and fungible credit. 
While the paper of FEDER et al. (1989) is at last driven by the desire to support 
policy formulation that stimulates production, JAPPELLI (1990) has a theoreti-
cally differently motivated point of departure. His aim is to analyse the charac-
teristics of credit-constrained households in the U.S. economy in order to chal-
lenge the life-cycle model of consumption. The life-cycle model in its simple 
form claims that current consumption is independent of current income – an in-
dependence that breaks down in the presence of binding borrowing constraints. 
Theoretically, an appropriate strategy would be to estimate a reduced form func-
tion for the demand for loans in excess of the binding borrowing constraint. This 
excess demand is supposed to depend on both demand and supply variables. 
Since excess credit demand (as the difference between optimal consumption
59 
and debt ceiling) is unobservable, JAPPELLI exploits the specific qualitative in-
formation contained in the 1983 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances on whether 
a respondent is credit-constrained or not. This information was obtained in a 
similar fashion as in the study by FEDER et al. (1989). As a result, JAPPELLI esti-
mates a Logit equation with the probability of being credit-constrained as de-
pendent variable. He finds that income, wealth, and age are the most important 
determinants of being credit-constrained.
60
The approach of directly asking respondents about their rationing status was fur-
ther refined by BAYDAS et al. (1994) and ZELLER (1994). BAYDAS et al. analyse 
a sample of micro-entrepreneurs in Ecuador, in which they further divided the 
                                           
59  In the standard version of the life-cycle model, current consumption only depends on life-
cycle characteristics such as age or household composition (but not on current income, see 
DEATON 1997, pp. 359-60). 
60  WINKER (1996) applies a similar approach to German firm panel data, where financial con-
straints based on ‘ifo-Innovationstest’-data are used as dependent variable of a Probit 
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group of constrained borrowers in those who are (a) completely rejected, i.e. 
who applied for a loan without success, or (b) unsatisfied, i.e. who applied but 
obtained a smaller loan than demanded. Together with the (c) satisfied borrow-
ers who obtained as much as applied for and the (d) non-applicants, BAYDAS et 
al. identify four groups of respondents. Based on this distinction, they perform a 
multinomial Logit model to quantify determinants and probabilities for respon-
dents to be in one of the four distinct groups.
61 ZELLER (1994) employs a similar 
approach of four categories to analyse formal and informal borrowing in Mada-
gascar. Theoretically, he structures credit rationing as a sequential process 
where first potential borrowers decide whether to apply, and second lenders de-
cide whether to grant a loan.
62 As a consequence, he uses this grouping to esti-
mate a two-stage Probit model. 
The above categorisation into four groups of potential borrowers was further 
developed by  MUSHINSKI (1999), who divides non-applicants into (d1) pre-
emptively rationed and (d2) not interested respondents. He argues that house-
holds of group (d1) may well have some notional demand for credit, although in 
effect they do not apply because – according to statements made in interviews – 
they fear rejection or high transaction costs of loan application. As a conse-
quence, in an analysis of Guatemalan credit unions, the author estimates no-
tional demand offer probabilities by means of a Probit model which identifies 
the probability that a household with positive notional demand for credit re-
ceives a loan offer. In a first-best world, this probability is supposed to be one, 
and a smaller value thus can be interpreted as an indicator of credit rationing. 
This claim seems however not to be warranted, as long as no information on re-
turns on credit use is provided.  
The results suggest that demand offer probabilities of credit unions are generally 
higher than those of banks, and that credit unions’ lending decisions are not as 
much dependent on easily collateralisable wealth as those of banks.
63 Further-
                                           
61  BARHAM et al. (1996) use principally the same categorisation to investigate the ability of 
Guatemalan credit unions to relax credit constraints of small-scale producers. However, 
they condense groups (c) and (d) into one group of unconstrained borrowers. 
62  This two-stage structure was also used by HEIDHUES et al. (1998, p. 364) in their analysis 
of the Romanian credit market. 
63  In order to circumvent the problem of modelling the interdependent decision process re-
sulting in the choice of the lender (credit union or bank), MUSHINSKI focuses only on the 
lender offer decision, which he assumes to be independent from the households’ choice of 
lenders. He thus understands the credit market outcome as a sequential process of first ap-
plication and second acceptance or rejection, similar to ZELLER (1994). 120    3 Empirical research methodology 
more, the econometric analysis shows that ignoring notional credit demand may 
lead to implausible coefficients of the demand offer equations. 
In contrast to all authors using the qualitative information approach desribed 
previously, KOCHAR (1997) uses survey data of rationing outcomes on seg-
mented credit markets in rural India to analyse these outcomes as jointly deter-
mined by borrower and lender behaviour. This involves the application of jointly 
distributed bi- and trivariate Probit models with partial observability (see 
MADDALA 1983, p. 279).
64 A major result of KOCHAR’s analysis is that, condi-
tional on the households’ demand for credit, the degree of effective rationing is 
rather low. A disadvantage is that information on loan contract terms such as 
interest rate and loan size is discarded. 
In light of the criteria established above, the analysis of qualitative information 
collected in interviews can be assessed as follows: 
─  Qualitative information on loan rationing in rural credit markets directly cor-
responds with the casual observation of credit-constrained farmers, that is 
farmers who complain about lack of access to credit. 
─  The categorisation of a certain respondent exclusively relies on his own sub-
jective assessment of his situation. The validity of this statement may be 
questioned, although there are no plausible arguments why it should be less 
valid than any other information collected in field surveys.  
─  In any case, the qualitative information allows the consistent differentiation 
of respondents into those for whom liquidity is exogenous (i.e. not under the 
control of the respondent) and those for whom it is not.  
─  However, it is not necessarily a consistent measure of credit market effi-
ciency, since no disequilibrium in terms of resource allocation is explicitly 
tracked down. Furthermore, it does not allow a quantification of the severity 
of credit rationing. 
─  Although it requires specific questions to be included in survey question-
naires, it is relatively easy to collect but still lends itself to multivariate meth-
ods of analysis. The causal determinants of the qualitative choice variable 
can principally be identified. 
                                           
64  In the approaches described so far there are single decisions among several alternatives, or 
sequences of single decisions. Opposed to that, in the KOCHAR model there are two (three) 
interdependent decisions, each between two alternatives, which involves the estimation of 
a system of equations with correlated disturbances. See GREENE (2000, pp. 849; 857).     3.1 Research objectives and methodological background  121   
─  A general problem is the theoretical structuring of the decision-making proc-
ess on segmented credit markets where more than one source of credit is 
relevant. There may be good arguments to assert that choice between several 
sources is an interdependent process and even the decision of the lender to 
grant the loan may be involved in this. If this assertion holds, estimations 
based on sequential and independent decision processes might be inappropri-
ate. 
In summary, qualitative information on credit access has the advantage that it is 
relatively easily collected and interpreted. In addition, it may support an impor-
tant assumption for econometric modelling, namely that credit is exogenously 
determined for credit-constrained households. 
Approach 3: Analysis of quantitative information collected in interviews by us-
ing the credit limit concept 
In an attempt to overcome the qualitative nature of the indicator described pre-
viously, researchers at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
developed the credit limit concept as a novel approach to measure rationing 
(DIAGNE 1999; DIAGNE et al. 2000). The idea is to ask a given respondent about 
the maximum amount a lender is willing to lend him, which is the credit limit of 
the respondent with regard to this lender (DIAGNE et al. 2000, p. 10).
65 The credit 
limit thus measures the borrower’s current access to credit, which may be dif-
ferent for different loan sources. However, a given credit limit does not neces-
sarily imply a binding credit constraint. Departing from the life-cycle model of 
intertemporal consumption, the authors define a borrower as being credit-
constrained if “the optimal amount borrowed when borrowing under a credit 
constraint is strictly less than the optimal amount that would be borrowed if the 
credit constraint did not exist” (p. 17). In other words, the borrower is credit-
constrained only if his optimal loan size is effectively restricted by his credit 
limit. Furthermore, a distinction is made between access to credit and participa-
tion in credit markets. Households may choose not to participate in credit mar-
kets, although they have access to credit (i.e. a positive credit limit). Together 
with information about the optimal loan demand (or simply loan amount applied 
for), a metric quantification of the extent of credit rationing is possible. 
                                           
65  In the survey the respondents were asked “the maximum amount they could [subjunctive, 
M.P.] borrow during the recall period from both informal and formal sources of credit” 
(DIAGNE et al. 2000, p. 29, italics in the original). 122    3 Empirical research methodology 
The appealing feature of the credit limit concept is that it allows a metric quanti-
fication of credit access, which in turn may be used in econometric analyses. 
Furthermore, it principally allows to measure the success of a given credit ex-
pansion policy by its impact on perceived credit limits of the target group, and 
the effect this expanded credit limit has on other variables of household welfare. 
In an application to Bangladesh and Malawi, DIAGNE et al. (2000) find that mi-
crofinance institutions promoted in the study area had a positive effect on bor-
rowers’ credit limits. 
DIAGNE (1999) uses the credit limit variable to evaluate decisions to participate 
in credit programmes and access to credit by rural households in Malawi. His 
formal model has a two-stage structure, according to the choice-based sampling 
procedure of the survey which was stratified along programme membership 
status. The first stage consists of a four-alternative, two-level nested multinomial 
Logit model (see GREENE 2000, pp. 857-874) which depicts participation deci-
sions as population conditional choice probabilities. In the second stage, these 
probabilities are used to estimate a reduced form recursive system of simultane-
ous equations of credit limits and amount borrowed as dependent variables. The 
results of the analysis show that participation decisions in certain credit pro-
grammes are highly driven by programme attributes other than the interest rate. 
Furthermore, the diversification of assets is more relevant for formal credit ac-
cess than its total value. Increasing credit limits are only partially exploited by 
borrowers, which – according to the author – underlines the importance of ac-
cess to credit as an insurance mechanism that is only utilised in case of emer-
gency. Finally, informal credit is regarded as only a weak substitute of formal 
credit, since, in contrast to the latter, the former is mainly used for consumption 
purposes. 
The characteristics of the credit limit concept are as follows: 
─  It requires specific questions to be included in survey questionnaires. In par-
ticular cases, it may be difficult to make respondents understand what is ex-
actly meant by the question on credit limits (DIAGNE et al. 2000, p. 30), or 
some respondents may be ignorant about their credit limit. 
─  Compared to the qualitative indicator it provides a metric measure of credit 
rationing, which allows the application of more sophisticated methods of 
analysis. 
─  As the qualitative indicator, it is also not necessarily a consistent measure of 
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Since the experience with this method is limited so far, it probably makes sense 
to use it as a complement to other methods. 
Approach 4: Analysis of spill-over effects with regard to secondary credit 
sources 
The central theoretical assumption of this method is that credit sources other 
than bank credit are more expensive than bank loans. If a borrower makes use of 
these secondary sources, he is assumed to be unable to satisfy his financial needs 
from the primary source, though he has sufficient repayment capacity to serve 
the secondary source. He can therefore be treated as credit-rationed with regard 
to the primary source. It might be possible, however, that there is also rationing 
on the side of the secondary source. Use of the secondary source due to unsatis-
fied demand with regard to the primary source is sometimes called ‘spill-over’ 
(BELL et al. 1997). 
Trade credit in developed countries and informal credit (moneylender) in devel-
oping countries are the two secondary segments of credit markets usually re-
ferred to. Both are regarded as comparatively more expensive than formal bank 
loans, although lenders in these secondary segments usually are in a more ad-
vantageous position with regard to information asymmetries as compared with 
banks (see the discussion on trade credit in JAFFEE and STIGLITZ 1990, p. 879 
and on informal credit in ALEEM 1993, and section 2.2.2 above, pp. 55 et seq.). 
As a metric indicator of credit rationing,  PETERSEN and RAJAN (1995) and 
HARHOFF and KÖRTING (1998) use the criterion of fast payment discounts actu-
ally taken by a firm, in percent of fast payment discounts offered to it. If firms 
often do not make use of the advantageous fast payment discount, they are re-
garded as rationed with regard to their primary lender (bank). The full amount 
which is to be paid afterwards can hence be regarded as a form of trade credit, 
which costs usually by far exceed lending rates offered by banks (PETERSEN and 
RAJAN (1995, p. 426). However, these studies solely concentrate on the formal 
loan markets in the U.S. and Germany, respectively, and the effects lending rela-
tionships have on the access to credit. 
BELL et al. (1997) estimate demand and supply functions under relatively re-
strictive assumptions of an unobserved regime switching model for segmented 
credit markets in rural Punjab.
66 Their analysis based on a cross sectional sample 
of farmers shows that the formal market is responsible for most rationing, de-
                                           
66  This study hence provides a link to approach 5. I mention it here due to its emphasis on 
segmentation and spill-over. 124    3 Empirical research methodology 
mand is rather inelastic with regard to interest rates, and tying credit to output 
marketing made informal lenders willing to advance much bigger loans. 
The method is assessed as follows: 
─  It requires detailed information on various loan sources used by respondents. 
For the more demanding analyses, panel data might be desirable. 
─  In case that the assumptions implicitly made are correct (secondary sources 
more expensive than primary, profit maximisation of borrower), this method 
provides a valid measure to quantitatively analyse rationing phenomena in 
segmented credit markets. Cause-effect modelling is principally possible. 
─  It is only relevant where segmented credit markets are important.  
─  It may be regarded as a shortcoming that the measurement of spill-over ef-
fects implies an underestimation of credit rationing if some rationed house-
holds do not turn to the secondary source of credit, but simply accept the 
constraints on the formal market instead. 
Approach 5: Econometric analysis in the framework of a static, microeconomic 
household model  
This method seeks to analyse the effects of credit rationing under implicit or ex-
plicit consideration of a farm household model and hence can take advantage of 
its theoretical results. It was demonstrated in subchapter 2.3 that market imper-
fections such as credit rationing lead to important interactions between the pro-
duction and the consumption sphere of the household. Observable consequences 
of these interactions are taken as a starting point for the econometric analysis of 
rationing phenomena in this approach. Since methodologically similar ap-
proaches have also been used for the analysis of labour markets, I refer also to 
selected studies on the latter. 
As shown in section 2.3.1 (pp. 77 et seq.), a binding constraint on the credit 
market leads to the presence of a marked-up shadow interest rate in the first-
order conditions for profit maximisation (equation (2-33), p. 83). A similarly 
modified shadow wage would obtain in the case of labour market restrictions 
(for example due to limited off-farm employment opportunities for the family 
labour force or rationing of hired labour in the peak season; see D. BENJAMIN 
1992, pp. 292-298). As a consequence, marginal revenues of factor use should 
be significantly different from observable, exogenous factor costs (interest rates 
or market wages). Furthermore, in the case of rationing, production and con-
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ling approach attempts to empirically detect both the household internal shadow 
price and the mutual dependency of consumption and production.  
In the credit market case, the presence of credit rationing is hence defined by its 
consequences for allocation decisions within the farm household. In addition, 
the credit market is understood to be efficient if the first-order condition for op-
timal credit allocation is met, namely that values of marginal productivity equal 
exogenous interest rates (see in particular CARTER and WIEBE 1990, pp. 1147-
1148; SIAL and CARTER 1996, pp. 771-772; 777-779). Referring to the consid-
erations in subchapter 2.2, this efficiency means the absence of credit rationing 
(no private excess demand), although social efficiency in a first-best sense is not 
warranted if the interest rate is affected by agency problems. 126    3 Empirical research methodology 
Table 3-1:   Econometric analyses of credit and labour market imperfec-











Credit market          
IQBAL (1986)  FD (linear)  2SLS  India 1970-71  n.a.  +
a
CARTER (1989)  Prof (Q), 
Prod (Q), FD 
(CD) 
OLS, 2S-SC Nicaragua 1981 –  n.a. 
CARTER and WIEBE 
(1990) 
Prod (CD)  OLS  Kenya ?  +  n.a. 
FEDER et al. (1990)  OS (CD)  2S-SC  China 1987  –  + 





2S-SC Pakistan  1987-
88 
+ n.a. 
KOCHAR (1997a)  FD (mixed)
b 2S-SC India  1981-82  n.a.  – 
Labour market          
LOPEZ (1984; 1986)  System
c FIML Canada  1970  n.a.
d + 
THIJSSEN (1988)  Prod (Q), D 
(AIDS)
e




D. BENJAMIN (1992)  FD (CD, TL) OLS, 2SLS  Indonesia 1980 n.a.  – 






Peru 1985-86  +  n.a. 
SKOUFIAS (1994)  Prod (CD), 
FS (mixed)
b
OLS-FE India  1975-79  +  n.a. 
SONODA and 
MARUYAMA (1999) 
Prod (CD), D 
(linear) 
3SLS Japan  1982-91 +  n.a. 
Notes: 
a endogenous interest rate and significant life cycle variables; 
b equation entails 
both logarithmic and linear or quadratic terms; 
c simultaneous equation system 
consisting of demand, ouput supply, and factor demand functions; 
d assumption of 
constant returns to scale in labour; 
e demand for leisure based on a first-stage in-
come estimation. Abbreviations: Estimation method: OLS = ordinary least 
squares, 2SLS = two-stage least squares, 3SLS three-stage least square, 2S-SC = 
two-stage with selectivity correction, FIML = full information maximum likeli-
hood, FE = fixed effects; Function: type: Prof = profit function, Prod = production 
function, D = demand, FS = factor supply, OS = output supply, FD = factor de-
mand; form: Q = quadratic; CD = Cobb-Douglas, TL = translog, AIDS = Almost 
Ideal Demand System; n.a. = not analysed. 
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Table 3-1 lists a number of studies that basically follow this approach. With the 
exception of FEDER et al. (1990), all studies either concentrate on the shadow 
price of the factor or on the detection of interdependencies between production 
and consumption spheres of the household. Investigations of the shadow price 
either estimate a structural production function (CARTER, CARTER and WIEBE, 
THIJSSEN, JACOBY, SKOUFIAS, SONODA and MARUYAMA) or a reduced-form out-
put supply equation in connection with a selectivity correction (FEDER et al., 
SIAL and CARTER).
67 The selectivity correction may require additional qualita-
tive information. Both approaches are capable of yielding a – slightly different – 
estimate of the relevant internal return on credit (see the further discussion in 
section 3.3.4, p. 149). The estimates are then often employed in a factor demand 
or supply function in order to analyse the shadow price elasticity. Studies that 
examine household interdependencies usually take factor demand functions di-
rectly as their starting points. The table illustrates that a variety of functional 
forms is used, with the Cobb-Douglas still being the most popular. Particularly 
since many studies had to rely on cross-sectional data, instrumental variable es-
timators (two-stage least squares) play an important role in dealing with simul-
taneity problems in structural equations (see section 3.2.2, p. 140, below). 
The results are not uniform and differ by country. While CARTER (1989) finds 
that credit has even a negative effect on farm output in his Nicaraguan sample, 
CARTER and WIEBE (1990) and SIAL and CARTER (1996) report shadow prices of 
up to 300 and 78 percent net of repayment in Kenya and Pakistan, respectively. 
A notable result is that of FEDER et al. (1990), who find that the marginal prod-
uct of credit is low although demographic characteristics of the household have 
significant influence on production decisions. They conclude that farms are in 
fact credit-rationed but funds are diverted away to non-productive activities or 
used to finance long-term investment (p. 1156). KOCHAR (1997a) investigates 
how formal sector loans affect outcomes on the land lease market in India. He 
finds no significant relationship between both. The study of IQBAL (1986) is a 
bit separate from the others since he motivates the inclusion of household char-
acteristics into his borrowing function by considerations of life-cycle behaviour 
and not by the attempt to explicitly detect interdependencies between production 
and consumption (p. 196). The coefficients of these variables partly turned out 
to be significant. Furthermore, he allows for an endogenous interest rate that dif-
                                           
67  The methodology of FEDER et al. (1990) is applied to trace income and nutrition effects of 
credit based on rural household data from Madagascar by ZELLER (1995) and on data from 
Cameroon by SCHRIEDER (1996). 128    3 Empirical research methodology 
fers across farms. Most of the labour market studies find evidence for significant 
restrictions on rural labour markets, usually in the sense that on-farm return to 
labour is lower than the off-farm wage. An exception is D. BENJAMIN (1992), 
who is unable to trace any dependency between farm labour allocation and 
household structure.
68
A related study not mentioned in the table due to its different approach is LEE 
and CHAMBERS (1986), who take a dual producer model as a starting point. They 
test for the significance of expenditure constraints in U.S. agriculture. The intui-
tion behind the test rests on the homogeneity condition for the profit function. If 
profit is homogenous in all prices, this supports the absence of any constraint, if 
it is homogenous only in output prices, this supports the constrained model (p. 
861). LEE and CHAMBERS find evidence for the latter in the time-series data set 
used in their investigation.
69
I assess the household modelling approach as follows: 
─  Adopting the household modelling framework has the major advantage of 
yielding a theoretically consistent definition of credit rationing and a rather 
straightforward interpretation of credit market efficiency. Econometric mod-
elling offers a wide range of quantitative analysis including causal inference. 
The quantitative nature of results enhances comparability and interpretation. 
─  Econometric modelling is more data demanding than some of the qualitative 
methods described previously. However, it is not necessary to have available 
a time-series or panel data set, as the large number of cross-sectional studies 
demonstrate. 
                                           
68  A household model incorporating labour market imperfections is estimated by GLAUBEN 
(2000) for the Polish farm sector. GLAUBEN analyses the effects of different tax regimes on 
the allocation decisions of farm households based on a four-year panel data set. In contrast 
to the other labour market studies mentioned in Table 3-1, he does not focus on the house-
hold-internal wage but on off-farm labour income and costs of hired labour. These are as-
sumed to be marginally decreasing and increasing, respectively. However, instead of test-
ing for labour market imperfections, he simply fits a univariate Cobb-Douglas function to 
his observed income and cost data with labour volume as the sole regressor (p. 144). In my 
opinion, it is questionable whether this constitutes an appropriately specified regression 
model of off-farm income or hired labour costs. 
69  By means of an indirect production function, BHATTACHARYYA and KUMBHAKAR (1997) 
compare the ratio of unobserved shadow prices of inputs to market prices in order to ana-
lyse market imperfections for a sample of Indian farms. Their emphasis is on the effects of 
various distortions on output, therefore they do not provide direct evidence for credit mar-
ket failure and their study is not further investigated here.     3.1 Research objectives and methodological background  129   
─  Estimating an econometric model is methodologically more ambitious than 
previous approaches and hence to a larger extent subject to criticism, for ex-
ample as outlined in section 3.1.2, pp. 103 et seq. Crucial error sources are 
the non-experimental nature of the data (see section 3.2.2 below, pp. 140 et 
seq.) as well as the exact specification of the functions (for example with re-
gard to functional form and choice of regressors). 
The household modelling approach hence offers a promising way to combine 
theoretical reasoning with quantitative analysis, while the data demands remain 
manageable. 
Approach 6: Detecting violations of perfect market implications in an economet-
ric analysis of dynamic investment decisions 
As the previous one, this approach attempts to track down credit rationing by 
empirically detecting violations of implications of a theoretical decision making 
model. It thus also has an explicit theoretical foundation in which credit ration-
ing is interpreted, at least in the more recent studies. A central implication of the 
neoclassical assumption of perfect and complete capital markets is that invest-
ment decisions can be made independently of the financial structure of an enter-
prise (Fisher Separation and Modigliani-Miller Theorem, see the general discus-
sion in chapter 2).
70 If in reality investment is observed to depend on financial 
structure, this is interpreted as evidence for imperfect capital markets. It hence 
provides a first test for the presence of credit rationing (called a ‘financial sensi-
tivity test’ in the sequel, following HAYASHI 1987, p. 101).
71
                                           
70  There is a similar implication in the consumption literature, namely that consumption deci-
sions can be made independently of current income (which is known as the permanent-
income or life-cycle thesis). See HAYASHI (1987). 
71  HAYASHI (1987) uses the notion of an ‘excess sensitivity test’ for a well-specified problem 
in the consumption literature. I take ‘financial sensitivity’ as simply indicating the signifi-
cance of financial variables for investment outcomes. 130    3 Empirical research methodology 
Table 3-2:   Econometric analyses of credit market imperfections using 
farm investment equations 










Traditional approaches          
DE HAEN (1976)  increase in net 
debt; income – 
consumption 















OLS Germany   
1985-86 
+ n.a. 
WEERSINK and TAUER 
(1989) 
farm income; 
change in external 
debt 
GLS U.S.  1974-83  +
c n.a. 




China 1987-88  +
d n.a. 
KUIPER and THIJSSEN 
(1996) 
equity to equity 
plus debt 
VAR The  Nether-
lands 1949-91
+ n.a. 
Stochastic investment models        
HUBBARD and KASHYAP 
(1992) 
net worth  GMM  U.S. 1914-87  +  + 











cash-flow VAR  U.S.  1976-92  + n.a. 
Notes: 
a income – consumption had a negative effect on investment; 
b different liquidity 
specifications including contributions and withdrawals of the farm household; 
c negative sign for income; 
d formal (informal) credit significant for crop-related 
investment in one (zero) of four provinces under investigation; formal (informal) 
credit significant for housing investment in one (four) of four provinces; 
e formu-
lation that allows for transaction costs not rejected. Abbreviations: Estimation 
method: OLS = ordinary least squares, 2SLS = two-stage least squares, GLS = 
Generalised Least Squares, VAR = vector autoregression, GMM = Generalised 
Method of Moments; n.a. = not analysed. 
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The literature related to this approach can be grouped into a more traditional and 
a more recent branch (see Table 3-2). The theoretical foundation of the more 
traditional studies is often rather pragmatic (if there is one at all) and generally 
does not allow for uncertainty in the decision model. In contrast, more recent 
models explicitly base their research on stochastic investment models, which 
was probably eased by the development of corresponding econometric tools for 
time series analysis. 
The older and theoretically more pragmatic approach is to simply add a liquidity 
or financial variable to the existing investment function (comprising output or 
capital as explanatory variables) or explain investment by a liquidity variable 
alone (see J.R. MEYER and KUH 1957 on business investment). Later research is 
based on the flexible accelerator models as outlined in the first part of section 
2.3.2, pp. 91 et seq., augmented by a financial variable. Examples with reference 
to German agriculture include DE HAEN (1976), GROLIG (1980), and KLAIBER 
(1988), see Table 3-2.
72 DE HAEN investigates the consumption and investment 
decisions of farm households in Lower Saxony by estimating a simultaneous 
system of behavioural equations. He finds that an increase in net debt has a sig-
nificantly negative effect on investment; however, increasing liquidity reserves 
surprisingly act in the same direction as additional debt. In GROLIG’s analysis of 
German farm accountancy network data, a weighted mean of profit levels of 
previous periods was taken to reflect profit expectations. In various farm sub-
groups, these had a positive effect on investment, which might be interpreted as 
a liquidity effect (see WITZKE 1993, p. 248). KLAIBER uses a host of liquidity-
related variables to explain investment behaviour of farms in Baden-
Württemberg, most of which turned out to be significant. A drawback of his 
analysis may be that he did not check endogeneity of regressors, which is likely 
to be a problem in the cross-sectional data set used for the estimations (see sec-
tion 3.2.2, p. 140). In the development economics literature, FEDER et al. (1992) 
found a significant effect of credit on crop-related capital and housing invest-
ment in at least some of the investigated Chinese provinces. As KLAIBER (1988), 
FEDER et al. (1992) based their study on cross-sectional data only.  
WEERSINK and TAUER (1989) explicitly compare the explanatory power of dif-
ferent investment specifications by embedding various theoretical views in a 
single equation. This also includes cash farm income and increase in external 
debt. Based on their sample of New York dairy farms, the authors find that both 
are significant determinants of investment, although income has a negative sign. 
                                           
72  Further studies are briefly discussed by WITZKE (1993, pp. 247-249). 132    3 Empirical research methodology 
KUIPER and THIJSSEN (1996) also postulate a general investment equation which 
integrates several theoretical standpoints. Accordingly, they do not pretend to 
estimate a structural model provided by theory but rely on an Error-Correction 
Model known from macroeconomics. This is based on a vector autoregression 
(VAR) procedure, and hence provides a methodological link to the paper by 
BIERLEN and FEATHERSTONE (1992) presented below. They find that increasing 
equity to equity plus debt plays a significant role in determining investment of 
Dutch farms. 
In all these studies, liquidity variables hence turned out to have a significant in-
fluence on investment, which is evidence for the thesis of credit rationing.
73 
However, in most of the mentioned papers the theoretical framework is rather ad 
hoc. Often the analysis directly starts with a postulated investment function, 
which is usually different for the studies in the lower part of Table 3-2. 
More recent and methodologically sophisticated research extends the previous 
approach 5 by explicitly founding the analysis on a dynamic, stochastic optimi-
sation problem. An example of such a problem was outlined in section 2.3.2, pp. 
91 et seq., a general description can be found in CHOW (1997, pp. 22-23). The 
model may be regarded as using a modified maximum principle employed ear-
lier in this monograph which is generalised for the case of uncertainty (CHOW 
1997, p. 5). This type of extended model can be solved by dynamic program-
ming or the Lagrange method. Since the methodology is quite complex and will 
not be utilised in the present study, I confine myself to presenting very roughly 
its basic characteristics and some selected results which are related to credit ra-
tioning in agriculture. 
Similar to the static model, the absence of financial constraints prescribes that 
firm behaviour obeys the first-order condition of the dynamic optimisation prob-
lem (so-called stochastic Euler-equation, see BOND and MEGHIR 1994, pp. 199-
200). In principle, the condition postulates that in each period the expected mar-
ginal profit from investment equates its dynamic shadow value. If this condition 
is empirically rejected, the perfect market model is dismissed and financial con-
straints are assumed to be relevant.  
To avoid specification error, the usual procedure is to split the sample based on 
a-priori information into a constrained and an unconstrained subgroup. Qualita-
tive information on credit rationing may therefore be desirable. For the con-
                                           
73  A related study that uses financial variables to explain the qualitative decision whether to 
invest at all is ELHORST (1993).     3.1 Research objectives and methodological background  133   
strained group a modified investment equation including financial variables is 
then estimated. There are two broad approaches pursued in the literature (see 
BOND and MEGHIR 1994, p. 200): (a) using a VAR forecasting procedure in or-
der to estimate the marginal profit from investment, which allows an excess sen-
sitivity test, or (b) estimate the investment function as an empirical Euler equa-
tion by employing the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM; see JOHNSTON 
and DINARDO 1997, pp. 327-345). The latter allows an empirical rejection of the 
Euler-equation. Due to its utilisation of the orthogonality condition in the 
framework of a GMM estimation, this rejection has been called ‘orthogonality 
test’ by HAYASHI (1987). In both cases, time series or panel data is a necessary 
prerequisite. There are analogous applications in the consumption literature, fol-
lowing HALL and MISHKIN (1982).  
Frequent results are that firms classified a-priori as constrained display a higher 
sensitivity to financial variables than unconstrained ones, and the perfect market 
Euler equation is rejected by the constrained subsample. A recent survey of the 
literature is HUBBARD (1998). For illustrative purposes, I briefly summarise 
three studies dealing with the agricultural sectors in the U.S. and France, respec-
tively. 
HUBBARD and KASHYAP (1992) use a large panel of aggregate U.S. farm data to 
estimate investment functions based on Euler-equations. They test two variants 
of the Euler-equation against the data, one that implies perfect capital markets, 
and one including financial variables due to an additional borrowing constraint. 
The financial variable they use is the farms’ net worth, which is supposed to in-
fluence investment decisions as a measure of borrowing capacity. In adjacent 
periods with high net worth (that is without constraints), the assumption of per-
fect capital markets (and thus the first Euler-equation) should hold, while bor-
rowing constraints should be significant in periods with low net worth. Farm net 
worth is thus the implicit criterion to distinguish constrained and unconstrained 
observations to avoid misspecification of the model. The results of their estima-
tions suggest that (a) the model implying perfect capital markets was rejected by 
the data, (b) including financial variables as explanatories substantially im-
proved the fit of the model, and (c) the effect of changes in net worth was sig-
nificantly more important in times of a deteriorating economic environment for 
farming. Overall, the importance of capital market imperfections could thus be 
proven, with farms’ net worth as a significant determinant. 
A comparable model is estimated by C. BENJAMIN and PHIMISTER (1997) for 
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(1992) are that BENJAMIN and PHIMISTER (a) use a different selection criterion to 
distinguish constrained and unconstrained periods, and that (b), in addition to 
variables of financial structure, they also explicitly include positive transaction 
costs of borrowing in their extended Euler-equation. Their data set has the ad-
vantage that it allows the identification of adjacent periods in which farms’ bor-
rowed additional funds. For these periods, credit constraints are assumed to be 
absent, and the Euler-equation reflecting perfect capital markets should apply. In 
periods for which borrowing constraints are assumed to be present, an extended 
Euler-equation that allows for transaction costs of borrowing should hold. Both 
cases are estimated with or without additional financial variables by a GMM es-
timator. The results also reject the perfect capital market model. The extended 
Euler-equation which allows for transaction costs and uses the selection crite-
rion, however, was not rejected. In both cases, inclusion of financial variables 
could not improve the fit of the model. A general result is thus that different in-
vestment behaviour under credit constraints could be detected empirically, al-
though the role of financial variables could not further be enlightened. 
BIERLEN and FEATHERSTONE (1998) base their study on a panel of individual 
U.S. farm data.
74 The authors distinguish periods with or without credit rationing 
as well as subgroups of farms that are more or less likely to be constrained. 
Their selection criteria are farm individual level of assets, debt-to-asset ratio, age 
of operator, and certain business cycles. They estimate investment equations for 
the different subgroups by a VAR forecasting method. Cash-flow as an addi-
tional explanatory variable proved to be significant (a) in ‘bust’ periods and 
(b) for high-debt and younger-operator farms, according to expectations of rele-
vant credit constraints. Farm debt level was identified as being the most impor-
tant determinant of rationing. 
For the purposes of this monograph, the following evaluation can be given: 
─  By preserving a theoretical foundation, the more recent studies provide a ma-
jor extension of the previous static household modelling approach since they 
explicitly incorporate time and uncertainty.  
─  Although less theoretically elaborate, also the earlier contributions are capa-
ble of detecting an effect of financial variables on investment. 
─  A major disadvantage of the method is its enormous data requirements, at 
least for the more sophisticated approaches. In the absence of sufficiently 
large panel data it might not yield satisfying results. 
                                           
74  The theoretical basis of their study is GILCHRIST and HIMMELBERG (1995).     3.1 Research objectives and methodological background  135   
─  Most advantages and drawbacks of econometric modelling mentioned earlier 
also apply here. 
3.1.4 Conclusions for further research 
The previous methodological survey has shown that there is a large body of lit-
erature dealing with the problem of measuring and analysing credit rationing. 
The approaches differ with regard to their theoretical assumptions and plausibil-
ity, data requirements, and amenability to econometric analysis. My choice of 
method is based on the criteria stated in the outset of the previous section. The 
general principle was to achieve far-reaching plausibility coupled with theoreti-
cal consistency, analytical rigour and empirical tractability, given the limited 
availability of data. Furthermore, my subjective preferences certainly had some 
influence. 
In my opinion, plausibility and intuition are good reasons to include a qualitative 
indicator in the analysis, such as outlined in approach 2. Using the individual 
assessment of farmers has the advantage of corresponding closely with the initial 
problem statement that motivated this research (see chapter 1 and section 2.1.1, 
p. 23). Furthermore, the studies mentioned above demonstrate that this does not 
mean to make sacrifices with regard to econometric analysis, and qualitative in-
dicators also may be incorporated into a theoretically more rigorous analysis. 
Qualitative survey data will therefore play a role in the following analysis. 
I stated earlier that the theoretical foundation of this research can be described as 
an appropriately modified neoclassical approach (see section 2.1.3, p. 30). It was 
hence a natural consequence to focus attention on a neoclassical household 
model (subchapter 2.3). As already indicated, I will also take this model as the 
framework for the empirical analysis and interpretation of credit rationing phe-
nomena in rural Poland. I hence will draw heavily on the literature of approach 
5. At the same time I am aware of the theoretical caveats following from the 
drop of several assumptions of the standard neoclassical environment (see in 
particular section 2.2.4, p. 74). As far as the data allows, I will therefore utilise 
the insights to be gained from an explicit consideration of loan transaction costs 
as stressed in the transaction cost measurement tradition (approach 1). 
So far, little has been said about the availability of data. At the time when the 
current research was initiated, there was no appropriate micro data of Polish 
farm households available at all. It was therefore decided to carry out a farm 
survey in order to form a cross sectional data base (see next subchapter). This 
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design of the questionnaire. However, it was obviously impossible to collect 
panel or time-series data over a longer time period. This in turn precludes the 
implementation of a number of data demanding methods as presented in ap-
proach 6. 
The approaches that use the credit limit variable and spill-over effects both 
could be employed given the survey data. Since trade and informal credit 
sources turned out to be of less relevance for the survey respondents, the analy-
sis of spill-over effects was not of primary interest and awaits further investiga-
tion. The same holds for an implementation of the rather new credit limit ap-
proach, which was simply beyond the given research capacity. 
The following subchapter will describe the data used in this study and deal with 
some issues of econometric methodology. Subchapter 3.3 will elaborate further 
on the approach used in the empirical investigation. 
3.2 Data  issues 
The goal of this subchapter is to describe the data set used in this research. Fur-
thermore, a number of methodological issues will be raised which inter alia re-
sult from the non-experimental nature of the data. This will ease the understand-
ing of the empirical approach to be presented subsequently and may serve for 
further reference throughout the monograph. 
3.2.1 Data base 
The major data source for the analyses in this monograph is the IAMO Poland 
farm survey 2000 (see PETRICK 2001, on which this section is based). It is a 
cross-sectional farm survey conducted in the boundaries of the former Szczecin, 
Tarnów, and Rzeszów voivodships existing prior to the administrative reform of 
1. January 1999. The survey was carried out in 2000 and contains mainly data 
related to the economic outcomes of the year 1999. As Figure 3-1 shows, 
Szczecin has very contrary characteristics in terms of farm sizes in comparison 
to Tarnów and Rzeszów.      3.2 Data issues  137   










Av. farm size (ha)
Source:  Author’s depiction based on GUS (1998a). 
Mainly due to historical reasons, the organisation and structure of agricultural 
production in Poland is in fact highly region-specific (this is discussed e.g. in 
GÓRZ and KUREK 1998; JAKSCH et al. 1997). In the southern and eastern parts of 
the country, a very small-structured peasant agriculture predominates, with more 
than 75% of all farms cultivating less than 5 ha of land (see GUS 2002). In 
contrast to this, the north and north-west of Poland is characterised by a more 
diverse farm structure with a higher share of large-scale farms, which is a 
reflection of the previous importance of state enterprises in agriculture 
(Państwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne, PGR). Accordingly, the average farm size 
decreases from the north-west to the south-east of Poland. As a peculiarity for 
Central and Eastern Europe, under the socialist regime, agriculture in Poland 
never was completely collectivised. State farms in the north had been mainly 
established as a result of the re-organisation of former German estates after 
World War II and administrative land allotment in subsequent years (for detailed 
analyses see BARCZYK 1962, PETRICK and TYRAN 2002, and PHILIPP 1983). 
However, after transition to a market economy, these state farms were liquidated 
or turned into the property of the Agricultural Property Agency of the State 138    3 Empirical research methodology 
Treasury (Agencja Własności Rolnej Skarbu Państwa, AWRSP). This agency in 
turn sells or leases out the land (for an analysis see e.g. MILCZAREK 2000 and 
ZIETARA 1995).  
As a result of these restructuring processes, the share of agricultural land culti-
vated by state-managed farms in Poland had fallen to less than 8% in 1997 
(GUS 1999, p. 9; 1997 is the latest year for which information is available) and 
its share has presumably further dropped since then. In addition, more than half 
of the land belonging to state-managed farms was not under cultivation in 1997 
(GUS 1999, p. 19), probably mostly due to the apparent dissolution of manage-
ment structures on these farms or severe economic difficulties. The state-sector 
thus has completely lost its importance. Within the private sector, besides the 
individual farms (indyvidualne gospodarstwa rolne) a number of other forms of 
farm organisations are considered in the official statistics (GUS 1998a, pp. 166-
7). These are ‘co-operative farms’ (spółdzielnie produkcji rolniczej), ‘private 
companies in home property’ (spółki krajowe prywatne), ‘other private entities 
in home property’ (pozostałe jednostki własności prywatnej krajowej), ‘private 
entities in foreign ownership’ (własność zagraniczna), and ‘private entities in 
mixed ownership’ (własność mieszana). These other legal forms are potentially 
important in terms of absolute numbers only for the North-western regions, 
where they partly emerged from restructured state farms. However, their exact 
delimitation from each other is unclear and is further confused by the ongoing 
changes of ownership status during the past decade. An examination of their in-
ternal management structure has shown that it is quite heterogeneous 
(FEDYSZAK-RADZIEJOWSKA et al. 1999). For these reasons, the survey only dis-
tinguished whether a given farm was owner-operated or run by a hired manager, 
and whether it was in foreign ownership. The survey did not further differentiate 
legal forms of farms. In the following analysis, legal forms are thus also not dis-
tinguished. In general, only farms of the private sector were surveyed.     3.2 Data issues  139   
Table 3-3:   Stratification of survey sample 
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Szczecin 18,888  8,303 43.96 120 1.45 17.5  117.7
Tarnów 53,710  13,356 24.87 108 0.81 3.3  11.3
Rzeszów 115,757  29,627 25.59 236 0.80 3.3  10.9
Sample total  188,355  51,286 27.23 464 0.90 -  28.4
Poland total  2,041,380  - - - - 7.0  -
Note:   * Survey frame is no proper subset of GUS database on individual farms, see discus-
sion in text. 
Source:  GUS statistics according to GUS (1998); author’s calculations. 
The survey is based on a random sample of farms in the record of the official 
extension service ODR (Ośrodek Doradztwa Rolniczego, Extension Centre of 
Agriculture). This contains roughly one third of all farms identified by the Cen-
tral Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS), though it is no proper 
subset of the GUS database on individual farms, since it also contains other or-
ganisational forms (see discussion above). In addition, the ODR record consists 
only of farms that show at least some degree of commercialisation and market 
integration and that account for the bulk of the traded agricultural produce in the 
research area. Farms surveyed generally are larger in size than farms identified 
by GUS (Table 3-3). The final sample consists of 464 farms; 120 from Szczecin, 
108 from Tarnów, and 236 from Rzeszów. Within the given geographic bounda-
ries of the three voivodships, it is a stratified one-stage random sample. In total 
there are 22 strata, seven forming the Szczecin voivodship, four the Tarnów, and 
eleven the Rzeszów voivodship. The 22 strata are identical with administrative 
districts (powiat). Table 3-3 shows a breakdown of the stratification of the sam-
ple on the voivodship level and the relation between the GUS database and the 
survey frame.  
The questionnaire used was pre-tested in early 2000 and slightly modified af-
terwards. The final version consisted of sixteen sections. Section 1 covered the 
identification of the stratum the respondent belongs to. Sections 2 to 4 contained 
questions on household composition, occupation of household members, educa-
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tailed information on production activities including yields, revenues, and sales 
channels of plant and animal products, input use, assets and machinery of the 
farm, labour force, and expenses. Sections 9 to 14 entailed the core questions 
dealing with investment and finance including information on investment ex-
penses, loan sources, loan applications, credit contracts, credit from suppliers, 
traders, relatives, and friends, and collateral. Section 15 closed with questions on 
farm management practice; Section 16 was intended to provide information on 
the course and success of the interview. Further details on sampling issues, or-
ganisation of data collection and a reprint of the questionnaire can be found in 
PETRICK (2001). 
3.2.2 Problems due to the non-experimental nature of the data 
The use of survey data for regression analysis implies a number of difficulties in 
applying the standard econometric tools which will be described in the follow-
ing. Since detailed textbook treatments are available and because I present the 
employed formal estimation procedures below, I will confine myself to a brief 
outline. References with a particular emphasis on survey data are BEHRMAN and 
OLIVER (2000) and DEATON (1997). 
The classical regression model assumes that the magnitude of an observed out-
come variable Y (the regressand) can be explained by a set of independent vari-
ables X (the regressors) plus an error term (see e.g. GREENE 2000, pp. 213-223). 
The error term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed condi-
tional on the X’s, with a conditional mean of zero. Usually the interest focuses 
on one or several particular regressors (sometimes called ‘treatment variables’), 
while the remaining regressors play the same role as the control group in an ex-
periment: they allow for differences in Y that are not caused by the treatment and 
thus isolate the relationship of interest (DEATON 1997, pp. 92-93). All remaining 
statistical ‘disturbances’ (e.g. due to measurement error or unobserved explana-
tory variables) are captured by the error term. Efficiency and consistency of a 
regression analysis which aims at recovering the coefficients of the regressors 
fundamentally hinge on the assumptions concerning this disturbance term. Un-
fortunately, in survey data-sets it is often implausible that the standard assump-
tions hold, due to the nonexperimental nature of the data. The most common 
problems are described as follows, together with possible avenues for dealing 
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Simultaneity 
Simultaneity causes the conditional mean of the disturbance term to be not equal 
to zero. It can be made intuitive by considering a simultaneous equation system 
of regressions, which could for example arise in the framework of a household 
model (see section 2.3.1, pp. 77 et seq.). As soon as a regressor of a first equa-
tion appears as regressand in another equation, there will be a correlation be-
tween the disturbance terms and this regressor in the first equation. An example 
is a (structural) production function which contains variable inputs as regressors. 
The same inputs also occur as regressands in the (reduced-form) input demand 
function of the household, and are hence subject to simultaneity. The problem 
could also be regarded as one of an omitted variable. In the production function 
example, the exogenous determinants of the variable input quantity are not in-
cluded into the equation, which leads to simultaneity (or endogeneity) bias. As a 
result, the regression analysis no longer yields consistent estimates of the coeffi-
cients of interest. Similar effects are produced by feedback processes, reverse 
causality, or measurement errors (see DEATON 1997, pp. 92-105; BÖRSCH-
SUPAN and KÖKE 2002). 
A possible way to address the simultaneity bias is by employing additional in-
formation in the form of variables which are correlated with the explanatory 
variable but not with the disturbance term. These are called ‘instruments’, the 
procedure hence instrumental variable (IV) regression. A common difficulty is 
to find instruments that have the just mentioned properties (see DEATON 1997, 
pp. 111-116), which is why the problem is frequently ignored (e.g. by CARTER 
and WIEBE 1990, KLAIBER 1988, THIJSSEN 1988,  to mention a few studies cited 
earlier). 
Selectivity 
Selectivity occurs when the regression is based on observations which are not a 
random subsample of the population under investigation. It can be regarded as a 
special type of simultaneity, since the problem is again the correlation between 
disturbance term and explanatory variable. The present research provides an il-
lustrative example. It will be seen that the farm population investigated here falls 
into two subsamples, borrowers and non-borrowers. The relation between, say, 
credit and output can hence only be estimated for the borrower subgroup. How-
ever, farmers do not become borrowers by chance but most likely have certain 
characteristics that influence the volume of credit obtained (being more innova-
tive, have more collateral available, etc.). In a regression that relates output to 
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be captured by the disturbance term, which in turn will be correlated with the 
credit variable. The estimator will therefore be inconsistent (see DEATON 1997, 
pp. 101-105). 
Among others, nobel laureate James J. HECKMAN has developed tools to address 
the selectivity problem (e.g. 1979; 1990). The strategy of his approach is to 
model the selection rule by a first-stage Probit equation, which can then be used 
to correct the regression of interest. 
Heteroscedasticity 
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the assumption of an identical distribution 
of the error term conditional on the explanatory variables is violated. This may 
be the case, for example, if large farms show a greater variation in output than 
small farms, even after accounting for farm size. Heteroscedasticity hence re-
flects an inherent heterogeneity of the population, which is often observed in 
survey data. In an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, heteroscedasticity 
will lead to inefficiency and incorrect standard errors. However, test procedures 
and robust estimators of the variance-covariance matrix which can address this 
issue in the framework of OLS are available. 
Much more serious is the problem if limited dependent variable models are used 
for regression analysis (for example the Tobit model). In this case, heteroscedas-
ticity can make the estimator inconsistent, and sometimes the only solution will 
be to rely on non-parametric methods (see DEATON 1997, pp. 78-92). 
Sample design 
The way the data was collected has a distinct influence on the results of a regres-
sion analysis. This influence may be due to a specific weighting procedure em-
ployed in the survey, or to clustering or stratification during the data collection. 
To illustrate, consider the calculation of means from a sample of observations 
that had varying but known probabilities to be selected. It is quite intuitive that 
the computation must be corrected by using the known probabilities as weights 
if the mean of the underlying population is to be calculated. It might be sug-
gested that this directly extends to the use of weights in regression analysis. 
However, there exists no straightforward procedure to incorporate weights into 
the regression since weighted least squares (WLS) is not guaranteed to be con-
sistent (for a discussion see DEATON 1997, pp. 68-73). The standard approach 
(also followed here) is therefore to ignore the weights, which implies the as-
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Clustering leads to an underestimation of standard errors in regressions because 
clusters tend to be more homogenuous than the overall population. However, 
this procedure was not used in the data collection of the present study, which 
employed a stratification approach. It might be reasonable to pay attention to 
structural differences between strata and use a stratawise regression procedure 
(DEATON 1997, pp. 67-68). However, effects of stratification might also safely 
be ignored since stratification generally improves the precision of estimates (pp. 
12-15; 49-51; 71). In the following analyses, an effect of sample design is thus 
not taken into account, which means that the sample is treated as if it were a 
simple random sample. 
Data availability 
This last section of the subchapter makes the point that (even) survey data rarely 
can fulfil all data wishes of the researcher, and sooner or later any emprical re-
search comes to its limitations due to lacking data. The reasons for unavailable 
data may either be that, due to financial or time constraints, it simply was not 
collected, or even that it principally cannot be collected, for example because 
respondents were not able or willing to recall the necessary information. A par-
ticular problem in cross-sectional data-sets is that variation of certain variables 
will be quite low (for example price data), and that lagged variables (which may 
often be useful as instruments) by definition are not collected.  
Another issue is missing data for a subgroup of respondents, a phenomenon 
commonly encountered in survey data. As soon as there is a systematic default 
due to some (possibly unobserved) characteristics of respondents, missing data 
will introduce a bias in any estimates. Although the non-response rates in the 
Poland farm survey 2000 were rather low (PETRICK 2001, p. 14), a certain loss 
of observations in the regressions was unavoidable (see below). The general les-
son is hence that “data sets do not have to be perfect – they never are – and in 
fact much insight has been gained from data that are far from perfect in quality” 
(SINGH et al. 1986b, p. 66). 
3.2.3 Outlier control 
The use of more advanced econometric techniques requires a careful analysis of 
outliers in the data-set, in order to prevent an undue influence of single data 
points on the estimates (see MUKHERJEE et al. 1998, pp. 75-107; 137-148). A 
criterion frequently used is the interquartile range (IQR), where a data point is 
considered as an outlier if it lies 1.5 times the IQR below (above) the lower (up-
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lying observations (see also the histograms given in PETRICK et al. 2002, p. 207). 
To take an example from the given data set, with regard to total land cultivated, 
the upper threshold is at 60.3 ha, implying that 12.1 percent of observations 
must be considered as outliers. The problem is hence a relevant one. This was 
confirmed by explorative regression analyses which showed substantial influ-
ence of certian data points. After a careful inspection of the histograms of the 
employed variables, I therefore decided to generally cut off observations above 
some arbitrarily chosen level, which was in any case far above the previously 
defined outlier threshold.
75 As a consequence, 33 observations had to be 
dropped. It turned out that this substantially mitigated the problem of influencial 
data points. Nevertheless, in the subsequent regressions, particular attention was 
paid to the graphs of standardised residuals in order to control for any remaining 
influential observations. 
3.3 Empirical  strategy 
This subchapter aims at describing the empirical approach chosen in the current 
research. I start with an overview and continue with the detailed presentation of 
the areas of empirical investigation. Descriptive statistics and results are pre-
sented in chapter 4. 
3.3.1 Overview 
The empirical investigation of credit rationing of Polish farm households pre-
sented in this monograph can be grouped into three major steps: 
1. In order to evaluate the access to credit as perceived by farmers I analyse 
qualitative information about credit rationing experience collected during 
the interviews. This can be expressed in the form of a bivariate variable (ra-
tioned or non-rationed). Building on the theoretical analysis of subchapters 
2.1 and 2.2, the determinants of credit rationing are investigated by a Probit 
regression model. 
2. The central aims of the second step are to (a) quantify the credit-rationed 
household’s willingness to pay for credit and to (b) investigate the conse-
quences of non-separability of the households’ production and consumption 
decisions, both by econometrically estimating an appropriately specified 
household production model. The theoretical point of reference here is the 
                                           
75  The cut-off levels employed were as follows. Short-term credit volume max. 140 ths. zł; 
long-term credit volume max. 600 ths. zł; total land cultivated max. 300 ha; capital stock 
net of farm land max. 1000 ths. zł; investment volume max. 1200 ths. zł.     3.3 Empirical strategy  145   
two-period farm household model presented in section 2.3.1, pp. 77 et seq., 
which is why the focus is on the effects of short-term loans. Furthermore, the 
analysis serves the double purpose of providing a metric measure of credit 
rationing and a quantitative analysis of the effects of credit rationing on farm 
output. 
3.  My goal in the third step is to look at the effects credit rationing has on the 
investment behaviour of farmers. Based on the dynamic farm household 
model discussed in section 2.3.2, pp. 91 et seq., I derive an estimating in-
vestment function. This function not only allows to analyse the determinants 
of farmers’ investment activities but also provides a tool to test the implica-
tions of the financial constraints model of investment with regard to access to 
long-term loans. It hence will give additional evidence regarding the pres-
ence of credit rationing. 
The three steps are described in more detail subsequently. Before, however, an 
operational definition of credit rationing is required, which is given next. 
3.3.2 An operational definition of credit rationing 
In the empirical analysis, I regard a farm household as being credit-rationed if at 
the prevailing interest rate the credit volume demanded exceeds the volume of-
fered by the lender. This definition is operationalised in different ways at vari-
ous stages of the analysis as follows. 
During the survey, the definition was operationalised by asking respondents 
about their credit market experience (see Approach 2 in section 3.1.3, p. 118). 
Credit applicants were asked whether they would have liked to borrow more at 
the same interest rate. If so, this is taken as evidence for an excess demand and 
the respondents are classified as being credit-rationed. Rationed applicants who 
obtained some credit are called partially rationed. Applicants who did not obtain 
a loan at all are classified as completely rejected. Non-applicants were asked 
whether they had the intention of applying for credit at a particular place in the 
past but did not do so because the application might have been turned down. Re-
spondents who answered positively are classified as discouraged non-borrowers 
(see JAPPELLI 1990). Borrowers who obtained as much as desired and non-
discouraged non-applicants are regarded as not credit-rationed. 
In the household modelling analysis, credit rationing is operationalised by its 
observable effects. In the two-period farm household model, a binding credit 
constraint has two major implications (as presented in section 2.3.1): (a)  the 
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by the lender, and (b) production and consumption decisions become mutually 
dependent (see Approach 5, section 3.1.3, p. 124). I attempt to empirically detect 
both effects in the framework of an econometric output supply model.  
In the dynamic household model, the effects of credit rationing are as follows 
(see section 2.3.2): (a) financial variables play a significant role in determining 
investment outcomes, and (b) there is a non-separability of consumption and in-
vestment decisions similar to the two-period production model. These effects 
shall be investigated in the framework of the investment function analysis (see 
also the discussion of Approach 6, section 3.1.3, p. 129). 
3.3.3 Subjective experience of credit rationing 
In the econometric analysis based on survey responses, the variable to be ex-
plained is the qualitative self-classification of borrowers. At first glance, the 
classification into several subgroups would suggest a model with a multinomial 
dependent variable. However, the groups of completely rejected and discouraged 
respondents turned out to be unimportant in the sample (see section 4.1.1, pp. 
163 et seq.). I therefore merged these two categories with the group of partially 
constrained borrowers. As a result, the credit rationing status is expressed by a 
dichotomous or binary variable. It can be analysed by the following stochastic 
model: 
i i i u k + = z γ' *  (3-1) 
ki* is a latent variable denoting an excess credit demand. We observe ki, which is 
a dichotomous (1, 0) variable indicating whether observation i is a credit-
constrained borrower or not.   represents a vector of explaining variables (such 
as household and production characteristics). 
i z
γ is a vector of parameters, while 
ui is a random error term. (3-1) is hence a model with a discrete dependent vari-
able (see AMEMIYA 1981). A plausible and frequently employed interpretation of 
this type of models is to regard its predictions as probabilities that observation i 
belongs to the constrained subgroup. Unfortunately, running an OLS regression 
on (3-1) would not ensure that the predictions are in fact bound in the (0, 1) in-
terval. It is therefore usual practice to transform   and in this way constrain it 
to the desired interval. A commonly used transformation is the standard normal 
distribution, which gives rise to the Probit model (GREENE 2000, pp. 811-849).  
i z γ'
In the following, the Probit model is employed to analyse the determinants of 
credit rationing as given by the subjective assessment of the respondents. I esti-
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requirements of the output supply model investigated later. Probit models are 
non-linear in parameters, they are therefore usually estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood (ML). Furthermore, the reported coefficients do not provide the mar-
ginal effects of a change in zi on ki*. In non-linear models, marginal effects de-
pend on the specific values of the regressors. They are therefore usually reported 
for the sample means, separately from the coefficients. Note that the Probit 
model implies a very general functional form. Since the exact functional rela-
tionship may be quite complex and is generally unknown, the Probit specifica-
tion can only be regarded as a rough approximation to the real relationship (see 
the discussion in section 3.1.2, pp. 103 et seq.). 
The choice of explanatory variables in the Probit model reflects the discussion 
of chapter 2 as summarised in sections 2.2.4, p. 74, and 2.3.3, p. 100. In particu-
lar, the following considerations were taken into account: (a) the presence of 
credit rationing is determined both by supply and demand, observable character-
istics that guide the lending decision of the bank should hence be included, (b) 
this is specifically important for factors that are likely to mitigate or worsen ef-
fects of asymmetric information, for example collateral availability or the repu-
tation of the borrower (see the discussion in section 2.2.2, pp. 55 et seq.), (c) on 
the other hand, consumption choices of household members are equally likely to 
affect the perceived rationing status of the household (see the discussion in sec-
tions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, pp. 77 et seq.). 
I first explain the specific model and then the general model. This is due to the 
fact that the specific model is further used in the household production analysis. 
The latter precedes the investment analysis, which employs the general Probit 
model. 
In the specific model to be further used in production analysis, the dependent 
variable is credit rationing (yes/no) with regard to short-term loans taken during 
the production year 1998/1999. The specifity is that only partially rationed and 
completely rejected short-term borrowers are considered in this model, i.e. 
short-term borrowers who obtained a positive loan volume in 1998/1999 but not 
as much as desired and applicants for short-term loans who were fully rejected.
76 
This decision was made in order to maintain consistency with the output supply 
model which is based on constrained short-term applicants only (see section 
3.3.4, p. 149). It implies that borrowers of long-term loans (rationed or not) are 
considered as non-borrowers in this model. 
                                           
76  For completely rejected applicants the purpose of their loan application was known. This 
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The following explanatory variables were chosen (expected signs are given in 
parentheses). Land owned (-) and land rented from private persons (+) were 
taken as indicators of the volume of collateralisable wealth, which is expected to 
play a key role in the presence of asymmetric information on the loan market. 
The age of newest tractor (+) was used as a simple measure of the quality of the 
collateralisable wealth. The years of farming practice indicate the experience of 
the farmer. They were also included in quadratic form, to allow an age depend-
ent effect. Usually one would expect that up to a certain age, more years of 
farming experience imply a lower probability of being credit-rationed. A vari-
able measuring the educational degree of the farmer (+) takes a value between 
one for the lowest and five for the highest degree. A dummy indicating the ex-
pressed habit of regularly conversing with neighbours (-) is used as a measure of 
village-internal information flow. Conversation with neighbours might reduce 
the probability of being credit-rationed due to improved information availability 
for the local bank. It is taken as a proxy for how well the respondent is known in 
the village. On the consumption side, the number of adult males and females 
were taken as household characteristics. The effect of the number of adults in 
the household is indeterminate since a higher number of household members 
may both increase (via increased consumption) and decrease (via generation of 
unearned income) the liquidity shortage. The separate inclusion of males and 
females is motivated by the fact that Polish women tend to benefit more from 
social transfer payments than men (WORLD BANK 1995, p. 117). In addition, the 
number of males or females may take on a signalling function for the bank. For 
example, more men in the households’ labour force may indicate that more re-
sources are devoted to actual farm production as opposed to household work, 
and hence may imply a higher creditworthiness. All explanatory variables are 
assumed to be exogenous or predetermined at the time of loan application. 
The general model directly employs the definition of subjective credit rationing 
as given above, independently of any loan term. As the investment model dis-
cussed below, it covers a period of three years (1997-1999), which is neverthe-
less treated as a single decision period. A problem with investment and borrow-
ing events is that they occur relatively rarely, as was illustrated for short-term 
borrowing. Confining the anlysis to one calendar year, as done for the produc-
tion model, would have resulted in a lot of zero observations. The chosen ap-
proach of taking into account a period of three years considerably mitigates this 
effect. However, it has a number of consequences for the definition and choice 
of variables as compared to the specific Probit model presented previously. First, 
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The dependent variable hence indicates by one all farm households which self-
classified as credit-rationed according to the definition given in section 3.3.2, p. 
145, irrespectively of the term structure of the loan. This decision led to an in-
crease of the sample size of the investment model (see below). Second, the 
choice of explanatory variables was slightly modified. For land owned, I used 
the nominal value of land owned by the farm in the beginning of the investment 
period expressed in thousand zł, which was calculated by subtracting land in-
vestment carried out in the period 1997-1999 from the stated value of owned 
land in 1999. Land quality is hence captured as well, at least as long it is re-
flected in monetary land values. However, since the variable is based on farm-
ers’ own assessments of their land values, individual biases are possible. The 
volume of land rented from private persons was excluded from the equation be-
cause it is unplausible to regard this as exogenous and stable over a period of 
three years. The age of the youngest tractor was also regarded als endogenous in 
the investment model and hence excluded. Because they did not have significant 
effects, the educational and years of farming practice variables were excluded as 
well. However, a dummy was added indicating a previously rescheduled loan 
(+), which illustrates the credit history of the borrower. The rescheduled loan 
variable was taken from the interviews where respondents were asked whether 
they rescheduled the repayment of a loan in the past. This is regarded as evi-
dence for a relatively poor reputation of the borrower.  Furthermore, two dum-
mies indicating the year in which the loan was approved by the bank were added 
to the model.
77
Descriptive statistics of the variables and the estimation results are presented in 
subchapter 4.1. 
3.3.4 Effects on production 
In this monograph I use a reduced-form output supply function as the major in-
strument to empirically analyse the effects of credit rationing on production out-
comes. The reader may recall from the discussion of Approach 5 in section 
3.1.3, p. 124, that the major alternative is to use a production function instead. 
The justification for my choice is as follows: 
                                           
77  This variable does not capture the year of loan application of fully rejected farmers. How-
ever, since their number is very small as compared with the partially rationed borrowers 
(see section 4.1.1), this deficit of the data seems to be acceptable. Note further that a three 
year period requires two dummies indicating two of the three years. Three dummies indi-
cating each of the year would lead to perfect collinearity and make estimation impossible. 150    3 Empirical research methodology 
1.  As shown in the theoretical Section 2.3.1, pp. 77 et seq., the production func-
tion can be used to estimate the shadow interest rate of liquidity, provided it 
is used for production (by equation (2-34), p. 83). In contrast, the output-
supply equation captures the willingness to pay for credit independent of the 
use of credit in the borrowing period for either production or consumption, 
by equation (2-46), p. 88. Therefore the latter is regarded as a more plausible 
measure of the actual payment abilities of the household. 
2.  In contrast to the reduced-form output supply equation, the production func-
tion is a structural equation (see section 2.3.1). Structural equations pose se-
vere econometric problems of simultaneity, since the household’s choice of 
input and output levels is reasonably assumed to happen simultaneously. 
Both are under the control of the decision maker. A major assumption of the 
standard regression model hence becomes questionable (section 3.2.2, p. 
141). Reduced-form equations suffer from these problems to a much lesser 
extent, since they are constructed in such a way that the explanatory variables 
are exogenous. 
3. Only the output supply model can also capture the non-separability of con-
sumption and production decisions. In contrast to the production function, it 
explicitly takes the household modelling framework into account and allows 
a more comprehensive analysis of credit rationing. 
4.  A final reason for choosing the output supply approach was the larger sam-
ple size available for estimation. A production function analysis is limited to 
producers who used working capital loans, because only for these the volume 
of credit financed inputs is known from the survey data. To the contrary, the 
output supply function is estimated for households that borrowed any type of 
short-term loan independent of its purpose. This fact led to a sample size 
used for the output supply model which is approximately 20 percent larger 
than the production function sample. 
Nevertheless, also the output supply approach has some drawbacks. Usually, 
reduced-form equations are regarded as less stable than structural equations, and 
they do not allow to recover the structural parameters underlying the decision 
model (SADOULET and DE JANVRY 1995, p. 160). In a separate research paper, 
the production function approach was hence investigated further (PETRICK 
2003). The results of this paper will briefly be taken up in chapter 4. 
Independently of the chosen approach, one further important aspect complicates 
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can consistently only be expected for the subgroup of farmers who indeed ex-
perienced an exogenous constraint on borrowing. For the constrained subgroup 
the amount of credit available reasonably imposes an upper limit that is not un-
der the control of the household, at least in the short run. FEDER et al. (1990) 
therefore argue that the reduced-form output supply equation should only be es-
timated for farmers who self-classified as being credit-rationed according to the 
qualitative criterion explained above. A related point is made by CARTER and 
YAO (2002) who distinguish between local and global separability in agricul-
tural household models. They maintain that usually only a fraction of house-
holds is constrained in some markets, which is why consumption-production 
dependencies should only be expected for this subgroup. CARTER and YAO pro-
vide evidence for the claim that a consistent analysis of (non-) separability can 
only be done for an appropriately chosen subset of household data. This is there-
fore also the strategy favoured in the present research, although I also estimated 
a ‘counterfactual’ model on the entire sample of short-term borrowers (see sec-
tion 4.2.2, pp. 176 et seq.). 
A fundamental consequence of this sample splitting procedure is that the estima-
tion related to the credit-rationed subgroup of observations is not based on a 
random draw of the initial sample. This in turn is a typical case of sample selec-
tivity (see section 3.2.2, p. 141). Fortunately, the specific Probit estimation de-
scribed in the previous section provides the necessary information to test and 
correct the potentially resulting bias. The procedure is to include a so-called In-
verse Mills Ratio (IMR) as additional regressor in the selected equation, result-
ing in a two-step Heckman model (for details see HECKMAN 1979; GREENE 
2000, pp. 926-937). The IMR can be computed for each sample observation by 
using the results of the Probit equation (3-1), p. 146: 
) ˆ ( / ) ˆ ( i i i IMR z ' γ z ' γ Φ =φ  (3-2) 
In this equation,  (.) φ  and   denote the density and the distribution functions 
of the standard normal distribution. A decision concerning a potential selectivity 
bias can be based on the t-test for the parameter of the IMR in the second-stage 
regression (DAVIDSON and MACKINNON 1993, pp. 542-545; GREENE 2000, pp. 
932-933). 
(.) Φ
The estimating equation is hence the output-supply function under credit ration-
ing of the two-period household model presented in section 2.3.1, p. 86, restated 
here for convenience:  
) , , , , , , , (
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The estimated coefficients of this function are used to compute the marginal 
willingness to pay for credit of each credit-rationed household, by utilising the 
relationship given in (2-46). The difference between estimated  * ρ  and market 
interest rate can be regarded as a measure of credit rationing or credit market 
efficiency (as postulated by SIAL and CARTER 1996).  
At this point, three issues of data availability arise (see section 3.2.2, p. 143). 
The first concerns the availability of price data in cross-sectional data sets. As 
frequently encountered in similar settings (see for example FEDER et al. 1990, p. 
1155, fn. 7), price variation is very low in the present data base. Furthermore, 
household specific prices are only observed for output or input bundles which 
are in fact produced or employed by the household. One of the quite commonly 
reported price variables in the sample is the wage for agricultural workers. The 
regional means of this wage are as follows (in zł/hour): Szczecin 39.1 (N=101); 
Tarnów 39.0 (N=63); Rzeszów 40.4 (N=201). The median values are all equal to 
40.0. Their regional variation is hence quite small. Sufficiently disaggregated 
regional price indices are also not available from official statistical sources. Fur-
thermore, in explorative regression work, price variables including the market 
interest rate r did not turn out to have any significant impact on observed behav-
ioural outcomes. I therefore decided to disregard any price effects in the analysis 
and made the assumption that the annual vector of input and output prices is 
identical for all observations. All monetary values were thus used without defla-
tion. However, a dummy variable was included in the subsequent regressions to 
distinguish the northern from the structurally rather different southern regions in 
the sample. In case that the assumption of a uniform price vector is too restric-
tive, any regional differences may at least be captured by this dummy. 
The second issue concerns the measurement of initial liquidity endowment E and 
its delimitation from credit K . FEDER et al. (1990) purport to measure total li-
quidity as the sum of cash value of product inventory, deposits in financial insti-
tutions, and fungible formal loans (p. 1155, fn. 6), and use this aggregate instead 
of E and K  in equation (2-42). In my opinion it is quite doubtful whether total 
liquidity as a stock variable in a given year can be meaningfully operationalised 
at all. To which point in time is it related? How is the liquidity of physical assets 
(for example product inventories) determined? How are the assets evaluated in 
monetary terms and how do they enter the calculation? It seems unlikely that 
these questions can be answered in a plausible and uncontroversial way, even 
neglecting the practical measurement problems in a survey. In the upshot, the 
problems of directly measuring E appear to be almost unsurmountable, which is 
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include K  as given by the reported loan volumes and regard E as being captured 
by the farm and household characteristics entering the equation. Implicitly, this 
is the approach taken by SIAL and CARTER (1996). 
The third issue is related to the fact that many of the farm households which 
self-classified as credit-rationed according to the definition given in section 
3.3.2, p. 145, borrowed long-term. The value of short-term credit hence was zero 
for the majority of observations. This implies that for all these respondents the 
variation in the variable K  is also zero. In explorative work it turned out to be 
difficult to econometrically identify any effect of credit on output if the entire 
subsample of credit-rationed households was used. I therefore decided to neglect 
the discouraged non-appplicants for estimating the output equation. The analysis 
is hence restricted to the subsample of short-term borrowers, i.e. the partially 
rationed respondents who obtained a short-term loan, plus the fully rejected ap-
plicants for short-term credit, as indicated in section 3.3.3. An unfortunate con-
sequence of this decision is that the sample size used for the output supply esti-
mation considerably shrank (see section 4.1.2, p. 164). 
It is now possible to characterise the estimating equation more specifically. 
Taken together, equations (3-1) and (2-42) form a system in which (2-42) is only 
observed if ki=1. After the previously explained modifications, the estimating 
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with  i ε  a random error term. In this system,  i ε  and ui are supposed to have a 
bivariate normal distribution with zero means and a given correlation. The mar-












ρ , (3-4) 
with E(yi) the expectation of yi. The value of  * ˆi ρ  can be computed for each 
farm household i and then compared with the observed interest rates. This is 
done by regressing the estimated willingness to pay on interest rates as follows 
(see a similar application in JACOBY 1993): 
i i i e r b b + + = 2 1 * ˆ ρ ,   (3-5) 
with ei again a random error term. b1 and b2 are parameters to be estimated. The 
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volves the null hypothesis (b1, b2) = (0, 1), which can be subjected to an F-test 
procedure. 
In the light of the theoretical discussion of transaction costs given in section 
2.1.4, pp. 32 et seq., it is reasonable to ask how a farm-individual value for the 
exogenous market interest rate r is determined. This is the place where the ear-
lier considerations on relevant transaction costs come into play. In the determi-
nation of r, I include loan-related transaction costs and hence obtain a kind of 
actual market interest rate in the spirit of the Ohio State tradition. If the esti-
mated endogenous willingness to pay is still far above the market interest rate 
cum transaction costs, it might be concluded that measured transaction costs are 
only a small portion of the overall difference between market and willingness to 
pay. 
I calculated loan-specific transaction costs in a rather heuristic way that makes 
compromises with regard to the determination of opportunity costs. My total 
transaction costs include (a) travelling costs, depending on the distance between 
farm and bank and the number of visits as stated in the questionnaire, and 
(b) what could be called signalling costs, which comprise actual cash expenses 
due to additional fees, insurance, etc., and the opportunity costs of time spent 
waiting at the bank, all as given in the questionnaire. I call them signalling costs 
because they are related to the specifities of the loan contract (as opposed to 
conventional trade agreements without asymmetric information) and have to be 
borne by the borrower (see section 2.1.5, pp. 38 et seq.). A breakdown and com-
parison with the willingness to pay is given in section 4.2.2, p. 180. 
A further important specification issue is the selection of the functional form. 
Unfortunately, the true form is usually unknown. In this case, choice is com-
monly based on one or both of the following two approaches (OUDE LANSINK 
and PEERLINGS 2001, p. 58): (a) selection with reference to a given catalogue of 
ad-hoc criteria, or (b) selection based on statistical tests.
78 I made use of both 
approaches. Based on a number of ad hoc criteria, a pre-selection was made, 
which was then confronted with the data. I first explain the criteria used for pre-
selection based on a survey of functional forms by FUSS et al. (1978).  
Out of five criteria for choosing functional forms given by FUSS et al. (1978, pp. 
224-225), three are of particular importance for this study. First, the functional 
form should contain no more parameters than are necessary for consistency with 
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the maintained hypothesis. Second, functional forms should be chosen in which 
the parameters have an intrinsic and intuitive economic interpretation, and in 
which functional structure is clear. Third, the chosen functional form should be 
well-behaved in displaying consistency with maintained hypotheses such as 
positive marginal products or convexity.
79
In the present case, the first criterion is of relevance due to the limited number of 
degrees of freedom for the output supply regression, which is based only on a 
sub-sample of the entire database. This fact limits the possible number of ex-
planatory variables for which independent parameters can be estimated with 
some given precision, particularly if interaction terms as commonly used in par-
simonious flexible forms should be employed. The chosen model specification 
should therefore concentrate on the most important variables without too much 
restricting the flexibility of the model. This flexibility was regarded as desirable 
particularly for the parameters determining the marginal willingness to pay, 
which involves the second and third criterion of FUSS et al. My aim was to find a 
specification sufficiently rich to allow the estimation of a function of the will-
ingness to pay for credit that accounts for interactions with other explanatory 
variables and thus to reach a maximum of flexibility. At the same time, I re-
garded theoretical plausibility as a decisive benchmark for specifying the model. 
However, in the reduced-form output supply equation, this has much less impor-
tance than in other commonly estimated relationships (such as production or 
profit functions), particularly if no price variables enter the equation. It was ex-
plained above that even marginal credit effects lower than the market interest 
rate can be a theoretically plausible outcome. Fixed production factors are ex-
pected to show positive marginal products, although, just because they are as-
sumed to be fixed, nonpositive marginal products are by no means theoretically 
inconsistent. 
Most of the commonly employed functional forms are based either on a linear or 
a log-linear specification. Augmenting by appropriately chosen interaction and 
quadratic terms adds flexibility to these basic forms. For example, taking the 
linear specification as a starting point, a second-order approximation of an arbi-
trary functional form is the Quadratic. Adding cross-terms to the log-linear form 
(or Cobb-Douglas) yields the Translog (FUSS et al. 1978, pp. 230-240). In the 
explorative stage of research I started with a simple linear specification. This 
was in turn augmented by all cross terms for credit and the fixed factors, so that 
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a restricted version of the standard Quadratic resulted. Adding also quadratic 
terms of credit and fixed factors led to a serious deterioration of the precision of 
estimates, presumably due to the small number of degrees of freedom left. I 
therefore worked with the restricted version that includes only cross terms. See 
subchapter 4.2, pp. 171 et seq.,  for results. 
The major alternative was to use a logarithmic specification (see the functional 
forms used in the studies reported in Table 3-1, p. 126). The decision between 
the modified Quadratic and a logarithmic alternative was based on a statistical 
test. Since the competing models are nonnested, I worked with an artificial nest-
ing procedure in spirit of the J-test (DAVIDSON and MACKINNON 1981), as pro-
posed by GREENE (1995, section 14.4.5). In the alternative variant, the depend-
ent variable as well as all linear and cross terms of regressors excluding the 
dummy variable were transformed by taking logarithms. Hence, a kind of re-
stricted Translog function obtains. Each of the regressions was augmented by 
the difference between the predictions from the other model and the predictions 
for the other model produced by the initial one. Thus, the quadratic model was 
augmented by an additional regressor defined as the difference between the pre-
diction of the logarithmic model and the logarithm of the prediction of the quad-
ratic model. If this regressor is significant as tested by a conventional t-test, the 
logarithmic model adds significant fit to the quadratic model, providing evi-
dence against the latter one. The logarithmic model is analysed analogously. 
The results of this test are given in subcapter 4.2; they unambiguously support 
the choice of the modified Quadratic. One caveat is, however, that the test is 
only asymptotically valid, which qualifies the result given the small sample size. 
As dependent variable I use aggregate output supply measured in thousand zł. 
Output supply includes the products consumed by the farm household for human 
or animal nutrition, which were aggregated by imputed unit values (see PETRICK 
2001, pp. 16-17). The independent variables are fixed factors of production, 
credit, and household characteristics to test the non-separability hypothesis. 
Fixed factors are operationalised as total land cultivated (ha), capital stock of 
farm net of land (thousand zł), and short-term credit volume (thousand zł). The 
credit variable includes the total volume of short-term loans taken in the produc-
tion year 1998/99. Demographic characteristics of the household are captured by 
the number of adult males and females, to maintain consistency with the Probit 
model presented above. Household characteristics are added linearly to the 
model, so that the coefficients are the marginal effects on output supply. This 
resembles the approach of FEDER et al. (1990) and is a simplified version of D.     3.3 Empirical strategy  157   
BENJAMIN (1992).
80 In addition to the presented variables, the estimating equa-
tion also contains a dummy indicating location in the northern region and the 
above mentioned IMR. 
3.3.5 Effects on investment 
The investment analysis aims at making the theoretical considerations of section 
2.3.2, pp. 91 et seq., fruitful for an empirical investigation of Polish farm house-
holds’ investment behaviour. In principle, it would be possible to base an em-
pirical investment function on the flexible accelerator (2-56), p. 98. The optimal 
capital stock is a function of the arguments of M(.) including optimal E, which 
in turn is determined by the household’s preferences (see also KUIPER and 
THIJSSEN 1996, p. 458). A broadly similar approach has been used in the ad-
justment costs literature, although devoid of E, for example by LOPEZ (1985). 
However, estimation of the capital adjustment coefficient B is not the primary 
goal of the present study.
81 In contrast, in the empirical analysis, I want to focus 
on the basic implication of the financial constraints model, namely that invest-
ment depends on available collateral and credit access. I will therefore attempt to 
extract the essence of the model by means of an estimable reduced-form invest-
ment equation. This can be written as follows: 
) , , , ( p Z E E I I & =  (3-6) 
In this equation, the capital stock, the output price, and the existing volume of 
equity E are taken as given at the beginning of the planning period. The change 
in E, denoted E & , is the result of the optimal plan of the decision maker in the 
current period.
82 In contrast to conventional neoclassical investment equations 
(ELHORST 1993, p. 170), note the presence of equity formation and the equity 
stock as financial variables. 
Unfortunately, the empirical implementation of (3-6) faces a number of prob-
lems related to E & . First, E &  is difficult to measure if interpreted as a general im-
                                           
80  Since D. BENJAMIN (1992) solely focuses on the significance of demographic characteris-
tics, he uses the number of family members plus the fractions of several demographic cate-
gories (sex, age) as separate regressors in a log-linear labour demand equation (pp. 301-
304). This type of specification can be derived from a scaling model in spirit of POLLAK 
and WALES (1981). 
81  Note that B cannot be estimated directly but is usually calculated indirectly from its deter-
mining functions (LOPEZ 1985, p. 45; WITZKE 1993, p. 210). In addition, B may be non-
constant (MACCINI 1991, p. 24). 
82  Transfers T are not included separately since they affect I only via equity formation. 158    3 Empirical research methodology 
provement in collateral availability or even more broadly in credit-worthiness. 
Second, E &  is not exogenous because it is ultimately determined by the consump-
tion preferences of the household. Furthermore, as argued by WITZKE (1993, p. 
266), dynamic or long-term adjustment decisions of the household via E &  may 
generally be regarded as unimportant if the equilibrium of the system is dis-
torted in each period by newly incoming information (for example with regard 
to the access to credit function) and a subsequent revision of the optimal plan. 
On theoretical grounds, this of course calls into question the usefulness of the 
entire dynamic model. On the other hand, the existence of short-run distortions 
corresponds to the stated perception of borrowers who still experience that the 
maximum loan amount is externally dictated by the bank. According to the 
model of section 2.3.2, borrowers know the marginal cost of borrowing depend-
ent on their E and thus the amount of credit they obtain, an assumption that 
should exclude any perceived excess credit demand. 
For these reasons, I replaced E &  by the change in net borrowing, K & . The ob-
served level of net borrowing K &  might be regarded as the ultimate outcome of 
household preferences, its credit worthiness, plus all types of short-term distor-
tions. Note that the inclusion of K &  has three further advantages: first, K &  is eas-
ily observed. Second, K &  can be assumed to be exogenous for rationed borrow-
ers who said that they wanted to borrow more. Third, it opens the opportunity to 
directly investigate the relationship between new borrowing and investment. The 
latter is of particular interest for the current study due to its policy implications. 
Since the government actively supports credit expansion in the farm sector, the 
marginal effect of credit on investment is quite valuable information; the point is 
further explored below. If K &  is included into the investment equation, E can be 
dropped, since its only effect on I is through K & . Two further modifications con-
cern the exclusion of prices, for the same reason as in the output supply model 
discussed previously, and the inclusion of a vector of dummy variables ζ , cap-
turing regional and farm specific effects.  
I also experimented with two further dummies indicating the year of investment, 
and thus capturing any effects of changed overall price relations and other year-
specific effects (see similarly CALOMIRIS et al. 1986, p. 458). Year effects might 
be included because, although the data-set is cross-sectional in nature, it com-
prises pooled investment data for a period of three years. However, these effects 
turned out to be not significant in any of the estimations and were hence ne-
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The investment equation is again estimated only for households classified as 
credit-rationed according to the qualitative criterion of section 3.3.3, pp. 146 et 
seq. I assume that the financial constraints model of investment is applicable 
only for these households. Furthermore, this procedure reduces the danger of 
endogeneity of the credit variable K & . Since the relevant information is available 
from the Probit equation, I can again test for selectivity by including the IMR. 
The estimating investment equation is therefore: 
i i i i i i Z K I I ε + = ) ζ , , ( &  iff  0 > + i i u γz  (3-7) 
The determination of K &  is hence analysed by the first-stage Probit equation, 
which contains variables of collateral availability and creditworthiness as well as 
demographic characteristics of the household, see section 3.3.3. 
For later reference, I briefly restate the expected signs of the parameters to be 
estimated in (3-7). By (2-55), p. 97, the relation between change in net borrow-
ing and investment is unambiguously positive. The effect of Z on I depends on 
the size of the desired capital stock or farm size. A negative sign implies that 
farm sizes converge over time, whereas a positive sign implies diverging farm 
sizes. ζ  includes a dummy indicating whether the farm has permanent book-
keeping, which might be taken as a measure of management skills of the farmer. 
It is likely that more skilled farmers invest more. A second dummy has the value 
of one if the farm is located in the northern region. The effect on investment is 
also likely to be positive. 
The dependent variable in equation (3-7) poses three further specification prob-
lems, to be discussed subsequently: (a) discontinuity of the investment variable, 
(b) censoring of the investment variable, and (c) the choice of functional form.  
First, investment may be discontinuous or lumpy (MUNDLAK 2001, p. 57). This 
problem is ignored, justified by the fact that the volume of investment is the sum 
of all investment expenses over a relatively long period of three years (1997-
1999). Discontinuities therefore even out to a certain extent.
83  
Second, more seriously, approximately 20 percent of observations report a zero 
investment volume. This implies that the dependent variable is censored to some 
extent, which should be reflected in a possibly non-linear formulation of the 
model. In addition, non-linearity is also addressed more explicitly as a result of 
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the third problem, which is related to the choice of the functional form. Before 
explaining this, it seems useful to briefly highlight the policy implications of the 
credit variable.  
As noted earlier, the potential effect of new borrowing on investment is of key 
interest due to its policy relevance. A marginal effect of credit on investment 
equal to or larger than one implies that additional funds are completely used for 
productive investment. This describes a situation where subsidised credit is fully 
used for investment and even triggers the additional mobilisation of other finan-
cial sources, which is clearly desirable from the point of view of the govern-
ment. On the other hand, a marginal effect smaller than one implies that the 
marginal unit of credit is only partly used for the supposed investment purpose.  
However, the marginal effect is unlikely to be constant over the entire range of 
observations, as would be imposed by a linear model. It is of interest whether 
there are any size effects of credit use, or whether more credit implies a higher 
marginal investment effect. Due to the complex interactions between credit-
worthiness and investment via the access to credit function, substantial non-
linearities can be expected to be present. The change in the marginal credit ef-
fect can be investigated by evaluating the second derivative of the investment 
function with regard to credit. Therefore, the latter effect should not unduly be 
constrained by the choice of functional form. 
To address the censoring problem, I considered a Tobit model (AMEMIYA 1984; 
GREENE 2000, pp. 905-926) in the estimation of the investment equation. Con-
ventional marginal effects in the Tobit model vary with different values for the 
regressors. They give the total effect of a change in explanatories on the ob-
served, censored investment volume. In an imaginary way, the latter effect can 
be decomposed into an effect on the conditional mean (and thus the size) of in-
vestment  plus an effect on the probability that the farm invests at all 
(MCDONALD and MOFFIT 1980). The implicit assumption of the Tobit model is 
that the given regressors explain both effects. In the present study, the uncen-
sored part of the model is the relationship of interest, whereas the qualitative 
choice whether to invest or not is not analysed more deeply. Regarding the zeros 
as implying unobserved disinvestment might provide a rationale for this ap-
proach. In this case, the marginal effects are given by the coefficients of the To-
bit model (JOHNSTON and DINARDO 1997, pp. 436-439).  
In the standard Tobit formulation, the level of investment is still explained by a 
model that is linear in parameters. However, by including higher-order polyno-
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ducing more flexibility is to trace more closely the true functional relationship 
between credit and investment. I hence augmented the Tobit equation by a quad-
ratic and a cubic term for the credit variable. This is assumed to contribute little 
to improve the explanatory power of the model with regard to the decision to 
invest at all (i.e. the qualitative choice part of the Tobit model). The virtue of 
this procedure is that a cubic function for the uncensored part of the investment 
equation obtains, which can be used for the further analysis of the credit-
investment relationship. 
Investment volume in thousand zł is the aggregate of all productive investment, 
including land, all types of agricultural machinery, farm buildings, livestock, 
permanent crops, to name the most important components (see the detailed de-
scription in section 4.3.1, pp. 184 et seq.). Only gross investment is considered 
here, to avoid the difficult choice of a depreciation rate. Credit access was meas-
ured as the total volume of credit with a repayment term of more than 12 months 
taken by the farmer in the period 1997-1999. There were 81 single loan con-
tracts reported for the group of farmers under investigation. 78 percent of bor-
rowers obtained at least one loan under the government program. The capital 
stock Z at the outset of the investment period was difficult to measure, since de-
tailed statements on farm assets were only available for 1999. I used the nominal 
value of land owned by the farm in the beginning of the investment period, as in 
the Probit model. The advantage of using land as compared to other assets is that 
the problem of depreciation can reasonably be ignored. 
3.3.6 Limitations of the approach 
The previous sections aimed at making the empirical approach of the current 
research transparent and understandable for the reader. However, the general 
limitations of this type of econometric analysis as discussed in section 3.1.2, pp. 
103 et seq., still apply.  
A more specific limitation concerns the distinction of credit rationing and under-
investment as used in the theoretical chapter. Consistent with the discussion in 
subchapter 3.1, pp. 102 et seq., the previously presented methodological appara-
tus seems appropriate to correctly identify credit rationing as the presence of 
private excess demand (given an exogenous interest rate). To the contrary, un-
derinvestment as a deviation from the social optimum can only be detected to the 
extent that it coincides with credit rationing. As argued in section 2.2.3, pp. 63 et 
seq., in the presence of asymmetric information, it is not necessarily the case that 
observed market interest rates correctly reflect economy-wide scarcities. Since I 162    3 Empirical research methodology 
analytically separate the demand side of the credit market from the supply side, I 
cannot perform a rigorous welfare analysis. However, if the marginal willing-
ness to pay for credit substantially exceed market interest rates, this is at least 
suggestive evidence that remunerative investment cannot be carried out. This 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON CREDIT RATIONING OF POLISH FARM 
HOUSEHOLDS 
The following chapter presents the results of the empirical investigation of credit 
rationing in rural Poland. This consists of a number of descriptive statistics and 
the results of the econometric estimations as explained in detail in the previous 
chapter. I do neither provide an in-depth discussion of the structural properties 
of the farms surveyed nor of differences between regions. These issues, together 
with a comparison of Polish and German farms, are treated more extensively in 
PETRICK et al. (2002). 
The structure of the chapter reflects the discussion of the empirical approach in 
chapter 3. In subchapter 4.1, I present the results of the qualitative choice model. 
Subchapter 4.2 covers the output supply model together with an examination of 
the difference between willingness to pay for credit and market interest rate. 
Subchapter 4.3 gives the results of the econometric investment analysis. 
4.1  Qualitative information on credit rationing 
In this subchapter I present the results of the analysis of qualitatve statements by 
farmers as explained in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, pp. 145 et seq. After a descrip-
tive overview is given (section 4.1.1), I present the estimates of the specific (sec-
tion 4.1.2) and the general (section 4.1.3) Probit model, followed by a summary 
of findings (section 4.1.4). 
4.1.1 Overview of credit rationing based on qualitative information 
I start with a descriptive evaluation of the credit market experience of farm 
households in the regions surveyed.
84 Table 4-1 gives an overview of the indi-
vidual assessment of rationing outcomes according to the methodology de-
scribed in section 3.3.2. The calculation was made before the sample was re-
duced due to outlier control (see section 3.2.3, p. 143). 
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Table 4-1:   Frequency of rationing experience (total sample) 
Rationing experience  Observations Percent 
satisfied applicant  185 41.4
partially rationed applicant  168 37.6
completely rejected applicant  4 .9
not interested non-applicant  71 15.9
discouraged non-applicant  19 4.3
total 447 100.0
Notes:  Includes all types of loans applied for between 1997 and 1999. Key to 
table: satisfied applicant: applied at least at one bank, received at least 
one loan, and did not want to borrow more at most recent loan; partially 
rationed applicant: applied at least at one bank, received at least one 
loan, and did want to borrow more at most recent loan; completely re-
jected applicant: applied at least at one bank and did not obtain any 
loan at all; not interested non-applicant: did not apply and is not dis-
couraged; discouraged non-applicant: did not apply because fear of re-
jection. Not corrected for outliers. Missing observations were skipped. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
The table shows that by far the most important groups are the satisfied and the 
partially rationed applicants. 16 percent of respondents were not interested in 
borrowing at all, and only a small minority was completely rejected or discour-
aged. It can hence be concluded that about 80 percent of farmers in the sample 
are borrowers, and that perceived excess demand is a relevant problem for al-
most half of the borrowers. 
Due to the relative unimportance of fully rejected and discouraged respondents, 
I consider these two groups together with the partially rationed group as the pool 
of credit-rationed respondents in the following. In contrast, satisfied applicants 
and not interested non-applicants are regarded as not credit-rationed. Hence, I 
work with a dichotomous classification. 
In the sequel, I also distinguish between short-term and long-term loans. Short-
term loans are defined by a loan term of up to 12 months, and long-term loans 
by a term of more than 12 months. 
4.1.2 Specific Probit model 
In the specific Probit model the dependent variable captures rationed short-term 
applicants vis-à-vis all other respondents, as explained in section 3.3.3, p. 146.     4.1 Qualitative information on credit rationing  165   
Table 4-2 breaks down the sample into constrained and unconstrained respon-
dents as well as borrowers and non-borrowers. The table only includes observa-
tions which are also used for the Probit estimation below. As in all following 
statistics, due to the exclusion of outliers as described in section 3.2.3, p. 143, 
there is a loss of observations as compared with Table 3-3 and Table 4-1. 
Table 4-2:   Frequency of rationing experience (specific model) 
Rationing experience  Observations Percent 
Constrained respondents (short-term)  51 12.4
Unconstrained respondents (short-term)  361 87.6
Borrowers (short-term)  114 27.7
Non-borrowers 298 72.3
All respondents  412 100.0
Notes:  Considers short-term loans taken in the production year 1998/99. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
Approximately three quarters of respondents did not borrow any short-term 
loans at all. Notice that non-borrowers (of short-term loans) might be borrowers 
of long-term loans (see section 3.3.3). Among the borrowers of short-term loans, 
80 percent obtained a loan with a subsidised interest rate (not shown in the ta-
ble). Almost half of the borrowers self-classified as credit-rationed, similar to 
the evaluation over all loan types given earlier. 51 farm households must be re-
garded as being credit-rationed with regard to short-term loans, these are the 
households indicated by one in the dependent variable of the Probit regression. 
Table 4-3 displays a number of descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
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Table 4-3:   Description of variables used in the Probit regression (specific 
model) 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Minimum Maximum  Valid 
observa-
tions 
Credit-rationed short-term borrower 
(dummy) 
.1 .3 .0 1.0 412
Total land owned (ha)  13.4 16.7 .0 142.9  412
Land rented from private persons (ha)  2.4 5.6 .0 52.5  412
Age of newest tractor (years)  10.7 6.6 .0 37.0  412
Farming practice (years)  22.1 9.8 .0 60.0  412
Educational degree (1..5)
1 3.4 .8 1.0 5.0 412
Adult males in household (no)  1.8 .9 .0 5.0  412
Adult females in household (no)  1.7 .9 .0 5.0  412
Conversation with neighbour (dummy) .7 .4 .0 1.0  412
Notes: 
1 Educational degree indexed as follows: 1=not completed primary education, 
2=completed primary education, 3=completed vocational school, 4=completed tech-
nical school or liceum, 5=completed university. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
The results of the Probit estimation are given in Table 4-4. The table also con-
tains marginal effects, which are calculated at sample means and are expressed 
in percentage points (for example, one ha additional land owned reduces the 
probability of being credit-rationed by about .09 percent at sample means). For 
the farming practice variable no marginal effect is given, since there exists no 
straightforward way to calculate it for interacted variables (AI and NORTON 
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Table 4-4:   Probit estimates of the probability of being credit-
rationed (specific model) 
 Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
Constant -2.693 -4.089  –
Total land owned (ha)  -.005 -.762  -.086
Land rented from private persons (ha)  .053 3.920  .931
Age of newest tractor (years)  .034 2.562  .601
Farming practice (years)  .012 .352  –
Farming practice square  >-.001 -.508  –
Educational degree (1..5)  .121 1.052  2.109
Adult males in household (no)  -.157 -1.547  -2.732
Adult females in household (no)  .267 2.696  4.651
Conversation with neighbour (dummy)  .453 2.086  6.953
χ
2 of γ=0 (significance)  36.242 (<.001) 
Percent correctly predicted (threshold= .5)  0s: 99.4, 1s: 7.8 
Percent correctly predicted (threshold= .12) 0s: 65.4, 1s: 74.5 
Observations  412 
Notes:  Marginal effects in percentage points, calculated at sample means. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
The coefficients of four out of nine explanatory variables are significant at least 
at the five percent level; significance of the other five is weaker. To the extent 
that they were derived theoretically, all statistically significant coefficients but 
one have the expected sign. 
The key indicators of collateralisable wealth suggest that collateral is of major 
importance as a determinant of credit rationing: less land in owned property, as 
well as a higher amount of rented land, imply a higher probability of being 
credit-constrained. According to its t-value, the amount of land rented from pri-
vate persons is the most important determinant of credit rationing. The quality of 
the collateral also has a statistically significant influence, since farms with older 
tractors are more likely to be credit-rationed. 168    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the farming experience nor the education of the 
farmer play a significant role for the probability of being credit-rationed. Re-
garding the other household characteristics, the coefficient of the number of fe-
males is significant at less than one percent. Apparently, more women in the 
farm household tend to tighten the credit constraint, which is in contrast to the 
conjecture that higher public transfer payments for females increase the avail-
able liquidity. Alternatively, more women in the household could make the farm 
less creditworthy due to a higher share of labour devoted to farm production as 
opposed to household work. The reverse holds for men, however less signifi-
cant.  
The positive coefficient of the dummy on village internal information flow is 
contrary to expectations. Given this fact, the interpretation of the coefficient is 
difficult, although it has a statistically significant impact. A possible explanation 
is that better information about farming activities of a given borrower led the 
bank to the impression that this borrower is in fact not creditworthy. He may 
thus have obtained less credit than expected and consequently classified himself 
as credit-constrained.  
The null hypothesis that all coefficients of the model except the constant are 
zero as represented by the χ
2-statistic is clearly rejected. The given fit measures 
are in a range commonly observed in the literature. Since the distribution of the 
dependent variable is very unbalanced, the percentage of the correctly predicted 
values is given for two thresholds for predicting  1 *= k : the standard value .5 
and the share of the 1s in the sample, .12 (for further discussion see GREENE 
2000, pp. 833-834). As expected, the second threshold resulted in a substantially 
higher percentage of correctly predicted 1s, at the cost of fewer correctly pre-
dicted 0s. 
4.1.3 General Probit model 
The general Probit model is directly related to the qualitative statements tabu-
lated in Table 4-1, p. 164. It is general in the sense that it does not filter out any 
rationing events by restricting the investigation to short-term loans. All types of 
loans over the whole reporting period 1997-99 are captured by the dependent 
variable in this regression. However, as explained previously, to obtain a di-
chotomous variable, partially rationed, fully constrained, and discouraged re-
spondents were all simply considered as being credit-rationed and not distin-
guished further. The variables used are described in Table 4-5.     4.1 Qualitative information on credit rationing  169   
Table 4-5:   Description of variables used in the general Probit model 





Credit-rationed (dummy)  .5 .5 .0  1.0  345
Total land owned beginning of 1997 
(thousand zł) 
65.2 88.6 .0 600.0  345
Adult males in household (no.)  1.7 .9 .0  5.0  345
Adult females in household (no.)  1.7 .9 .0  5.0  345
Previous loan rescheduled (dummy)  .1 .3 .0  1.0  345
Conversation with neighbour (dummy)  .7 .5 .0  1.0  345
Year of loan approval = 1997 (dummy)  .3 .5 .0  1.0  345
Year of loan approval = 1998 (dummy)  .2 .4 .0  1.0  345
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
It may be noted in passing that the exact mean of the Previous loan rescheduled 
variable is .125, which means that 12.5 percent of respondents rescheduled a 
loan in the past. The survey data does not allow to calculate a repayment rate for 
agricultural loans; KARCZ (1998, p. 96) reports that this is commonly quite high 
among Polish farmers (98 percent). 
The regression results of the general Probit model are displayed in Table 4-6. 
The results broadly support the findings of the specific model. The only excep-
tion is the collateral variable Total land owned beginning of 1997, the coeffi-
cient of which is not significant. To the extent that the volume of available col-
lateral is appropriately measured it can hence be concluded that it is of less im-
portance in the general observation of credit rationing. On the other hand, the 
reputation effect as measured by the Previous loan rescheduled dummy is quite 
important, with a t-value of almost three. At sample means of all other variables, 
the subgroup of respondents who rescheduled a loan in the past had a 30 per-
centage points higher probability of being credit-rationed than the subgroup with 
a better reputation. Reputation thus plays a key role in determining credit access 
of farm households. Household characteristics have a similar influence as in the 
specific model, although the relative significance of males versus females 
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Table 4-6:   Probit estimates of the probability of being credit-rationed 
(general model) 
 Coefficient t-value Marginal 
effect 
Constant -.272 -1.163  –
Total land owned beginning of 1997 (ths. zł) <-.001 -.300  -.010
Adult males in household (no.)  -.217 -2.652  -8.581
Adult females in household (no.)  .149 1.813  5.894
Previous loan rescheduled (dummy)  .737 2.998  29.151
Conversation with neighbour (dummy)  .448 2.850  17.711
Applied in 1997 (dummy)  -.258 -1.691  -10.199
Applied in 1998 (dummy)  -.086 -.453  -3.402
χ
2 of γ=0 (significance)  26.985 (<.001) 
Percent correctly predicted (threshold= .5)  0s: 70.9, 1s: 47.4 
Observations  345 
Notes:  Marginal effects in percentage points, calculated at sample means. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
The regression also reveals that applying in 1997 significantly reduced the prob-
ability of being credit-rationed. This finding is quite in line with the fact that 
governmentally subsidised credit expansion in the farm sector showed a clear 
peak in this year (see Figure 1-4, p. 10). In subsequent years, governmental 
credit programs were cut down, which arguably resulted in a relative deteriora-
tion of credit access of farmers (see subchapter 1.2, pp. 7 et seq., and 
CZERWIŃSKA-KAYZER 2000, p. 12). 
It might be suspected that rationing of farmers was due to the depletion of gov-
ernment funds for subsidising credits. Since most farmers borrowed under the 
preferential state program, this could be expected. Whereas prior to 1995 gov-
ernment subsidies were not fully utilised, this was apparently no longer the case 
in 1996 (CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX 1997, p. 18). Due to the subsequent cut in 
credit lines, it is unlikely that there were unused subsidies in the years 1997-
1999. However, POGANIETZ and WILDERMUTH (1999, p. 539) suggest that ra-
tioning due to exhaustion of government funds would have taken the form of 
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ing to the first-in-first-out principle, up to the point where there were no funds 
left. This is in contrast to the fact that respondents in the current sample over-
whelmingly report partial rationing (Table 4-1), which considerably weakens 
the argument of exhausted government funds. 
4.1.4 Summary 
The results of the analysis of qualitative information on credit rationing can be 
summarised as follows. According to statements of farmers made during the 
survey, 80 percent of farm households took at least one loan in the reporting pe-
riod 1997-1999. Almost half of the borrowers obtained less credit than desired 
and are hence regarded as credit-rationed. Completely rejected applicants and 
discouraged non-applicants are of minor importance in the sample. 
Central determinants of credit rationing as revealed by a Probit regression analy-
sis are the reputation of the loan applicant as well as demographic household 
characteristics. Over all loan types, respondents with a good credit history have 
a 30 percentage points lower probability of being rationed than borrowers who 
rescheduled a loan in the past. In addition, more adult males in the household 
decrease the probability of being credit-rationed, while more females increase it. 
This is assumed to be an effect of higher liquidity demand for consumption pur-
poses by women or a signalling effect due to the higher share of male labour 
force. If only short-term borrowing is considered, collateral availability is an 
additional key factor of credit rationing, since more land owned and less land 
rented decrease the likelihood of becoming rationed. Finally, there is some evi-
dence against the view that a depletion of subsidised funds is a major reason for 
rationing outcomes. 
4.2  Output supply model 
The empirical output supply model is the major tool to analyse the effects of 
credit on farm output, as discussed in detail in section 3.3.4, pp. 149 et seq. In 
particular, it allows to quantify the marginal willingness to pay for credit as a 
metric measure of credit rationing and to trace the effects of household charac-
teristics on output supply, see the theoretical section 2.3.1, pp. 77 et seq. 
In section 4.2.1 I present the basic results of the estimation. In section 4.2.2 the 
marginal willingness to pay for credit is analysed further and compared with 
farm-specific market interest rates, and the non-separability hypotheses is exam-
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4.2.1 Results of the estimation 
First, I give an overview of the variables used in the estimations. Table 4-7 pre-
sents a number of descriptive statistics based on the subsample used for estima-
tion, which consists of rationed applicants for short-term loans (see section 
3.3.4).  
Table 4-7:   Description of variables used in the output supply model (ra-
tioned subsample) 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Minimum  Maximum  Valid 
obser-
vations
Aggregate output supply (thousands zł) 62.9 54.8 1.2  243.5  46
Total land cultivated (ha)  22.7 27.1 1.8  145.0  46
Capital stock of farm net of land (ths. zł) 223.0 152.9 21.5 843.0 46
Credit volume short-term (ths. zł) 6.9 10.2 .0  60.0  46
Adult males in household (no.)  1.7 .7 1.0  4.0  46
Adult females in household (no.)  2.0 1.0 .0  5.0  46
Farm is located in northern region 
(dummy) .2 .4 .0  1.0  46
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
Table 4-8 presents the results of two different specifications of the reduced-form 
output supply model. Model I is the base model as discussed in section 3.3.4. 
Model II is regressed over the entire sample of short-term borrowers, including 
non-rationed farmers, and is hence called counterfactual. The rationale for esti-
mating Model II is explained shortly below. However, I first concentrate on 
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Table 4-8:   Estimates of reduced-form output supply model 
  Base model on ra-
tioned subsample 
(I) 
 Counterfactual  on 
entire sample (II) 
 Coefficie
nt 
t-value   Coefficie
nt 
t-value 
Total land cultivated (ha) [A]  5.421 5.085 -.082  -.194
Capital stock of farm net of land (ths. zł) [B] .094 2.491 .074  2.198
Credit volume short-term (ths. zł) [C]  .805 .324 2.741  2.600
A * B  -.012 -3.294 .003  2.879
A * C  -.048 -3.813 .015  1.187
B * C  .018 1.591 -.008  -3.805
Credit-rationed short-term (dummy) * C  – – 1.684  2.269
Adult males in household (no.)  -.364 -.057 4.479  1.212
Adult females in household (no.)  11.216 2.012 3.251  .856
Farm is located in northern region (dummy)  -50.630 -2.554 -19.204  -1.573
Inverse Mills Ratio I  15.530 1.122 –  –
Inverse Mills Ratio II  – – 13.437  .826
F-value (significance)  10.75 (<.001)    18.61 (<.001) 
Adjusted R²  .684   .651 
Observations  46  105 
Notes:  Regressions include constant. All t-values corrected for selection according to 
HECKMAN (1979). 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
F-value and adjusted R² of Model I indicate that the significance and the ex-
planatory power of the entire model are quite satisfactory. Furthermore, the ma-
jority of coefficients could be identified with sufficient precision to allow a re-
jection of the null hypotheses that the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero.
85 Exceptions are the direct credit effect, the cross term B*C, the 
                                           
85  The critical values from the t-distribution for 35 degrees of freedom are 1.690 at the 90 
percent level, 2.030 at the 95 percent level, and 2.724 at the 99 percent level. 174    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
Adult males variable, and the Inverse Mills Ratio. The first two affect the mar-
ginal effects of the fixed production factors and the credit variable, of which the 
latter is of central interest in this research. I hence calculated the marginal effects 
on output of land, capital, and credit together with their t-values by employing 
the so-called delta method (DEATON 1997, pp. 128-129; GREENE 2000, pp. 357-
360).
86 The delta method allows to compute standard errors of transformations 
of estimated coefficients. In the given linear case, the standard errors can be 
simply obtained as linear combinations of the elements of the covariance matrix 
(GREENE 2000, p. 85). The usual t-value can then be used to test the null hy-
pothesis that the marginal effects at given sample means of the involved vari-
ables are zero (pp. 273-274). I also calculate marginal effects at sample medians, 
since the distribution of the variables is rather dispersed, as becomes clear by 
comparing means with minimum and maximum values in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-9:   Marginal effects of fixed production factors and 
credit at sample means and medians 
Marginal effect calculated at...  means  (t-value) medians  (t-value)
Total land cultivated (ha)  2.399 4.905 2.850  5.248
Capital stock of farm net of land (ths. zł) -.058 -1.503 .027  .906
Credit volume short-term (ths. zł) 3.638 3.795 3.824  3.738
Notes:  Calculations based on coefficients and covariance matrix of Model I. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Table 4-9 displays marginal effects and their t-ratios computed at means and 
medians of the rationed subsample. The table suggests that the marginal effects 
are usually positive, with the exception of fixed capital calculated at sample 
means, which is barely negative. However, it could not be identified to be sig-
nificantly different from zero anyway. It can hence be concluded that the mar-
ginal contribution of fixed capital to output supply is quite small. To the con-
trary, marginal effects for land and credit are significantly positive and were es-
timated quite precisely. 
As set out in the theoretical discussion (section 2.3.1, pp. 77 et seq.), marginal 
effects of credit as calculated here are a correct measure of the marginal willing-
ness to pay for credit only if there are no effects of credit on inputs not under the 
credit constraint. To test this, a reduced-form input demand function completely 
analogous to (3-3), p. 153, was estimated. I used the same regressors, the same 
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functional form and the identical selection mechanism as for the output supply 
equation.
87 The dependent variable was taken from the survey results and meas-
ures intermediate input purchases which are not credit financed (see PETRICK 
2003). Its mean is at 26.7 thousands zł with a standard deviation of 30.3, the 
minimum is .3 and the maximum value 124.4 for the selected sample. The mar-
ginal effect of credit on input demand at sample means was .363 with a t-value 
of .628, which is not significantly different from zero at any conventional level 
of significance. The chosen approach is hence a consistent way to estimate the 
marginal willingness to pay for credit, following equation (2-46), p. 88. 
The credit effect will be examined in more detail in the following section, as will 
be the significance of the demographic variables. The validity of the marginal 
effects of land and capital can be assessed by a comparison with descriptive 
farm indicators given by PETRICK et al. (2002), which are based on the same 
data set as the present research. With regard to land, the authors report an aver-
age revenue from farm production ranging between 1.974 and 3.043 ths. zł per 
ha.
88 This is quite the order of magnitude of the marginal effect of land on out-
put given in Table 4-9. Similarly, the average return on fixed capital is reported 
to be quite low or even negative, which fits well into the picture of an almost 
zero marginal effect of capital on output. 
The signs of the cross-terms can be interpreted as follows. First, the marginal 
effect of land on output decreases with increasing capital. This could be ex-
plained by a lower labour intensity with regard to land on capital-intensive 
farms. Second, the marginal effect of credit increases with increasing capital 
stock, but decreases with increasing land. This implies a ceteris paribus higher 
willingness to pay on farms operating capital-intensively, or farms with rela-
tively more capital and less land. To the extent that land is a collateral which is 
more valued by banks than capital, this is a plausible result, although nothing is 
said about the ownership structure of land and capital (in contrast to the Probit 
model examined in section 4.1.2, pp. 164 et seq., where the amount of rented 
land enters the equation with a positive sign). 
                                           
87  Note that there would have been no efficiency gains from estimating the input demand 
equation jointly with the output supply equation in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression. 
This is due to the fact that there are the same explanatory variables in both equations and 
no cross restrictions because of missing prices (see GREENE 2000, pp. 616-617). 
88  This is the range of gross revenue per ha given for median farms in the three regions sur-
veyed (PETRICK et al. 2002, p. 206). The values were transformed into zł by using the av-
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The estimates of Model I can be used to assess the importance of selectivity bias 
in the output supply equation. This is done by testing the significance of the 
IMR, as explained in section 3.3.4, p. 151. The reported t-value is clearly below 
any of the usually used critical values, so that there appears to be no significant 
selectivity bias. 
Due to the limited number of observations, I did not pursue a stratawise regres-
sion (see section 3.2.2, p. 142). However, a dummy was added indicating 
whether the farm belongs to the northern region of the survey. The dummy thus 
allows a linear shift of the output supply function to accomodate different struc-
tures in the northern versus the two southern regions. As Table 4-8 shows, the 
coefficient of the dummy is significant. The implication is that, all other things 
equal, credit-rationed farms in the more largely structured north on average sup-
ply less output than their small-scaled counterparts in the south (see section 
3.2.1, p. 136). An explanation for this could be the lower labour intensity on the 
northern farms, which reduces the average output per fixed factor. This is con-
sistent with the indicators presented by PETRICK et al. (2002). 
As indicated earlier, I tested the functional form of the given model against an 
alternative using logarithmic transformations of the variables by an artificial 
nesting procedure (see section 3.3.4). The coefficient of the additional regressor 
in the quadratic model (defined as the difference between the prediction of the 
logarithmic model and the logarithm of the prediction of the quadratic model) 
was 10.202 with a t-value of .324. In contrast, the coefficient of the additional 
regressor in the logarithmic model (defined as the difference between the predic-
tion of the quadratic model and the prediction of the logarithmic model above e) 
was .025 with a t-value of 2.389. This is unambiguous evidence in favour of the 
quadratic model.
89
4.2.2 Marginal willingness to pay for credit and non-separability hypothesis 
In a second step, the coefficients of the output supply model for rationed farms 
were taken to compute the farm individual willingness to pay for credit as given 
by equation (3-4), p. 88. The procedure is to compute marginal effects of credit 
                                           
89  The test was carried out without accounting for selectivity. When estimating logarithmic 
models the problem arises that only strictly positive values can be transformed into loga-
rithms. To allow an estimation of the logarithmic model on the same dataset as the quad-
ratic model, I restricted the estimation to partially rationed borrowers, added .1 to all vari-
ables, and estimated both the logarithmic and the quadratic model on these modified vari-
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for the farm specific values of land and fixed capital and subtract one. The re-
sults are summarised in Figure 4-1. 
Figure 4-1:  Distribution of marginal willingness to pay for 
credit 
Marginal willingness to pay for credit (%)






























Notes:  Mean = 208.8; Std. Dev. = 129.5; N = 41. Solid line in figure 
shows a normal distribution based on mean and variance of the 
underlying sample. 
Source: Author’s  calculations. 
The figure is based on 41 observations only, since five observations were ex-
cluded as outliers according to the IQR criterion explained in section 3.2.3, p. 
143.
90 The marginal willingness to pay for credit is net of repayment. All obser-
vations are in the plausible positive range, with slightly more mass in the left 
tail. On average, credit-constrained farm households were thus able to yield a 
return of 209 percent per annum on an extra unit of credit, with principal already 
deducted.
91 Given an average nominal annual interest rate on credit of 10 per-
                                           
90  The initial calculation was done for all 46 observations for which Model I was estimated. 
91  Throughout the study, liquidity management within the 12 month period is neglected. This 
is due to the fact that the output measure is only known on an annual basis. Of the 51 loans 
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cent in the sample, the presented estimations already point at substantial evi-
dence for credit rationing. The qualitative separation examined above is hence 
supported and the extent of credit rationing has been quantified. 
The estimates might be compared with the results of a production function 
analysis given in PETRICK (2003) (see the discussion in section 3.3.4, pp. 149 et 
seq.). In that paper I attempt to quantify the shadow interest rate by estimating a 
Cobb-Douglas production function on the same data set as the present research. 
In the production function, I distinguish between credit financed and non-credit 
financed variable inputs. The marginal productivity of credit financed variable 
inputs is taken as an estimator for the shadow interest rate of working capital 
loans. The results are quite similar to those presented in this section. The shadow 
price of the production function analysis has a mean of 184 percent. 92 percent 
of the estimated shadow rates are positive, with the following quantile values: 
68.0 (25%-quartile); 129 (median); 250 (75%-quartile). The number of observa-
tions in the sample was 34. Overall, the result of an internal return on credit in 
excess of nominal market interest rates is hence supported. However, recall 
from section 3.3.4 that the production function only captures direct credit ef-
fects, whereas the output supply equation captures both direct and indirect ef-
fects of credit (for example, via consumption). Somewhat surprisingly, the aver-
age shadow rate calculated on the basis of the production function is a bit 
smaller than the marginal willingness to pay presented earlier in this section. 
Contrary to the expectation in the theoretical model, there seem to be positive 
indirect effects of credit on output at work.  
It appears therefore instructive to have a look at the reported uses of short-term 
credit among the rationed respondents (Table 4-10). The by far most frequent 
use of credit is indeed for input purchases, followed by some investment pur-
poses such as machinery, livestock, or plant purchases. These investment ex-
penses may partially be the reason for the positive indirect effects of credit. An-
other possible explanation could be that consumptional uses hidden in the 
‘household assets’ or ‘other’-items have positive effects on output, for example 
via human capital formation or nutritional improvements (see HEIDHUES 1994). 
                                                                                                                                    
months: one with 3, 5, 6, and 10 months, two with 8, and three with 9 months repayment 
period. For these loans, the real marginal willingness to pay is probably underestimated, so 
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Table 4-10:   Uses of short-term credit (rationed sub-sample) 
 Responses  (%) 
Input purchases  77.6 
Agricultural machinery purchases  6.9 
Livestock or plant purchases  5.2 
Renovation of buildings  1.7 
Purchase of household assets  1.7 
Land purchases  .0 
Automobile purchases  .0 
Tractor purchases  .0 
Purchases of non-agricultural machinery  .0 
Other 6.8 
Notes:  51 loan contracts in the sample. Multiple answers possible 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
In accordance with the empirical strategy outlined in section 3.3.4, I also tested 
the difference between marginal willingness to pay and market interest rates. As 
suggested above, I used the nominal market interest rate corrected for loan-
specific transaction costs for comparison. 180    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
Table 4-11:   Description of transaction costs and interest rates of loans for 
rationed farms 







Transport costs per farm and loan contract (zł) 8.7 .1  111.4  48
Signalling costs per farm and loan contract (zł) 195.2 3.0  1612.0  42
Transaction costs per farm and loan contract (zł) 204.4 3.1  1614.9  42
Transport costs in % of loan volume  .4 <.1  12.9  48
Signalling costs in % of loan volume  2.4 .2  17.0  42
Transaction costs in % of loan volume  2.8 .2  17.1  42
Marginal nominal interest rate of short-term loans (%)  9.8 5.3  24.5  48
Marginal interest rate including transaction costs (%)   12.8 6.6  35.5  42
Notes:  Definitions see text. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
Table 4-11 gives an illustration of the size and composition of the interest rate 
used for the comparison. Transport costs are defined as the sum of direct ex-
penses for travelling plus opportunity costs of time spent for travelling. Both are 
based on the distance between farm and bank from which the loan was received, 
as stated in the interviews. Time spent for travelling and travel costs were then 
calculated according to average numbers given by GUS (2000, p. 328).
92 Signal-
ling costs consist of cash expenses required by the bank in addition to the inter-
est rate (various fees, insurances) plus opportunity costs of time expenses for 
negotiating at the bank as given in the interviews. Both components sum up to 
(total) transaction costs per farm and loan contract. If the number of loans taken 
was more than one, transport and signalling costs were averaged over the given 
loan contracts. Of the 42 valid observations reported for transaction costs per 
farm and loan, 36 farmers took only one short-term loan, 5 took two, and 1 took 
                                           
92  A km of travelling is valued with .12 zł according to the travel fare of slow PKS bus for 
the 41-50 km distance in 1999. Travelling time is calculated with an average speed of 
50 km/hour or .02 hours/km. Opportunity costs of time are valued with 6 zł/hour, which 
consists of 5 zł/hour as the average salary of an agricultural worker as given in the survey 
results plus an (arbitrary) extra premium of 20 percent for management skills of the farm 
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three. The table gives transaction costs and their components in absolute values 
and expressed in percentage of the loan volume. 
As a reference for the marginal nominal interest rate I used the nominal rate re-
ported for the loan. In case that there was more than one loan taken, I used the 
maximum interest rate reported from all loan transactions, assuming that this was 
the marginal one. Adding the transaction costs in percentage of loan volume to 
the marginal nominal interest rate yields the marginal interest rate including 
transaction costs, which is used for the empirical test of credit rationing. 
Before presenting the results of the test, it might be instructive to have a look at 
the composition of the actual interest rates faced by farmers. Table 4-11 shows 
that signalling costs contribute the major part (96 percent) to the total amount of 
transaction costs. These in turn have the size of almost 30 percent of the nominal 
interest rate if expressed in percentage of loan volume. They hence make up a 
substantial proportion of actual interest rates to be taken into account by the 
farmer, why it is inaccurate to ignore them. 
Table 4-12:   Test of equality of willingness to pay and market interest 
rates including transaction costs 
 
1 ˆ b   2 ˆ b   F-test Significance  Valid ob-
servations 
  for the restriction 





Notes:  t-values in parentheses. Null-hypothesis for the F-test: (b1, b2) = (0, 1) in equation 
(3-5), p. 153. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
The results of the test of equality of marginal willingness to pay and market in-
terest rates including transaction costs as explained in section 3.3.4 are shown in 
Table 4-12. The F-test strongly rejects the null-hypothesis of equal marginal 
willingness to pay and effective interest rates. For the given sample of farm 
households, the marginal willingness to pay is thus significantly different from 
interest rates. The constant term is positive, large, and highly significant. This 
allows two conlusions. First, the earlier result that the marginal willingness to 
pay by far exceeds market interest rates is supported by a statistical test. Second, 
since measurable transaction costs have been taken into account, it becomes 
clear that these costs do not necessitate to withdraw loan applications, at least 
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were observed in the range between nominal and nominal cum transaction cost 
interest rates. High transaction costs are therefore not the reason that farmers 
cannot obtain credit. 
I now turn to the significance of the household characteristics. Table 4-8 shows 
that the effect of the number of adult females in the household is significant at 
the five percent level. The positive sign indicates that one more adult female 
household member increases the volume of output by about 11 thousand zł. In 
contrast to that, an effect of the number of adult males could not be borne out 
empirically. It cannot be read off from the reduced-form model through which 
pathways demographic characteristics have an impact on output supply. The 
positive sign of the effect suggests that more women tend to decrease the liquid-
ity demand and hence increase the volume of output supplied, which is in con-
trast to the effect in the Probit equation (section 4.1.2). Alternatively, consump-
tion expenditures of female household members might positively affect produc-
tion in other ways, for example, if used for human capital improvement. In any 
case, although not fully conclusive, the significance of this demographic vari-
able is additional evidence for a market imperfection that breaks separability of 
production and consumption decisions. 
Finally, I also estimated the so-called counterfactual model, the results of which 
are given in the right columns of Table 4-8. The model is estimated on the entire 
sample of short-term loan recipients (both rationed and non-rationed), which is 
counterfactual for two reasons (see section 3.3.4): (a) significant effects of credit 
and demographic variables on output are theoretically consistently only to be 
expected for the rationed subsample, and (b) credit demand is an endogenous 
choice of the non-rationed farm households, which undermines the consistent 
one-stage estimation of the output supply equation. The problem is the mixture 
of observations for which credit demand is endogenously or exogenously deter-
mined. The estimates of Model II must therefore interpreted with caution. How-
ever, the major virtue of the counterfactual model is the ability to illustrate the 
gap in the willingness to pay between rationed and non-rationed farm house-
holds. This virtue can be captured in full by introducing an additional variable 
‘credit volume short-term’ times the credit rationing dummy, as shown in Table 
4-8. For non-rationed farms it takes the value zero. If the willingness to pay for 
rationed farms is in fact higher than for non-rationed farms, the variable must 
have a positive sign. Two further specification issues are relevant for this model: 
first, the three constrained non-borrowers in the sample are neglected, because 
for them the credit volume is zero and hence the ‘credit times credit-rationing-
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borrowers are regarded introduces a different selection mechanism. This was 
taken into account by estimating the probability of being a borrower by an addi-
tional Probit equation, which produced the Inverse Mills Ratios for the counter-
factual Model II.
93  
Indeed, the coefficient of the ‘credit times credit-rationing-dummy’-variable has 
the expected positive sign and is statistically significantly different from zero. 
The magnitude of the coefficient reveals that being a credit-rationed borrower 
increases the willingness to pay for credit by 168 percentage points as compared 
to an otherwise identical non-rationed borrower. The average willingness to pay 
for credit at sample means for both subgroups is 184.2 percent for constrained 
borrowers and only 31.3 percent for unconstrained borrowers. The willingness 
to pay of rationed farms is hence about six times as high as for the non-rationed 
sub-sample. Furthermore, the t-value of the ‘adult females’ variable is much 
lower than in Model I, so that the evidence in favour of a market imperfection 
diminishes. The results of the counterfactual model are thus quite in line with 
theoretical expectations, therefore providing additional support for the overall 
approach.
94 The results of the counterfactual model are taken up again in section 
5.2.1, pp. 199 et seq. 
4.2.3 Summary 
The econometric analysis of this subchapter consistently supports the earlier 
finding that more than 40 percent of borrowers experienced pronounced credit 
                                           
93  The Probit equation contained the following explanatory variables: total land owned, land 
rented from private persons, capital stock of farm net of land, adult males in household, 
adult females in household, farm has permanent book-keeping (dummy), farmer partici-
pated in additional training courses (dummy), farmer is member of co-operative bank 
(dummy), and farm experienced harvest failure (dummy). The null of γ=0 for this model 
could be rejected at any conventional significance levels. The borrowing decision is ana-
lysed in more depth by PETRICK and LATRUFFE (2003). 
94  Another ‘counterfactual’ regression (suggested by Feder et al., 1990) would be to estimate 
model I on the non-rationed sub-sample of respondents. The results of such a regression 
supported the expectation that neither credit nor household characteristics have a signifi-
cant influence on output. Two problems with this regression are that (a) credit is an en-
dogenous choice for this subgroup and hence not a consistent explanatory variable in the 
reduced-form output supply equation, and (b) it is not clear whether the non-significance 
of the credit variable is indeed reflecting actual farmers’ behaviour or is only due to the 
fact that there are many non-borrowers in the subsample (see Table 4-2). For all the non-
borrowers credit takes the value of zero, which makes an estimation of its effect difficult. 
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rationing by rural banks. For so rationed farms, credit plays a highly significant 
role in determining output. These farms display a marginal willingness to pay 
for credit of on average 209 percent net of principal. The willingness to pay in-
creases with increasing capital intensity with regard to land. It it significantly 
different from individual interest rates for credit that account for loan specific 
transaction costs, which are 13 percent per annum on average. Measurable trans-
action costs were shown to be in the range of 30 percent of nominal interest rates 
faced by farmers, with additional fees forming the major part of these transac-
tion costs. These costs, however, do not necessitate a withdrawal of loan appli-
cations and therefore cannot explain credit rationing of farmers. 
In the group of credit-rationed farms, household characteristics have a signifi-
cant effect on output supply. This is evidence for a violation of separability be-
tween production and consumption decisions and thus lends empirical support to 
the existence of a market imperfection. 
The results were backed by a comparison with an alternative estimation based 
on a production function approach. Furthermore, a counterfactual model esti-
mated on all short-term credit recipients demonstrated that the willingness to pay 
is substantially higher on rationed than on non-rationed farm households. 
4.3 Investment  model 
The investment model is used to investigate the effect of credit rationing on the 
investment behaviour of Polish farm households, as described in section 3.3.5, 
pp. 157 et seq. Of particular interest is the relationship between governmentally 
promoted credit access and actual amounts spent for productive investment pur-
poses. 
Section 4.3.1 gives an overview of the investment outcomes based on the survey 
data. Section 4.3.2 presents the estimation results, whereas the marginal effect of 
credit on investment is analysed in more detail in section 4.3.3. Section 4.3.4 
summarises the findings of this subchapter.  
4.3.1 Overview of investment activities 
As a background for the later interpretation of the results it seems useful to give 
an overview of the reported investment activities of farmers. Farmers were asked 
to indicate which relative share the various investment activities take in their 
total investment volume. In Table 4-13, I present the mean shares of various in-
vestment purposes in the total investment portfolio of each farm. The average 
investment volume per farm has a mean of 39.1 ths. zł and a standard deviation     4.3 Investment model  185   
of 47.8. The analysis in this section is restricted to repondents who reported 
positive investment in the period 1997-1999. 
Table 4-13:   Mean shares of various investment activities of credit-
rationed farm households (in descending order) 
Investment purpose  Mean 
share 
(%) 
Investment purpose  Mean 
share 
(%) 
1. Renovate or extend residential 
building 
20.27 12. Link farm to/ modernise the 
sewage network 
0.98
2. Buy automobile  14.48 13. Improve roads and/ or farmyard 
(P) 
0.98
3. Renovate or extend farm build-
ings (P) 
13.04 14. Buy machinery/equipment for 
non-agricultural use (P) 
0.97
4. Buy agricultural machinery (P)  13.01 15. Buy personal computer system 
(PC) (P) 
0.96
5. Buy tractor (P)  10.54 16. Buy mobile phone  0.8
6. Buy land (P)  5.87 17. Link farm to/ modernise the gas 
network 
0.65
7. Buy animals (P)  5.42 18. Establish/ renovate guestrooms 
for agrotourism (P) 
0.52
8. Link farm to/ modernise the 
drinking water network 
2.74 19. Link farm to/ modernise the 
electricity network (P) 
0.33
9. Link farm to/ modernise the tele-
phone network (P) 
2.53 20. Buy plants (P)  0.22
10. Modernise the heating system  2.42 Other (P)  3.26
Notes:  N = 144. Based on respondents with positive investment in 1997-1999. (P) marks 
items classfied as productive investment. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
In Table 4-13, I marked with (P) those investment activities which can be rea-
sonably classified as productive investment, that is items that are primiarily re-
garded as enhancing the productive capacity of a farm. The table shows that the 
major investment activities were related to the extension of residential buildings 
and to automobile purchases, items that arguably do not fall under this category. 186    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
Only on the third to sixth positions follow investments in productive assets, in 
particular buildings, machinery, land, and livestock. I conclude that investment 
priorities of Polish farm households are such that growth in agriculture is ranked 
lower than what could be labelled ‘durable consumption goods’. Investment in 
business activities not directly related to agriculture rank even lower, such as 
machinery/equipment for non-agricultural uses or establishment of guestrooms 
for agrotourism. Including not credit-rationed respondents into the analysis 
grossly does not change the picture, as PETRICK et al. (2002, p. 211) show. The 
latter paper also demonstrates that productive investment is concentrated in the 
northern regions and in the group of more profitable farms. 
Table 4-14:   Uses of long-term credit (rationed sub-sample) 
 Responses  (%) 
Agricultural machinery purchases  19.5 
Renovation of buildings  19.5 
Input purchases  14.8 
Tractor purchases  14.8 
Land purchases  9.4 
Automobile purchases  7.4 
Livestock or plant purchases  4.7 
Purchases of non-agricultural machinery  2.0 
Purchase of household assets  1.3 
Other 6.7 
Notes:  93 loan contracts in the sample. Multiple answers possible 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Poland farm survey 2000. 
The reported use of long-term credit by rationed farm households (Table 4-14) 
supports the previous analysis. The renovation of buildings is equally important 
as the purchase of agricultural machinery. Also automobile purchases rank rela-
tively high. 
A major aim of the subsequent econometric analysis is to find out how produc-
tive investment of Polish farm households is related to governmentally promoted 
credit access. The investment variable used in the estimations is the farm indi-
vidual aggregate of all investment items marked as ‘productive’ in Table 4-13.     4.3 Investment model  187   
4.3.2 Results of the estimation 
The pool of credit-rationed respondents as described in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3, 
pp. 163 et seq., is used for the estimation of the investment equation. Note how-
ever that only 79.5 percent of these respondents reported positive investment, 
and only 44.1 percent took long-term loans. The characteristics of the subsample 
are illustrated by a number of descriptive statistics in Table 4-15, net of drop 
outs due to data cleaning and missing values. I display values separately for all 
constrained respondents and for constrained non-zero investors. 
Table 4-15:   Description of variables used in the investment model (ra-
tioned subsample) 





All rationed respondents     
Investment volume 1997-1999 (ths. zł) 24.8 42.4 .0  322.5  156
Credit volume 1997-1999 (ths. zł) 20.6 43.2 .0  400.0  156
Land owned beginning of 1997 (ths. zł) 65.7 97.3 .0  600.0  156
Farm has permanent book-keeping 
(dummy) 
.4 .5 .0 1.0  156
Farm is located in northern region 
(dummy) 
.3 .5 .0 1.0  156
Respondents with positive investment     
Investment volume 1997-1999 (ths. zł) 31.2 45.5 .0  322.5  124
Credit volume 1997-1999 (ths. zł) 24.8 47.4 .0  400.0  124
Land owned beginning of 1997 (ths. zł) 60.2 88.4 .0  520.0  124
Farm has permanent book-keeping 
(dummy) 
.5 .5 .0 1.0  124
Farm is located in northern region 
(dummy) 
.3 .5 .0 1.0  124
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 4-16. I report the results for 
three specifications. Mainly for purposes of exploration and comparison, I esti-188    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
mated a linear investment equation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (I). This 
equation is also used for testing selectivity, it is therefore estimated in a two-
stage procedure together with the general Probit equation presented in section 
4.1.3, pp. 168 et seq., as explained in section 3.3.5, pp. 157 et seq. The second 
specification is a conventional Tobit model (II), to account for the censoring of 
the investment variable. Marginal effects at sample means are reported in a sepa-
rate column of Table 4-16. The third specification is the cubic Tobit model (III), 
which includes the credit variable in quadratic and cubic form. For this model, 
marginal effects are analysed separately below.     4.3 Investment model  189   
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16.070   23.387
(3.813)
Inverse Mills Ratio  1.521
(.162)
––    –
Log-Likelihood -714.319 -610.996    -608.950
Adjusted R²  .666 –    –
N 156 156    156
Notes:  t-values in parentheses. t-values of the linear model corrected for selectivity. 
Marginal effects calculated at sample means of selected observations. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
A number of important conclusions can already be derived from the linear 
model. First, in contrast to received neoclassical thinking, the financial variable 
does have an effect on investment outcomes. Credit access is of overwhelming 
importance in the linear model (as measured by the t-value). This is consistent 190    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
with the self-classification of borrowers as being credit-rationed. Furthermore, it 
supports the theoretical predictions of the financial constraints model of invest-
ment behaviour as presented in section 2.3.2, pp. 91 et seq.  
The coefficients of all other regressors have the expected signs and are signifi-
cant, at least at the ten-percent level. The coefficient of the land variable is sig-
nificant at five percent, indicating that farms with fewer assets at the outset in-
vest more. The coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio which tests the impact of 
selectivity fails to be significant, it can hence be assumed that there is no selec-
tivity bias in the equation. For this reason I ignore selectivity in all other estima-
tions.  
A further conclusion concerns the marginal effect of credit on investment in the 
linear model. The effect is smaller than one, which already points at an under-
utilisation of credit for productive investment purposes. This is quite in accor-
dance with the farmers’ reported use of credit funds for what I called durable 
consumption goods in section 4.3.1. As a side information, only for 50 percent 
of borrowers does the amount of productive investment exceed the credit vol-
ume. However, the linear model imposes that this effect is constant over the en-
tire range of observations, as noted earlier. The coefficients of the two dummy 
variables are significant and have the expected sign. The implication is that 
farms with permanent bookkeeping and farms in the northern region systemati-
cally invest more. 
The two other specifications are primarily used to further examine the marginal 
credit effect. Since they introduce additional flexibility into the specification, 
they should trace this effect more accurately. As can be seen from the values of 
the Log-Likelihood function, the fit of Models II and III continuously improves 
as compared with the linear model. 
4.3.3 The marginal effect of credit expansion 
The marginal effect given in Table 4-16 for the standard Tobit model is the par-
tial derivative of expected investment with respect to credit, evaluated at sample 
means. This marginal effect is smaller than one, even lower than in the linear 
model. Since I am primarily interested in the slope of the uncensored part of the 
investment function, the coefficients of the standard Tobit model represent the 
correct marginal effects. They also indicate a slope smaller than one. The gen-
eral result of a diversion of the marginal credit funds from investment is hence 
supported.     4.3 Investment model  191   
The cubic Tobit model achieves the best fit of the data in terms of the Log-
Likelihood, although the improvement as compared to the standard Tobit is 
small. It might be taken as the most flexible and therefore also the most accurate 
depiction of the true relationship.
95 However, as compared to the two other mod-
els, flexibility increases at the cost of less precisely estimated coefficients of re-
gressors, as shown by their t-values. To check the precision of the marginal ef-
fect, I calculated the latter together with its standard error at sample means of 
non-zero investors, based on the coefficients of the cubic Tobit model given in 
Table 4-16. The procedure is similar to the one for calculating t-values for mar-
ginal effects in section 4.2.1, pp. 172 et seq. This resulted in a marginal effect of 
.559 with a t-value of 4.502, which is significantly different from zero at the one 
percent level. Therefore using the coefficients of the cubic Tobit model, I com-
puted marginal effects individually for all investors in the sample (Figure 4-2).  
Figure 4-2:   Distribution of marginal credit ef-
fects 
Marginal effect of credit on investment































Notes:  Mean = .526; Std. Dev. = .144; N = 124. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on cubic Tobit model. 
The shown histogram offers two interesting insights: first, almost all observa-
tions fall below the threshold of one (98.4 percent, to be precise). Second, the 
                                           
95  A possible objection to the Tobit results concerns the presence of heteroskedasticity (see 
section 3.2.2). In order to address this problem, I estimated the cubic investment equation 
for investors only, by using OLS. The resulting coefficients support the results of the pre-
sented Tobit model. 192    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
mean of these individual marginal effects is substantially below the (constant) 
marginal effects obtained from the coefficients of Models I and II. 
A further analysis of the relationship between credit and investment based on the 
cubic Tobit coefficients was done at sample means of all other variables (based 
on all rationed respondents), see Figure 4-3.  
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Notes:  Calculated at sample means of all other variables. 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on cubic Tobit model. 
The figure reveals that, over the range of smaller credit volumes, the marginal 
effect slightly increases with increasing credit volume. The function is hence 
convex, i.e. the second derivative is positive. Only at a credit volume of 200 ths. 
zł, there is an inflection point, indicating a decreasing marginal effect for larger 
credit volumes. In the range between 150 and 275 ths. zł credit volume, the 
slope is almost stable at about one or even slightly higher. In terms of additional 
mobilisation of funds, this could thus be called an optimal credit volume range. 
However, only 1.6 percent of actual observations fall in this range. Almost 95 
percent of the observed credit volumes are below 100 ths. zł and hence in a 
range of the function where its slope is clearly smaller than one. This might be 
taken as evidence for a band-wagon effect, i.e. small loan amounts are taken on     4.3 Investment model  193   
favourable terms to finance consumption activities, whereas there is no actual 
investment project available.
96
If the land variable is taken to measure farm size, the following relationships can 
be traced empirically. There is a significant positive correlation of .22 between 
farm size and investment volume, i.e. large farms seem to invest more. The cor-
relation between credit volume and land owned is .30. Accordingly, particularly 
if non-borrowers are neglected, high farm-individual marginal credit effects are 
found in the group of relatively larger farms. However, net of the credit effect, 
large farms invest less, as can be seen from the regression results. The implica-
tion is that, out of a group of farms with equal credit volume, smaller farms de-
vote a higher amount of money to investment. There are hence two opposing 
effects with regard to investment: larger credit volumes imply more, but larger 
farm sizes as such (i.e. controlling for credit volume) imply less investment. 
Overall, it is therefore incorrect to say that large farms invest more, but if they 
use credit for investment, they obtain larger credit volumes and hence divert less 
to non-productive activities. 
4.3.4 Summary 
An ex-post evaluation of investment activities suggested that non-productive 
investment ranked high on the priority list of interviewed farmers. Residential 
buildings and automobile purchases were the two items with the largest share of 
farm-individual investment expenses in the reporting period, whereas machinery 
and land purchases followed on lower positions. 
The econometric investment analysis led to two major results. First, credit ac-
cess proved to be a significant factor of investment decisions of credit-rationed 
farmers. This supports the theoretical prediction of the financial constraint 
model of investment behaviour and is consistent with the qualitative self-
classification of respondents. Second, the analysis provides evidence that subsi-
dised credit funds are partly diverted to non-productive purposes. In various 
specifications of the credit-investment relationship, the marginal effect of credit 
on productive investment was clearly smaller than one. Based on a cubic Tobit 
estimate of the investment function, the mean of the farm-individual marginal 
effects was at .53 on average. Other, less flexible models presented as well prin-
                                           
96  The survey data does not allow assessment of the return on investments carried out by 
farmers. Since complete defaults are of minor relevance in Poland irrespective of credit 
use, it must be assumed that many investment loans used for consumptive purposes are re-
paid out of current household income rather than direct investment returns. 194    4 Empirical results on credit rationing of Polish farm households 
cipally support this result. Every second borrower invests less in productive as-
sets than he borrows. Only 1.6 percent of the selected respondents with positive 
investment displayed farm-individual credit effects larger than one. Over the 
observed range of credit volumes, the marginal effect increases with an increas-
ing credit volume. However, the results provide evidence against the view that 
investment is positively related to farm size.      5.1 Overview of major findings of the study  195   
5 DISCUSSION 
The final chapter aims at synthesising and discussing the findings of this study. 
In subchapter 5.1, I summarise the results of the theoretical and empirical analy-
sis. Subchapter 5.2 attempts to place the findings in the wider context of eco-
nomic research. In subchapter 5.3, I present and discuss the policy recommenda-
tions that follow from the study. Subchapter 5.4 concludes with a number of 
suggestions for further research. 
5.1  Overview of major findings of the study 
The following provides a concise summary of the major findings of the previous 
theoretical and empirical analysis: 
1.  The theoretical investigation of credit markets sets out that credit rationing 
as a persistent private excess demand for loans is by definition excluded in 
the traditional neoclassical market model (sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, pp. 24 et 
seq.). The introduction of positive transaction costs is a first step to a more 
realistic depiction of credit market outcomes (section 2.1.4, pp. 32 et seq.). 
However, the claim that empirically observable transaction costs could be 
regarded as a source or measure of credit rationing is shown to be unwar-
ranted. Only models that explicitly account for asymmetric information be-
tween market participants can establish a situation of persistent credit ration-
ing (section 2.1.5, pp. 38 et seq.). 
2.  The further analysis suggests that credit rationing is a likely outcome on 
markets with asymmetric information (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, pp. 50 et 
seq.). However, theory does not provide unambiguous propositions regard-
ing the welfare implications of credit rationing (section 2.2.3, pp. 63 et seq.). 
Since the presence of asymmetric information cancels the functioning of the 
price mechanism, the traditional concepts of social efficiency are no longer 
valid. As a consequence, credit rationing does not necessarily imply under-
investment, and it generally does not create a case for straightforward gov-
ernment policy. It seems therefore reasonable to analytically decouple the 
analysis of credit rationing as a privately perceived excess demand and un-
derinvestment as a socially undesirable situation. The subsequent analysis in 
this monograph focused on the former of these two issues. 
3.  The extent to which asymmetric information has harmful effects on invest-
ment outcomes depends on the availability of counteracting instruments or 
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(section 2.2.2, pp. 55 et seq.). The way in which governments can improve 
on these instruments and arrangements will play a vital role for successful 
policy action. Any intervention measures should consider the conditions and 
causes that are responsible for an undesirable market outcome, in case that 
this has been successfully identified. 
4.  In the framework of a two-period farm household model, the consequences 
of introducing a binding credit constraint are examined (section 2.3.1, pp. 77 
et seq.). The market interest rate loses its relevance for household internal 
allocation of funds and is replaced by an endogenous, unobservable shadow 
interest rate. Compared with a first-best world without credit rationing, the 
household will reduce output, which implies a loss of income. An increase 
in government transfers relaxes the liquidity constraint and thus has positive 
effects on farm output. 
5.  In a multi-period household model with endogenous equity formation, credit 
rationing results in a positive shadow price of equity, since equity (for ex-
ample as collateral) has a value for financing production in the future (sec-
tion 2.3.2, pp. 91 et seq.). Investment cannot immediately attain its optimal 
level due to credit rationing. The household thus reduces current consump-
tion in favour of equity formation, which would be superfluous in the pres-
ence of a perfect capital market. Since the ultimate goal of the household is 
current and future consumption, possible liquidity effects on production as a 
result of increased public transfers are only of a short-term nature. Addi-
tional funds are likely to be consumed in the long run. Similarly, improve-
ments in access to credit have conflicting short- and long-term effects on in-
vestment. 
6.  The presence of a perfect capital market allows the convenient separation of 
production or investment decisions on the one hand and consumption deci-
sions on the other. Both farm household models suggest that this cannot be 
maintained under a binding credit constraint, which has two important con-
sequences. First, there is no objective criterion anymore which allows to as-
sess the (private) efficiency of input use or investment activities. Both deci-
sion complexes can only be made simultaneously with the household’s con-
sumption plan and are thus affected by the household’s preferences. Second, 
any empirical production or investment analysis has to take these interde-
pendencies into account. Household preferences have to be made amenable 
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7.  The third chapter starts with a reflection on the methodological foundations 
of empirical economic analysis (section 3.1.2, pp. 103 et seq.). It is argued 
that econometrics cannot be the fundamental benchmark for the falsification 
of theories, in particular because there are no universal laws in economics 
and there are huge opportunities for data mining in the research process. 
Furthermore, there are no absolute standards for the statistical rejection of 
hypotheses. The methodological standpoint of critical rationalism should 
therefore be left behind and be replaced by a more pragmatic and instrumen-
talist position. 
8.  A survey of possible methodological approaches to the empirical analysis of 
credit rationing revealed that there are a number of techniques available in 
the literature (section 3.1.3, pp. 114 et seq.). The empirical results of the pre-
sent study are primarily based on a regression analysis of cross-sectional 
survey data, which combines qualitative and quantitative indicators of credit 
rationing. The empirical strategy is discussed extensively in subchapter 3.3, 
pp. 144 et seq. 
9.  According to statements of farmers made during the survey, 80 percent of 
farm households took at least one loan in the reporting period 1997-1999. 
Almost half of the borrowers obtained less credit than desired and are hence 
regarded as credit-rationed. Completely rejected applicants and discouraged 
non-applicants are of minor importance in the sample (section 4.1.1, pp. 163 
et seq.).  
10. Central determinants of credit rationing as revealed by a Probit regression 
analysis are the reputation of the loan applicant as well as demographic 
household characteristics (section 4.1.3, pp. 168 et seq.). Over all loan types, 
respondents with a good credit history have a 30 percentage points lower 
probability of being rationed than borrowers who rescheduled a loan in the 
past. In addition, more adult males in the household decrease the probability 
of being credit-rationed, while more females increase it. This is assumed to 
be an effect of higher liquidity demand for consumption purposes by women 
or a signalling effect due to the higher share of male labour force. If only 
short-term borrowing is considered, collateral availability is an additional 
key factor of credit rationing, since more land owned and less land rented 
decrease the likelihood of becoming rationed (section 4.1.2, pp. 164 et seq.). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence against the view that a depletion of 
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11. The econometric analysis of output supply supports the earlier finding that 
more than 40 percent of borrowers experienced pronounced credit rationing 
by rural banks. For so rationed farms, credit plays a highly significant role in 
determining output (section 4.2.1, pp. 172 et seq.). These farms display a 
marginal willingness to pay for credit of on average 209 percent net of prin-
cipal. The willingness to pay increases with increasing capital intensity with 
regard to land. It is significantly different from individual interest rates for 
credit that account for loan specific transaction costs, which are 13 percent 
per annum on average (section 4.2.2, pp. 176 et seq.). Measurable transac-
tion costs were shown to be in the range of 30 percent of nominal interest 
rates faced by farmers, with additional fees forming the major part of these 
transaction costs. These costs, however, do not ex-post rationalise a with-
drawal of loan applications and therefore do not constrain borrowers. In the 
group of credit-rationed farms, household characteristics have a significant 
effect on output supply. This is evidence for a violation of separability be-
tween production and consumption decisions and thus lends empirical sup-
port to the existence of a market imperfection. A counterfactual model esti-
mated on all short-term credit recipients demonstrates that the marginal will-
ingness to pay for credit is substantially higher for rationed than for non-
rationed farm households. 
12. An ex-post evaluation of investment activities suggests that non-productive 
investment ranks high on the priority list of interviewed farmers. Residential 
buildings and automobile purchases are the two items with the largest share 
of farm-individual investment expenses in the reporting period, whereas ma-
chinery and land purchases followed on lower positions (section 4.3.1, pp. 
184 et seq.).  
13. The econometric investment analysis leads to two major results. First, credit 
access turns out to be a significant factor of investment decisions of credit-
rationed farmers (section 4.3.2, pp. 187 et seq.). This supports the theoretical 
prediction of a financial constraint model of investment behaviour and is 
consistent with the qualitative self-classification of respondents. Second, the 
analysis provides evidence that subsidised credit funds are partly diverted to 
non-productive purposes. In various specifications of the credit-investment 
relationship, the marginal effect of credit on productive investment is clearly 
smaller than one (section 4.3.3, pp. 190 et seq.). Based on a cubic Tobit es-
timate of the investment function, the mean of the farm-individual marginal 
effects is at .53 on average. Other, less flexible models presented as well 
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tive assets than he borrows. Only 1.6 percent of the selected respondents 
with positive investment display farm-individual credit effects larger than 
one. Over the observed range of credit volumes, the marginal effect in-
creases with an increasing credit volume. However, net of the investment ef-
fect of the credit volume, small farms invest more. 
In summary, the analysis provides evidence that credit rationing is a relevant 
phenomenon in rural Poland. A significant fraction of borrowers could substan-
tially increase their productivity if access to working capital were improved. 
However, the examination of long-term loans revealed that farmers often prefer 
the investment in non-productive assets to growth investment. Credit rationing 
hence is unlikely to be the ultimate constraint for modernisation and structural 
change in the Polish farm sector. Government intervention in its current form 
has clearly failed to eliminate credit rationing, and the targeting of state spon-
sored funds turns out to be rather dubious. An alternative government policy 
should aim to improve the general creditworthiness of prospective borrowers 
and address the causes of loan default in the past that led to a poor reputation of 
certain borrowers. 
5.2  Integration with existing research and theory  
In this subchapter I wish to discuss the implications of the previous results for 
the current scientific debate. In the first section, I comment on the relation to 
other studies on the same topic and to research that used a similar methodology 
in a different country. The second section aims at investigating the repercussions 
on economic theory formation. 
5.2.1 Relation to existing empirical research 
The results of the previous analysis confirm the earlier conjecture in WORLD 
BANK (2001) that credit rationing is a relevant problem in rural Poland. Interest-
ingly, both studies arrive at an almost identical result regarding the frequency of 
subjectively experienced credit rationing. As noted in section 1.4.3, p. 18, the 
World Bank study found that about one half of borrowers said they wanted a 
larger loan on the same terms (WORLD BANK 2001, p. 66). The result in the pre-
sent study was that 47.6 percent of borrowers self-classified as being credit-
rationed (section 4.1.1, p. 164). I re-examined the Wold Bank finding that in-
vestment is determined by current income and investigated it in a methodologi-
cally more robust way. Instead of current income, which arguably is subject to 
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vestment volume. This turned out to be highly significant, which is interpreted 
as evidence in favour of a financial constraint (section 4.3.2, pp. 187 et seq.). 
The empirical investment analysis in this monograph also substantiates the sug-
gestions of POGANIETZ and WILDERMUTH (1999) and JÓZWIAK (2001) concern-
ing the diversion of credit funds to non-productive purposes. As presented in 
section 4.3.1, p. 185, renovation of residential buildings and automobile pur-
chases rank highest among farmers’ investment expenses. However, the extent 
of diversion diminishes with increasing loan size. 
In its empirical approach towards a detection of credit rationing, the current 
study joins the research cited in section 3.1.3, pp. 114 et seq. With regard to the 
output supply analysis, it may be recalled from the overview in the above sec-
tion that results by other authors were highly country-specific. For example, the 
estimated shadow interest rates varied in a range from negative values to plus 
300 percent. The average willingness to pay estimated in the current study was 
209 percent, thus also relatively high. A possible objection to the results is that a 
high willingness to pay may have other causes than credit rationing. Two alter-
native explanations could be that a high internal value of credit is due to (a) re-
stricted access not to credit but to inputs which are financed by credit or (b) risk 
averse production behaviour of the farmer, which can also be interpreted as a 
result of missing markets for insurance. In general, as compared with a risk neu-
tral farmer, the marginal expected product of input use is reduced by a risk 
averse decision maker, so that the ex-post observed marginal productivity of in-
put use exceeds marginal factor costs (HARDAKER et al. 1997, pp. 127-133). 
Whether risk aversion leads to non-separability of production and consumption 
depends on the specification of the risk (FABELLA 1989). 
Of course, it cannot be totally ruled out that restrictions in access to inputs play a 
role in the Polish farm sector. Furthermore, it is quite plausible that Polish farm-
ers cannot insure all risks and therefore exhibit some degree of risk aversion 
(also suggested by WORLD BANK 2001, pp. 65-66). It is possible that both fac-
tors act through the credit variable in the output supply regression and thus rein-
force the estimated effect of credit rationing. However, they are likely to affect 
rationed and non-rationed borrowers in an equal way. A possibility to isolate the 
credit rationing effect is by analysing the results of the counterfactual model in 
Table 4-8, p. 173 (see also the discussion at the end of section 4.2.2, pp. 176 et 
seq.). Although to be treated with caution due to potential simultaneity bias, the 
estimates of the counterfactual model essentially show that the marginal will-
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characteristics are less significant for output supply if non-rationed borrowers 
are included into the sample. Notice that the credit rationing dummy allows a 
very precise identification of the group of borrowers for which an increased 
willingness to pay and local non-separability due to credit rationing can consis-
tently be expected. The obvious difference in willingness to pay between ra-
tioned and non-rationed can therefore directly be attributed to credit rationing 
itself. However, the willingness to pay for non-rationed borrowers still slightly 
exceeds the average market interest rate. The willingness to pay estimated for 
non-rationed borrowers may therefore be taken to reflect the effects of other in-
put constraints and of risk aversion, net of the credit rationing effect, which is 
given by the gap between both subgroups. 
Given this evidence, one may suspect that farmers have a large incentive to di-
vert investment loans to use them for working capital. However, borrowers of 
long-term loans and borrowers of short-term loans are two almost completely 
separate groups. Among the 168 partially credit-rationed survey respondents 
(Table 4-1, p. 164), only four borrowed short-term loans and in the same time 
period a long-term loan. Only one of these reported that he used some part of the 
investment loan for purchasing inputs. 
The results of the empirical investment analysis as portrayed in subchapter 4.3 
show that credit rationing with regard to long-term borrowing does exist also in 
the Polish farm sector. This finding is hence consistent with several studies from 
other countries, as summarised in section 3.1.3, Approach 6, pp. 129 et seq. I go 
on to discuss the implications for theory formation in the following section. 
5.2.2 Implications for current theory 
The empirical approaches to the analysis of credit rationing as pursued in this 
study uniformly substantiate the view that credit rationing is an important phe-
nomenon of reality. The aim of this section is to explore some of the potential 
consequences of this finding for the future development of economic theory. I 
want to proceed in such a way that I comment the previous finding from the 
viewpoint of each of the three theoretical positions presented in section 2.1.3, 
pp. 30 et seq., in turn. 
The empirical detection of credit rationing certainly stands in marked contrast to 
the assumptions of the perfect market model as presented in section 2.1.2, pp. 24 
et seq. A first question I want to raise is whether this finding provides an empiri-
cal refutation of the neoclassical market model. It was shown in section 3.1.2, 
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nomic theories is principally possible and desirable, neoclassical equilibrium 
theory is not very amenable to such an attempt. If reality is not in accordance 
with the assumptions of the model,  the model does not claim validity and can 
hence also not be refuted empirically (SCHNEIDER 1992, p. 537). A model that 
does not yield explanations of certain relevant phenomena in reality may how-
ever still serve a role in the scientific debate. First, there still may be situations 
in which the model is applicable (STIGLITZ 2002, p. 488, mentions the markets 
for wheat or corn). Second, certain aspects of the model, such as its formal con-
sistency or plausibility, or the simple fact that it is well known and thus provides 
a common point of reference, can make it useful in communication processes. 
The ultimate purpose of the theory is thus a rhetorical one (in the sense of sec-
tion 3.1.2). 
Of course, it is usually regarded as desirable to have theories that are capable of 
explaining the empirical phenomena one is interested in, and these theories are 
also likely to be more plausible. One approach also followed in this monograph 
is to introduce appropriate modifications of the standard neoclassical model 
which allow certain real world events to occur in the model – for example credit 
rationing. STIGLITZ (2002) regards this as a change in the paradigm of econom-
ics. Although only single assumptions of the perfect market model are changed, 
fundamental consequences result (as demonstrated to some extent in subchapter 
2.2, pp. 49 et seq.). In particular, the economic world analytically becomes much 
more complicated because many convenient separation theorems break down. 
Among these are the separability of consumption and production or investment 
decisions, the analytical independence of supply and demand, or the separation 
of efficiency and equity in welfare theory. As a consequence of asymmetric in-
formation on markets, the optimal production plan cannot be made without 
knowledge of the households’ consumption preferences, a change in the demand 
structure for some good has direct consequences for supply, and efficient re-
source allocation may very well depend on the initial wealth of the producers.  
With regard to the study of loan markets, two broad groups of insights could be 
gained from an agency theoretic analysis as pursued in chapter 2. First, there is 
no ambiguity that several properties of the standard neoclassical model do not 
hold on credit markets with asymmetric information or are restricted to a very 
specific range of applicability. This has profound consequences for the choice of 
an appropriate analytical approach to real-world events. Second, agency theory 
is able to identify important mechanisms to overcome the problems of asymmet-
ric information and to include these mechanisms into the theoretical model. The 
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propositions. The presence of credit rationing could be detected empirically by a 
number of complementary methods. It was demonstrated that privately undesir-
able market outcomes can be avoided by pledging collateral and establishing a 
good reputation as a borrower. Furthermore, the non-separability of consump-
tion and production decisions could be empirically verified. The traditional neo-
classical model can therefore be regarded as a definitely inappropriate descrip-
tion of the Polish rural credit market, whereas agency theory seems to take many 
crucial characteristics of this market correctly into account. 
On the other hand, there are a number of traits of agency theory that make its 
application and handling difficult and thus invited legitimate criticism. One line 
of criticism partly comes from the proponents of this theory themselves and 
concerns the lack of predictive power of the models, which is due to their sensi-
tivity with regard to the specific set of assumptions made. The precise way in 
which markets react under asymmetric information is often not easy to foresee. 
It is set out that the exact pathways in which counteracting mechanisms work 
could be painstakingly modelled and hence exactly be traced. However, since 
the theoretical analysis is carried out on a very high level of abstraction that only 
allows for punctually relaxing the assumptions of the standard model, predic-
tions for real-world events are hard to make. The following quote from HELLWIG 
(1987, p. 325) may illustrate this: 
“For the applied economist who studies, e.g., the regulation of credit or insur-
ance markets, the discrepancy between the predictions of the different game-
theoretic models presents a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, it is impor-
tant that he determine which of the different models is appropriate for the market 
at hand. On the other hand, this may be impossible to determine because matters 
like the order in which people make moves, which make all the difference for 
the game-theoretic specification, may not be observable and may not even be 
fixed in a given market.” 
The same argument equally applies to, for example, the distribution of the riski-
ness of credit projects as discussed in section 2.2.3, pp. 63 et seq. A related point 
is made by SUTTON’s (1990) comment titled ‘explaining everything, explaining 
nothing?’. It is this lack of robustness that led TERBERGER (1994, p. 143) to the 
conclusion that concepts of NIE are even more difficult to test empirically than 
much of traditional neoclassical economics (see section 3.1.2). There are few 
events that agency theory can definitely rule out to occur in a real-world situa-
tion under investigation. Furthermore, the lack of predictive power of these 
models goes hand in hand with the problem that straightforward policy recom-
mendations can rarely be derived. This issue is taken up again in subchapter 5.3. 204   5  Discussion 
Whereas STIGLITZ (2002, p. 486) argues that already small changes in the set of 
assumptions lead to tremendous consequences within the traditional, neoclassi-
cal framework, others would say that these small changes do not go far enough 
and even lead to inconsistencies. FURUBOTN and RICHTER (1997, p. 356) regard 
formal agency theory as a hybrid or mixture of the neoclassical and the ‘true’ 
new institutional position. Although they acknowledge that agency theory offers 
a genuine extension of the neoclassical standard (and thus argue against the view 
that transaction and information costs could be simply integrated into the ortho-
dox approach, as suggested for example by STIGLER 1961), they also point to a 
number of potential problems. These include (FURUBOTN and RICHTER 1997, p. 
458): (a) a set of contradictory assumptions, namely that individuals face (pro-
hibitively high) information costs in some dimensions whereas they possess per-
fect information with regard to all others, (b) the fact that hybrid models assume 
the availability of data (e.g. on production or utility functions) that cannot be 
known to a boundedly rational decision maker acting in a neoinstitutional envi-
ronment, (c) only one mode of decision making (rational choice) is allowed al-
though other modes might be preferable by a boundedly rational individual, and 
although rational choice leads to an infinite regress if decision-making is costly, 
and (d) hybrid models are thus fundamentally misleading because they assume 
data and decision procedures that are effectively beyond the power of real-life 
individuals. 
Any reference to a formal ‘first-best’ world is therefore rejected as leading to a 
‘nirvana fallacy’ (DEMSETZ 1969, p. 1). The efficiency criterion is only framed 
in very loose terms as a “device that separates relatively more desirable alterna-
tives from less desirable ones” (FURUBOTN 1999, p. 193). FURUBOTN adds the 
following (p. 194): 
“It should be clear that efficiency criteria that can never be met by actual people 
faced with the major constraints characterizing a neoinstituional economy are 
essentially irrelevant. Efficiency standards that show inefficiency always in exis-
tence in the real world are not very valuable guides to policy.” 
Consequently, TULLOCK (1999) proposes to abandon the concept of Pareto op-
timality, since in his view it cannot be applied in any useful way.  
Proponents of this more radical branch of NIE clearly break with the neoclassi-
cal tradition and usually also refrain from the more mathematically oriented way 
of analysis. The precise identification of causal relations as possible in mathe-
matically structured models of the economy is relinquished. However, the result-
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jected that the increased ‘vagueness’ also opens the way to undue data mining, 
and definitely reduces the theoretical preconditions to be fulfilled by an empiri-
cal analysis (as for example known from neoclassical production theory). On the 
other hand, it is argued that a verbal argumentation based on plausibility consid-
erations as for example used in Transaction Cost Economics improves the pre-
dictive power of the theory, thereby making this branch of NIE an “empirical 
success story” (O.E. WILLIAMSON 2000, p. 607). Furthermore, it was seen above 
that the clear-cut propositions of neoclassical analysis vanish anyway even if 
only the modifications proposed by formal contract theory are introduced. In 
addition, it is doubtful whether the perceived rigour of traditional economic rea-
soning is indeed an appropriate depiction of the existing world and thus ‘real’, or 
whether it is ‘rhetoric’ in the sense that it is merely a device for persuasion and 
argumentation (see section 3.1.2). 
Currently it seems that broadly two basic positions can be distinguished which 
have in common a critical attitude towards the orthodox neoclassical approach 
but are divided with respect to the question of how far an appropriate modifica-
tion should go. Whereas more mathematically oriented approaches as presented 
in this monograph are deemed a “prematurely formal theory” by proponents of a 
more radical position (O.E. WILLIAMSON 1993, p. 43), the latter, often more ver-
bal and ‘story-based’ way of argumentation is rejected by advocates of formal 
contract theory because it “glosses over all those details that matter” (HELLWIG 
1988, p. 204). 
The approach in this monograph was to follow a more formal way of analysis 
which does not cut all connections to the neoclassical standard. The theoretical 
analysis highlighted the virtues and the deficits of such an approach. However, 
in my opinion, the empirical application also demonstrated that it can be a useful 
guide for the examination of real-world problems in a rigorous, methodologi-
cally consistent, and therefore plausible way. Although it is legitimate to point 
out the weaknesses of this procedure and to call for more far-reaching changes 
in economic theory, I doubt whether the ultimate decision can be made on 
purely empirical grounds. The future landscape of economic theory is therefore 
likely to be characterised by much more heterodoxy than it used to be. 
5.3 Policy  recommendations 
The international experience as summarised in section 1.4.2, pp. 14 et seq., of 
this monograph suggests that the type of policy intervention currently in place in 
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lar programmes in other countries often did not increase the efficiency of their 
operations, access to subsidised funds frequently was very unequal, funds could 
rarely be targeted effectively, capital subsidies implied negative incentives for 
the development of financial intermediaries, and governmental investment pro-
motion often turned out to be prone to politically motivated abuse. For these rea-
sons, economists tend to refuse this type of market intervention. 
The previous theoretical and empirical analysis investigated a number of these 
issues and aimed at scrutinising the role government policy has in addressing 
potential deficiencies of credit markets in general and the Polish rural loan mar-
ket in particular. Although the current debate in the literature is far from being 
settled, it seems to become a widely accepted view that a theory of credit mar-
kets with pervasive agency relations concedes government activity a potential 
role in improving market outcomes. The problem is that, although unfettered 
markets are likely to lead to suboptimal allocation of funds, it is almost impossi-
ble to predict from a theoretical analysis alone which type of government inter-
vention is optimal. A major result of the previous analysis was that any policy 
measure should tackle the causes of undesired market outcomes. Although the-
ory suggests potential causes, their ultimate identification has to be made on 
empirical grounds.  
With regard to credit markets, it was shown that credit rationing does not neces-
sarily imply underinvestment as compared with a first-best solution. However, 
the empirical detection of underinvestment was seen to be not straightforward, 
and was dropped from the research agenda of this study. Furthermore, the dis-
cussion in the previous subchapter leads to doubts whether a purely hypothetical 
comparison with an idealised fist-best world is of any value for practical policy 
advice. 
Policy recommendations therefore must focus on the role of government within 
a world of asymmetric information and opportunism. The dilemma is that gov-
ernments are likely to face the same problems of, say, adverse selection or moral 
hazard as other economic agents do. Frequently it is the case that eliminating 
certain agency problems by government action even creates new ones. An ex-
ample is the granting of public loan guarantees in order to mitigate the problems 
of loan collateralisation. Depending on the precise design of the programme, 
banks’ incentives to properly screen and monitor borrowers might be diluted 
because the government effectively takes over the risk of loan default. The 
agency relation between the bank and the borrower is then simply transformed 
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economists still tend to be sceptical with regard to direct market intervention by 
governments. Even so, the government can and should make use of its power 
that no other economic agent possesses. Altough the government has no advan-
tage of its own in assessing risks and premiums, it should foster the adequate use 
of screening and monitoring procedures, for example by an appropriate regula-
tion and supervision. Furthermore, it can assign property rights in such a way 
that collateral problems are reduced, which in turn enables to overcome existing 
agency relations. 
The theoretical analysis of agricultural household models has shown that credit 
rationing has a number of undesired consequences for the performance of farms. 
In particular, the more severe the credit restriction, the higher are the reductions 
in farm output and hence farm income, and the slower is farm growth (provided 
there are profitable investment opportunities available). Any government should 
therefore be interested in removing binding credit constraints in their farm sec-
tors. 
The empirical analysis of credit rationing in the Polish agricultural sector pro-
vides a host of valuable information for policy advice. It may be useful to again 
summarise the major findings that are relevant in this respect: 
1. 80 percent of surveyed farmers took some type of loan between 1997 and 
1999 (the survey does not include pure subsistence farms). 
2. About 40 percent of borrowers are rationed by rural banks in the sense that 
they would have liked to borrow more at the same interest rate than they ob-
tained. 
3. Credit rationing was shown to be due inter alia to a poor reputation of bor-
rowers and to depend on the number of male and female household members. 
The availability of collateral plays a role in short-term lending, whereas repu-
tation effects are particularly pronounced if all types of loans are considered. 
4. Credit rationing restricts farm productivity to a substantial extent. With re-
gard to working capital loans, farmers’ call for more credit is hence legiti-
mised ex-post. 
5. The existing governmental subsidy scheme does not eliminate credit ration-
ing. On the other hand, there is evidence that it is not the ultimate source of 
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6. With regard to investment loans, funds are frequently diverted to non-
productive uses, particularly if loan sizes are small. However, per unit bor-
rowed, small farms invest more than large farms. 
The results show that the rural credit market provides resources for most farmers 
in the sample. However, credit rationing is a relevant phenomenon. The analysis 
highlights the role of devices to overcome problems of asymmetric information 
(collateral, reputation), which could be a first hint for policy advice. In addition, 
other factors (demographic characteristics) come into play as well. The empiri-
cal investigation also suggests that there are several critical points of current 
government intervention. It is clearly not successful in removing credit ration-
ing, which is no surprise if a lack of collateral or reputation are at the core of the 
problem. With regard to long-term loans, the targeting of credit is rather dubi-
ous. On the other hand, it might be seen as a virtue that lending apparently does 
not discriminate against small farms, since land owned has no significant effect 
on the probability of being credit-rationed. If only short-term borrowers are con-
sidered, there is a weakly significant, negative effect of land owned on the prob-
ability of being rationed. 
Based on the previous considerations, the following policy recommendations 
can be given: 
1. The Polish government should reconsider the objectives of its agricultural 
credit policy. The current policy of subsidising interest rates is not successful 
in eliminating credit rationing. In addition, it is neither well targeted to im-
prove farm productivity nor does it effectively foster investment in farm 
growth and productive assets. The government should therefore consider to 
phase out the current subsidisation scheme, since the dubious benefits are 
unlikely to justify the costs of funding and administering this programme. 
2.  Adequate policy measures should address the problems of lacking collateral 
and poor borrowers’ reputation. It should be checked to what extent govern-
ment policy can improve this. Since mortgaging land is widely practised in 
Poland, there seem to be no decisive bottlenecks in the legal basis for this. 
However, it should be examined how far macroeconomic factors or a wide-
spread policy uncertainty were relevant for the earlier defaults of borrowers.  
3. More attention should be paid to the availability of working capital loans. 
Even so, there appears to be even a kind of saturation on the market for in-
vestment loans. Although farmers are willing to borrow more long-term 
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for the purchase of durable consumption goods. This diversion of govern-
mentally sponsored investment funds should be avoided. 
4. The appropriateness of banking technology and screening and monitoring 
practices should be checked. The econometric analysis provides a number of 
hints for this task. It should be examined what is behind the fact that house-
hold characteristics play a role in the probability of credit rationing. Are 
these characteristics taken into account by the banks’ decision to grant a loan, 
and, if yes, why is this the case? Does this point to some sort of discrimina-
tion? It was shown that transaction costs, and in particular fees, considerably 
mark up the effective interest rate farmers have to pay. Although careful 
screening of borrowers is an important task of banks, it should be looked at 
whether banking practices can be streamlined to reduce these costs. Whereas 
the overall transition of the Polish banking industry has been widely success-
ful, there is evidence that the unfinished restructuring and reconsolidation 
process of the rural banking sector might be partly responsible for still inef-
ficient banking practices. Government policy should support this process. 
Other potential government activities include the establishment of a private 
credit rating agency, financial support to assessing credit worthiness of bor-
rowers, and the general support of market information systems (KOESTER 
2001, p. 314). 
5. The government should take short-term liquidity effects of potential future 
direct payments under the CAP into account. An important side-effect of 
these payments might be that they effectively bridge the working capital 
shortage of farms. As a result, hectare- or livestock-based payments would 
not only provide an incentive to keep land and livestock, but would also di-
rectly lead to an expansion of production on currently credit-rationed farms.
97 
However, permanent payments are unlikely to induce a persistent increase of 
the capital stock of farms. 
Since agency problems on rural loan markets are a fact of life, there are no sim-
ple solutions to overcome credit rationing, and the channelling of funds towards 
the most efficient use is a complicated task. A prudential government policy will 
align its policies with its democratically legitimised objectives and primarily at-
                                           
97  It is less likely that this will lead to significant changes in overall Polish agricultural out-
put, since only a fraction of farmers is constrained on working capital. The limited avail-
ability of land and the difficult economic situation of farms suggest that sectoral output 
changes will be at best moderate (PETRICK et al. 2002, p. 213). 210   5  Discussion 
tempt to address the causes and not the symptoms of any undesired outcome on 
agricultural credit markets. 
5.4  Recommendations for future research 
The aim of this final subchapter is to look at the implications of the previous 
analysis for potential future research activities. Since only a fraction of open 
questions raised in the course of the study could be addressed explicitly within 
this monograph, and because many of the proposed answers might be regarded 
as tentative or unsatisfactory, it seems useful to identify a number of key re-
search areas for the time to come. I restrict the following considerations to the 
narrower range of issues that formed the core of this research. The recommenda-
tions can be grouped as follows: 
1. The analysis has demonstrated that the theoretical understanding of many 
relevant real-world phenomena not explicable in the standard neoclassical 
models has progressed over recent years, but there are still many unresolved 
problems. The theoretical landscape has evolved neither in a uniform nor in a 
necessarily consistent way. This is of course natural and only to be expected 
in a rapidly growing research field. However, it seems particularly desirable 
to develop more robust theoretical models for predicting the implications of 
asymmetric information, or the consequences of dropping other assumptions 
of the neoclassical tradition. One question to be raised is whether the highly 
abstract and mathematically oriented way of analysis can and should be re-
tained. Communication processes with proponents of more verbally oriented 
theoretical approaches such as Transaction Cost Economics should be 
sought. 
2.  This should go hand in hand with a further exploration of the empirical ap-
plicability of NIE concepts in general. Although the consequences of agency 
theoretic models for the empirical analysis of real-world events are increas-
ingly understood, there is still a gap between the abstract and often highly 
simplifying theoretical models and the practical policy problems at hand. 
MATTHEWS (1986, p. 917, as cited in EGGERTSON 1990, pp. 31-32) is still 
right in arguing that  
“[b]ecause economic institutions are complex, they do not lend themselves eas-
ily to quantitative measurement. Even in the respects in which they do, the data 
very often are not routinely collected by national statistical offices. As a result, 
the statistical approach which has become the bread and butter of applied eco-
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The present study has provided an example of how the economic analysis of 
institutions can be undertaken by using econometric modelling techniques. 
However, the approach has still been carried out on a rather general level, for 
example in terms of specifying functional relationships. It seems therefore 
desirable to further strengthen the link between theoretical concepts and rep-
resentative empirical and policy-oriented analysis. 
3. On the other hand, it appears also desirable to make progress in developing 
analytical tools for practical policy advice on markets with pervasive agency 
relations. In particular, I have in mind a clarification whether traditional con-
cepts of welfare theory are still useful devices for policy analysis or how far 
they can and should be replaced by other concepts more capable of reflecting 
the ‘frictions’ of the real world. 
4. With regard to the empirical analysis of rural credit markets, it might be a 
rewarding task to try other methods for empirically detecting credit ration-
ing, as presented in section 3.1.3, pp. 114 et seq., and check their conver-
gence with the results of this study. To have available a suitable toolbox of 
empirical methods will be a crucial prerequisite for potential advances in 
theorising and policy advice as outlined in the previous paragraphs. 
5.  Future work on the Polish case could extend the current research in a number 
of directions. A first could be to investigate other sources of finance in Polish 
agriculture, in particular informal sources or trade credit. These have been 
largely neglected in this study because they are of less quantitative relevance 
as compared to formal credit. However, they may be important for small-
scale and subsistence farms. A second approach could be to carry out a more 
comprehensive  cost-benefit analysis of Polish credit market intervention. 
This would be a challenging task, in particular with regard to a proper meas-
urement of the programme’s benefits. A third issue not investigated in this 
monograph concerns the political aspects of governmental intervention on 
credit markets in Poland. Future research could possibly draw on earlier work 
by WENZELER (1999), who provides an analysis of bank sector restructuring 
in Poland based on political economy considerations. 
6. A final most important task for subsequent research concerns a further in-
depth analysis of the determinants of structural change in the Polish farm 
sector. The current study has failed to provide a comprehensive explanation 
based on credit rationing. In contrast, the empirical analysis demonstrates 
that credit access seems not to be the decisive bottleneck for farm investment 
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change in Poland. A promising starting point for such an investigation will be 
the rural labour market, the current shape of which effectively blocks the 
outflow of agricultural labour force or even forces people into the sector to 
secure a most basic livelihood (DRIES and SWINNEN 2002; PETRICK and 
TYRAN 2003). Structural change and the development of labour and land re-
lations in Polish agriculture are thus of high political interest for the years to 
come. At the same time, rural labour markets are among the least understood 
phenomena of transition (TANGERMANN and SWINNEN 2000, p. 198). 
Overall, there are fundamental research questions yet to be answered in the theo-
retical, empirical, and policy-oriented spheres of this field. Following HANF 
(1997), it is to be hoped that agricultural economists with their rare blend of ex-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On the verge of EU accession, Poland’s agricultural sector is characterised by a 
number of distinct structural weaknesses, which are a major reason for the unsat-
isfactory income situation of rural households. Among these weaknesses are that 
farm productivity is substantially below EU standards, investment has per-
formed much weaker as compared with the overall Polish economy, and struc-
tural change has been very small. It has been suggested that credit access is a 
crucial factor for overcoming these undesired outcomes. Furthermore, the Polish 
government massively intervenes on rural credit markets, in particular by grant-
ing subsidies on working capital and investment loans for agriculture. Against 
this background, the aim of the present research is to discover how far potential 
deficiencies on rural credit markets can be made responsible for the structural 
weaknesses of the Polish farm sector and thereby provide an economic rationale 
for government activity. 
Central to the analysis is the notion of credit rationing. This notion abounds in 
the recent literature on credit market problems, although it is not used in a uni-
form way. In this monograph, credit rationing is understood to indicate a situa-
tion of persistent private excess demand for credit. The subsequent theoretical 
and empirical analysis explores how far this concept can be made fruitful for the 
understanding of the Polish rural credit market and the effects of governmental 
intervention. 
The major findings of the study can be summarised as follows: 
1.  The theoretical investigation of credit markets sets out that credit rationing is 
by definition excluded in the traditional neoclassical market model, whereas 
it is a likely outcome on markets with asymmetric information. However, 
theory does not provide unambiguous propositions regarding the welfare as-
sessment of credit rationing. Since the presence of asymmetric information 
cancels the functioning of the price mechanism, the traditional concepts of 
social efficiency are no longer valid. As a consequence, credit rationing does 
not necessarily imply underinvestment, and it generally does not create a case 
for straightforward government policy. It seems therefore reasonable to ana-
lytically decouple the analysis of credit rationing and under- or overinvest-
ment. The subsequent analysis in this monograph focused on the first of 
these.  
2. The extent to which asymmetric information has harmful effects on invest-
ment outcomes is shown to depend on the availability of counteracting ar-214   Executive  summary 
rangements, such as collateral, joint liability, or reputation of borrowers. The 
way in which governments can improve on these instruments will play a de-
cisive role for successful policy action. Any intervention measures should 
consider the conditions and causes that are responsible for an undesirable 
market outcome, in case that this has been successfully identified. 
3. In the framework of a two-period farm household model, the consequences 
of introducing a binding credit constraint are examined. The market interest 
rate loses its relevance for the household internal allocation of funds and is 
replaced by an endogenous, unobservable shadow interest rate. Compared 
with a first-best world without credit rationing, the household will reduce 
output, which implies a loss of income. An increase in government transfers 
relaxes the liquidity constraint and thus has positive effects on farm output. 
In a multi-period household model with endogenous equity formation, credit 
rationing has the effect that investment cannot immediately attain its optimal 
level. The household thus reduces current consumption in favour of equity 
formation. 
4.  The presence of a perfect capital market allows the convenient separation of 
production or investment decisions on the one hand and consumption deci-
sions on the other. Both farm household models suggest that this cannot be 
maintained under a binding credit constraint. As a consequence, there is no 
objective criterion anymore which allows to assess the (private) efficiency of 
input use or investment activities. Both decision complexes can only be made 
simultaneously with the household’s consumption plan and are thus affected 
by the household’s preferences. Any empirical production or investment 
analysis has to take these interdependencies into account. 
5.  In a reflection on economic methodology, it is argued that econometrics can-
not be the fundamental benchmark for the falsification of theories. The meth-
odological standpoint of critical rationalism should therefore be left behind 
and be replaced by a more pragmatic and instrumentalist position. The em-
pirical results of the present study are primarily based on a regression analy-
sis of cross-sectional survey data, which includes qualitative and quantitative 
indicators of credit rationing. 
6. According to statements of farmers made during the survey, 80 percent of 
farm households took at least one loan in the reporting period 1997-1999. 
Almost half of the borrowers obtained less credit than desired and are hence 
regarded as credit-rationed. Central determinants of credit rationing are the 
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istics. Over all loan types, respondents with a good credit history have a 30 
percentage points lower probability of being rationed than borrowers who re-
scheduled a loan in the past. In addition, more adult males in the household 
decrease the probability of being credit-rationed, while more females in-
crease it. If only short-term borrowing is considered, collateral availability is 
an additional key factor of credit rationing. 
7. The econometric analysis of output supply supports the earlier finding that 
more than 40 percent of borrowers experienced pronounced credit rationing 
by rural banks. These farms display a marginal willingness to pay for credit 
of on average 209 percent net of principal. The willingness to pay is signifi-
cantly different from individual interest rates for credit that account for loan 
specific transaction costs. These individual interest rates are 13 percent per 
annum on average. Transaction costs, however, do not ex-post rationalise a 
withdrawal of loan applications and cannot be regarded as the ultimate cause 
of perceived credit rationing. In the group of credit-rationed farms, household 
characteristics are proven to have a significant effect on output supply. This 
is evidence for a violation of separability between production and consump-
tion decisions and thus lends empirical support to the existence of a market 
imperfection. A counterfactual model estimated on all short-term credit re-
cipients demonstrates that the willingness to pay is substantially higher for 
rationed than for non-rationed farm households. 
8. An ex-post evaluation of investment activities suggests that non-productive 
investment rank high on the priority list of interviewed farmers. Residential 
buildings and automobile purchases are the two items with the largest share 
of farm-individual investment expenses in the reporting period. The econo-
metric investment analysis demonstrates that credit access is a significant fac-
tor of investment decisions of credit-rationed farmers. This supports the theo-
retical prediction of a financial constraint model of investment behaviour and 
is consistent with the qualitative self-classification of respondents. Further-
more, the analysis substantiates the evidence that subsidised credit funds are 
partly diverted to non-productive purposes. In various specifications of the 
credit-investment relationship, the marginal effect of credit on productive in-
vestment is clearly smaller than one. Based on a cubic Tobit estimate of the 
investment function, the mean of the farm-individual marginal effects is at 
.53 on average. Every second borrower invests less in productive assets than 
he borrows. Only 1.6 percent of the selected respondents with positive in-
vestment display farm-individual credit effects larger than one. Over the ob-
served range of credit volumes, the marginal effect increases with an increas-216   Executive  summary 
ing credit volume. However, the results do not support the view that invest-
ment is positively related to farm size. 
In summary, the analysis provides evidence that credit rationing is a relevant 
phenomenon in rural Poland. A significant fraction of borrowers could substan-
tially increase their productivity if access to working capital were improved. 
However, the examination of long-term loans revealed that farmers often prefer 
the investment in non-productive assets to growth investment. Credit rationing 
hence is unlikely to be the ultimate constraint for modernisation and structural 
change in the Polish farm sector.  
Government intervention in its current form has clearly failed to eliminate credit 
rationing, and the targeting of state sponsored funds turns out to be rather dubi-
ous. An alternative government policy should aim to improve the general credit-
worthiness of prospective borrowers and address the causes of loan default in 
the past that led to a poor reputation of certain borrowers. Policy action that im-
proves the access to working capital should be given priority. One of the poten-
tial side-effects of the introduction of direct payments under the CAP could be 
to relax exactly this constraint on working capital for currently credit-rationed 
farm households. 
Beyond a further integration of theory and empirics in the area of New Institu-
tional Economics, an important focus of future research should be the develop-
ment of analytical tools for practical policy advice on markets with pervasive 
agency relations. With regard to Poland, political aspects of governmental credit 
market intervention as well as a more comprehensive analysis of the determi-
nants of structural change in the farming sector appear to be promising research 
fields.    Zusammenfassung  217   
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Im Vorfeld des angestrebten Beitritts Polens zur Europäischen Union ist der Ag-
rarsektor des Landes von erheblichen Strukturproblemen geprägt. Diese stellen 
einen Hauptgrund für die unbefriedigende Einkommenssituation ländlicher 
Haushalte dar. Zu den Strukturproblemen in der Landwirtschaft gehören die im 
Vergleich zur EU niedrige Produktivität der Betriebe, die gegenüber der gesam-
ten polnischen Volkswirtschaft überaus schleppend verlaufende Investitionstä-
tigkeit, sowie der nur sehr langsam sich vollziehende Strukturwandel. Häufig 
wird der Zugang zu Krediten als ein Schlüsselproblem für die Überwindung die-
ses unerwünschten Zustandes angeführt. Die polnische Regierung interveniert 
auf ländlichen Kreditmärkten massiv durch die Bereitstellung von Subventionen 
für Betriebsmittel- und Investititonskredite im Agrarbereich. Vor diesem Hinter-
grund untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit, inwieweit ein mögliches Versagen der 
ländlichen Kreditmärkte für die genannten Strukturprobleme verantwortlich ge-
macht werden kann und ob dieses Versagen daher eine Rechtfertigung für die 
Staatseingriffe bietet. 
Der Begriff der Kreditrationierung kennzeichnet das zentrale Konzept der Ana-
lyse. Dieser Begriff findet sich häufig in der jüngeren Literatur, obwohl er nicht 
einheitlich verwendet wird. In dieser Arbeit bezeichnet Kreditrationierung eine 
Situation andauernder privater Überschussnachfrage nach Kredit. Die nachfol-
gende theoretische und empirische Analyse untersucht, inwieweit dieses Kon-
zept für ein Verständnis des ländlichen Kreditmarktes und der Effekte von 
Staatseingriffen in Polen fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. 
Die wesentlichen Ergebnisse der Arbeit können wie folgt zusammengefasst 
werden: 
1.  Die theoretische Untersuchung von Kreditmärkten legt dar, dass Kreditratio-
nierung im traditionellen, neoklassischen Marktmodell per Definition ausge-
schlossen ist, während Rationierungsergebnisse auf Märkten mit asymmetri-
scher Informationsverteilung wahrscheinlich sind. Die wohlfahrtsökonomi-
sche Analyse der Kreditrationierung liefert jedoch keine eindeutige Bewer-
tung. Da das Vorhandensein von asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung die 
Funktionsweise des Preismechanismus außer Kraft setzt, sind herkömmliche 
Konzepte der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effizienz nicht länger gültig. Eine Kon-
sequenz hiervon ist, dass Kreditrationierung nicht notwendigerweise mit Un-
terinvestition einhergeht und keine eindeutigen Politikmaßnahmen aus dem 
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sinnvoll, die Analyse von Kreditrationierung und die Analyse von Unter- 
bzw. Überinvestition zu trennen. Die folgende Untersuchung konzentriert 
sich auf Kreditrationierung. 
2.  Es wird gezeigt, dass das Ausmaß, mit dem asymmetrische Informationsver-
teilung schädliche Effekte auf das Investitionsergebnis ausübt, von der Ver-
fügbarkeit entgegenwirkender Arrangements abhängt, wie zum Beispiel Si-
cherheiten, gemeinschaftlicher Haftung oder der Reputation des Schuldners. 
Staatliches Handeln sollte die Wirksamkeit solcher Arrangements verbessern 
helfen. Mögliche Interventionsmaßnahmen sollten daher die Bedingungen 
und Ursachen in Betracht ziehen, die für ein unerwünschtes Marktergebnis 
verantwortlich sind, sofern letzteres erfolgreich aufgespürt werden konnte. 
3. Im Rahmen eines zweiperiodischen Betriebs-Haushalts-Modells werden die 
Auswirkungen der Einführung einer bindenden Kreditobergrenze untersucht. 
Der Marktzinssatz verliert unter diesen Umständen seine Bedeutung für die 
haushalts-interne Allokation von Finanzmitteln und wird durch einen endo-
genen, unbeobachteten Schattenzinssatz ersetzt. Verglichen mit einer first-
best Allokation ohne Kreditrationierung wird das Produktionsvolumen des 
Haushalts reduziert, was einen Einkommensrückgang nach sich zieht. Erhöh-
te staatliche Transferzahlungen lockern die Liquiditätsobergrenze und üben 
daher einen positiven Effekt auf das Produktionsvolumen aus. In einem 
mehrperiodischen Haushaltsmodell mit endogener Eigenkapitalbildung be-
wirkt Kreditrationierung, dass das Investitionsvolumen nicht unmittelbar sei-
nen optimalen Wert annehmen kann. Der laufende Konsum wird daher zu-
gunsten von Eigenkapitalbildung verringert. 
4. Geht man von einem vollkommenen Kapitalmarkt aus, so erlaubt dieser die 
analytisch bequeme Trennung von Produktions- und Investitionsentschei-
dungen auf der einen Seite und Konsumentscheidungen auf der anderen Sei-
te. Beide Betriebs-Haushalts-Modelle zeigen, dass diese Separierung bei ei-
ner bindenden Kreditobergrenze nicht aufrechterhalten werden kann. Als 
Konsequenz verschwindet jedoch das objektive Kriterium, anhand dessen die 
(private) Effizienz von Faktorallokations- oder Investitionsentscheidungen 
beurteilt werden könnte. Über beide Entscheidungskomplexe kann nur simul-
tan mit dem Konsumplan des Haushalts entschieden werden, so dass die Prä-
ferenzen des Haushalts in die Planung eingehen. Eine empirische Analyse 
von Produktions- oder Investitionsentscheidungen sollte diese Abhängigkei-
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5. Im Rahmen einiger Überlegungen zur Forschungsmethodolgie in den Wirt-
schaftswissenschaften wird argumentiert, dass ökonometrische Analysen 
nicht das ausschlaggebende Entscheidungskriterium für die Falsifizierung 
von Theorien liefern können. Der methodologische Standpunkt des kritischen 
Rationalismus sollte daher durch eine mehr pragmatische und instrumentalis-
tische Sichtweise ersetzt werden. Die empirischen Ergebnisse der vorliegen-
den Arbeit stützen sich vorwiegend auf eine Regressionsanalyse von Befra-
gungsdaten aus einer Querschnittserhebung. Die Analyse umfasst sowohl 
qualitative als auch quantitative Indikatoren der Kreditrationierung. 
6.  Entsprechend den Angaben von Betriebsleitern aus der Befragung nahmen in 
der Periode 1997-1999 80 Prozent der Haushalte mindestens ein Darlehen 
auf. Etwa die Hälfte der Kreditnehmer erhielt weniger Kredit als gewünscht, 
diese Teilgruppe wird daher als kreditrationiert angesehen. Zentrale Bestim-
mungsgründe der Kreditrationierung sind die Reputation der Kreditnachfra-
ger sowie demografische Haushaltscharakteristika. Betrachtet man alle in der 
Stichprobe vorkommenden Kreditfristigkeiten zusammen, so gilt für Nach-
frager mit einer vorteilhaften Kreditgeschichte eine 30 Prozentpunkte niedri-
gere Wahrscheinlichkeit, kreditrationiert zu sein als für solche Nachfrager, 
die in der Vergangenheit eine Kreditrückzahlung verschieben mussten. Dar-
über hinaus führen mehr männliche Erwachsene im Haushalt zu einer Ver-
ringerung der Wahrscheinlichkeit, kreditrationiert zu sein, während eine hö-
here Zahl weiblicher Erwachsene sie erhöht. Werden nur kurzfristige Kredite 
betrachtet, beeinflusst auch die Verfügbarkeit von Sicherheiten das Auftreten 
von Kreditrationierung. 
7. Die ökonometrische Analyse des Produktangebots stützt das vorgenannte 
Ergebnis, nach dem mehr als 40 Prozent der Kreditnehmer als kreditrationiert 
gelten müssen. Diese Betriebe weisen eine marginale Zahlungsbereitschaft 
für Kredit von im Durchschnitt 209 Prozent auf, wobei die Rückzahlung des 
Kreditbetrages bereits subtrahiert wurde. Die ermittelten Zahlungsbereit-
schaften unterscheiden sich signifikant von individuellen Kreditzinssätzen, 
die unter Einbeziehung von kreditspezifischen Transaktionskosten berechnet 
wurden. Diese Kreditzinssätze belaufen sich im Durchschnitt auf 13 Prozent 
pro Jahr. Transaktionskosten liefern jedoch ex-post keine Begründung für die 
Zurückziehung des Kreditantrags und können daher nicht als grundsätzliche 
Ursache für die wahrgenommene Kreditrationierung angesehen werden. Es 
wird gezeigt, dass Haushaltscharakteristika in der Gruppe der kreditrationier-
ten Betriebe einen signifikanten Einfluss auf das Produktionsergebnis haben. 
Dies belegt die Verletzung der Separabilitätsannahme hinsichtlich Produkti-220   Zusammenfassung 
ons- und Konsumentscheidungen und spricht daher zusätzlich für die Exis-
tenz von Marktunvollkommenheiten. Ein auf Basis aller Kreditnehmer ge-
schätztes Alternativmodell zeigt, dass Zahlungsbereitschaften für rationierte 
Betriebe wesentlich höher sind als für nicht-rationierte Kreditnehmer. 
8. Eine ex-post Evaluierung der Investitionsaktivitäten ergab, dass nicht-
produktive Investitionen für die befragten Betriebsleiter einen hohen Stel-
lenwert haben. Investitionen in Wohngebäude und Automobilkäufe sind die 
zwei Aktivitäten mit dem höchsten Anteil betriebsindividueller Investitions-
ausgaben im untersuchten Zeitraum. Die ökonometrische Investitionsanalyse 
zeigt, dass der Zugang zu Krediten im Entscheidungsprozess kreditrationier-
ter Landwirte eine signifikante Rolle spielt. Dieses Ergebnis stützt die theore-
tische Vorhersage des Investitionsmodells bei beschränktem Kreditzugang 
und stimmt mit der qualitativen Selbstklassifizierung der Befragten überein. 
Die Analyse belegt außerdem, dass subventionierte Kreditmittel teilweise für 
nicht-produktive Zwecke verwendet werden. In verschiedenen Spezifikatio-
nen der Kredit-Investitions-Beziehung ist der marginale Effekt der Kredit-
ausweitung deutlich kleiner als eins. Basierend auf einer kubischen Tobit-
Schätzung der Investitionsfunktion wurde ein betriebsindividueller margina-
ler Effekt von durchschnittlich 0,53 ermittelt. Jeder zweite Kreditnehmer in-
vestiert weniger in produktive Anlagen als er Kredit erhalten hat. Nur bei 1,6 
Prozent der ausgewählten Befragten mit positivem Investitionsvolumen liegt 
der Krediteffekte über eins. Über die Spannweite der beobachteten Kreditvo-
lumina steigt der marginale Effekt mit zunehmendem Kreditvolumen an. Die 
Ergebnisse stehen allerdings im Widerspruch zu der Sichtweise, dass das In-
vestitionsvolumen positiv mit der Betriebsgröße korreliert. 
Insgesamt belegt die Analyse, dass Kreditrationierung im ländlichen Polen ein 
relevantes Phänomen darstellt. Ein maßgeblicher Teil der Kreditnehmer könnte 
seine Produktivität deutlich erhöhen, wenn der Zugang zu Krediten erleichtert 
würde. Die Untersuchung von langfristigen Krediten ergab allerdings, dass Be-
triebsleiter nicht-produktive Investitionen oftmals gegenüber Wachstumsinvesti-
tionen bevorzugen. Kreditrationierung ist daher vermutlich nicht das entschei-
dende Hemmnis für Modernisierung und Strukturwandel im polnischen Agrar-
sektor. 
Der gegenwärtigen Subventionspolitik der Regierung ist es nicht gelungen, Kre-
ditrationierung zu beseitigen. Gleichzeitig erscheint die Zielorientierung der 
Zuweisung von staatlich verbilligten Mitteln höchst fragwürdig. Eine alternative 
Politik sollte sich um die Verbesserung der allgemeinen Kreditwürdigkeit poten-   Zusammenfassung  221   
zieller Nachfrager bemühen sowie die Ursachen bekämpfen, die in der Vergan-
genheit zu Kreditausfällen und damit zu einer schlechten Reputation bestimmter 
Kreditnehmer geführt haben. Maßnahmen, die den Zugang zu Betriebsmittel-
krediten verbessern, sollten bevorzugt umgesetzt werden. Einer der möglichen 
Nebeneffekte der Einführung von Direktzahlungen unter einer Gemeinsamen 
Agrarpolitik der EU könnte die Lockerung der Liquiditätsobergrenze für kredit-
rationierte Betriebe sein. 
Im Rahmen einer weiteren Integration von Theorie und Empirie im Bereich der 
Neuen Institutionenökonomik sollte die Entwicklung von Analyseinstrumenten 
für Märkte mit Anreiz- und Überwachungsproblemen einen Fokus künftiger 
Forschungstätigkeit darstellen. Außerdem besteht weiterer Forschungsbedarf im 
Hinblick auf die politischen Aspekte der staatlichen Kreditmarktintervention in 
Polen sowie die Bestimmungsgründe von Strukturwandel im polnischen Land-
wirtschaftssektor. 222   References 
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